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\.I M IGRATION AN D INEQUALITY 
When interviewed in their urban destinations, most rural-urban migrants indicate that their 
standard of living has improved as a result of thei r move to town (Population Information 
Program 1983:M-257)', It is, at the same time. well -known that some categories of rural residents 
are more likely to become involved in rural -urban migration than others (see for example 
Simrnons etal . 1977:27). Migration is selective in terrnsof age, gender, and income, among other 
things. from their communities of origin. Migrants tend to be young. often male, adu lts. The 
poorest people in rural communities, furthermore , are often not represented in migrant streams. 
Taken separately, these two empirical generalisations are unremarkable, and have assumed the 
status of common sense in the migration li terature. When read in combination, however, a 
proposition about the possible effects of migration on inequali ty emerges, which, to my 
knowledge, has not been conside red in any detai l in the migration literature before. and which I 
intend pursuing in this thesis. This proposition is as fo llows: Ifmigration is selec ti ve, and if rura l-
urban migration is a means for improving the welfa re of individuals. it means that some people 
are excluded from the immediate welfare-enhancing effects of rural-urban migration. Through a 
positive feedback process, the initial social inequality that is responsible for the inability of some 
to migrate will cause further inequality, this time between migrants and non-migrants. 
It is not on ly rural-urban migration that has this potential. Other kinds of migration. sllch as urban-
urban migration can have the same results. Consider for example a declining industrial area such 
as Newcastle in KwaZulu-Natal. where many people were retrenched over the last decade or so 
(Todes 1998). If, for one reason or another. some people find it impossible to move away to look 
for another job when they are retrenched, those people are at a disadvantage compared to others 
I I do not consider fo rced migrations in the fonl1 of refugee movements and s lavery in thi s 
thesis. These are obviously cases where migrants are unlikely to benefit. at least over the short 
tenn, from their movement. 
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who can do so. 
The recognition that migration can have these results does not rest easily with the basic neo-
classical model of migration. This model sees migration as a means of removing imbalances in 
income and employment opportunities between regions, as well as migrants and non-migrants, and 
ultimately as a mechanism to restore equilibrium. For neo-c1assical economists, therefore, 
migration reduces income inequalities, rather than increasing them, as long as there are is no 
undue interference by the state in the operation of the market economy. The assumption that 
migration (as part of the operation of the free market) will necessarily remove the inequalities 
between regions has been criticized a long time ago. One of the first, and up to now best-known, 
critics of this assumption has been the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal (1957:27). Not much 
attention has been given to the related criticism that migration can increase inequality between 
migrants and non-migrants, however (with the exception of the work ofMichael Lipton (l980J 
and his co-workers [Connell et al. I 977J, and Oded Stark 1986, 1988). 
This thesis intends investigating the possibility that migration might do just that. It consequently 
examines the theoretical and empirical grounds for the assertion that migration can increase the 
inequalities between migrants and non·migrants. This is my main objective. In addition I shall 
study two secondary issues, all related to the critique of neo-classical theory. The first of these 
relates to how migration can reinforce inequality between different classes of migrants (instead 
of migrants and non·migrants). This can occur when the migration of some rural residents is better 
prepared, and occurs with the help of better-resourced networks than in the case of others. As 
a result the chances that the migration will lead to a successful outcome, and that the migrant will 
benefit, are higher than for the worse-off migrant. Examples of this are the different experiences 
of push and pull migrants, as well as male and female migrants. I also intend to show that selective 
immobility can contribute to inequality between rural and urban areas. If the poorest are under 
some circumstances likely to be immobilised in the rural areas, and the better-off succeed in 
moving out, as I contend, if follows that regional inequality between urban and rural areas will be 
worsened. 
After declining from the end of World War 11 until the late 1970's, social inequality has been 
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increasing. both in the West and in less developed countries, as we ll as between rich and poor 
cOllntries (Bhalla and Lapeyre 1999: 18-20). Closer to home, South Africa has been, and sti ll is, 
characte ri sed by one of the highest rates of inequality in the wortd. Accord ing to Klasen 
(1997:60), only Brazil had a higher rate of inequality in 1993. A signilicant amount of th is 
inequality can be attributed to inequality between rural and urban areas. It is safe to say that the 
high rate of social inequality produced by the developmental path currently pursued by most 
count ries of the world is one of the most imponant issues that need to he addressed within the 
tie ld of development theory. It is within this context that this thesis wants to make a contribution. 
The increasing global inequality has been connected to an ensemble of fac tors, such as the rise of 
flexible production (Harrison 1994, see especially chapter9) and globalization (see Hoogveit 1997 
and Sassen 1994 for two contrasting conceptions of globalization). My focus will not be on 
global ization or any other macro process, however. but on the role of migration in inequality. In 
th is respect it is important to stress that migration can only. through a positive feedback 
mechanism, amplify already existing inequality, and cannot create it de novo. Migration is 
therefore not the initiator of inequali ty. The primary causes of inequality have to do with the 
growth path followed by a particular society, and macro-processes such as globalization. Studying 
the contribut ion of migration to inequal ity is nonetheless important, r believe, particularly because 
it has been neglected. 
1.2 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
Most of this thesis (chapters 2 to 5) is concerned wi th an exploration and evaluation of the 
literature on migration in, part icularly. poor countries. My emphas is will be on constructing a 
model of the inequality-producing effect of migration that 1) isolates the main factors that produce 
inequality and 2) specifies a further set of variables that will affect the intensity to which these 
factors manifest themselves and that will thus affect the extent of inequal ity that will be produced 
in a particular case. What I am trying to identi fy therefore are the main causall inksas well as what 
one can call , for want ofa better word, regulators, that affect the extent to which the main causal 
links manifest themselves. 
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The model is fleshed out in more detail in chapter 8. Here I will just give a few pointers so that 
the reader can get an idea of what the thesis is about. The main factor responsible for the 
selectivity of migration is its costs. Poor people cannot afford to invest in migration and are thus 
excluded from participation in it. This is an important causal link. in the model. The costs of 
migration vary from place to place and over time, however, which will affect the intensity of the 
selectivity of migration, and thus the extent to which it can produce inequality. The variables 
influencing the costs of migration. such as unemployment and the distance of the migratory move 
are examples ofregulators, as they affect the extent to which the causal link will be operative in 
a particular case. 
The costs of migration can also be reduced by the subsidy provided by migrant networks. The 
impact of migrant networks on the costs of migration, which is in turn influenced by regulators 
such as network resources and network dynamics, is another important causal link behind the 
selectivity of migration. The benefits provided by migration to the migrant, which is the last causal 
link, are affected by regulators such as the type of migration, gender and the sequencing of 
migration. 
My distinction between main causal links on the one hand and regulators affecting the intensity 
to which these appear on the other, was inspired partly by the realist conception of causality 
(Bhaskar 1979:110, 127-128, Outhwaite 1987:22). Arguing against a Humean conception of 
causality that identifies scientific laws in tenns of the conjunction of observable phenomena, 
Bhaskar claims that causal mechanisms may not. in open systems, produce observable effects, 
even though they are real. This is because there are numerous other causal effects that may cancel 
out the effect of the first one. This is based on Bhaskar's distinction between the realms of the real 
(causal mechanisms reside here), the actual (events in the world), and the empirical (experience 
of the world), with no guarantee that what transpires on the higher level of the real wi ll filter 
through to the lower levels. In tenns of this conception I am trying to isolate a causal mechani sm 
to explain social inequality, which may not produce observable effects under all circumstances 
because it is cancelled out by countervailing tendencies. 
I discuss these issues in the following order. Chapter two is devoted to a review of theories of 
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migration. I spec ifically focus on the extent to which these theories illuminate, i f at a iL the 
question of the effects of migration on the inequalities between migrants and non-migrant s. I come 
lO the conclus ion that the phenomenon of the se lectivity of migrat ion is an important determinant 
of the amount of inequality la be expected. This issue . as well as how it develops over time. is the 
focus of the third chapter. In that chapter r discuss, inte r alia, the different kinds of selectivity, 
such as income and gender selectivity. l give special attention to the theory of DougJas Massey 
and his co-workers with regard to the deve lopment of selectivity. Two factors are particularly 
important in conditioning the unfolding of selectivity over time, viz. the costs of migrat ion and 
the role of networks in subsid ising these costs. This is why chapter four is devoted to a discussion 
of the role of networks in migration. I look at, among other things, the structure and functi oning 
of networks, as well as network dynamics. One of the conclusions that I arrive at is that, contra 
Massey et ai., networks can only reduce the selectivity of migration to a limited extent . The 
participation of the poorest in migration, in particular, wil l continut: to be limitt:d because o[the 
tendency of networks to exclude them. 
My model of the inequality-inducing effect of migration has two dimensions. The one revolves 
around the issue of the selectivity of migration and how it develops over time. This aspect is 
discussed in chapters three and four. In chapter fi ve I examine the second dimension of this 
theory, which relates to the assumption that participation in migration is advantageous for -the 
migrant. This is a generalization that emerges from the literature on Third World migrat ion, but 
as such, it hides a tremendous amount of empirical variation. In that chapter I try to isolate a 
number of factors that may make migration more or less advantageous for the migrant , and in this 
way make the theory more attentive to regional and cultural variation. 
Chapters six and seven are devoted to a case study of migration from a rural South African 
community, called Nkosini. The case study is largely employed for the purposes of illustration of 
the model , and is not the main focus of my thesis. The people who live in that community were 
labour tenants on fanns in the Southeastern Transvaal before they moved there, and became 
involved in circular migration to distant urban destinations before the move to Nkosini. In order 
to simplify my analysis of their migration, I distinguish between their resident ial moves from fann 
to fann during the labour tenancy period, as well as their move to Nkosini, on the one hand, and 
6 
the development of migrant labour to distant destinations on the other. The first part is discussed 
in chapter six, in the context of a review of their settlement history over the last few centuries. 
Chapter seven is devoted to an examination of the rise of migrant labour to urban destinations. , 
My focus in that chapter is largely on changes in the selectivity of migration and in this respect 
it is an attempt to establish what lessons can be leamed for that model from a confrontation with 
empirical reality. 
I also use the ideas developed in the thesis to interpret the course of migration. and its 
implications, within that community. In the process, I try to show that concepts such as the costs 
of migration and network dynamics can enrich our understanding of the onset of migration as well 
as its implications for the people concerned, and that it should receive much more prominence in 
our conceptualisation of migration. Overall, my intention is to improve our understanding of both 
the model and the case study in the context of a confrontation between the two. 
The last chapter, chapter eight, concludes the discussion by situating it within the broader context 
of social development. In particular I try to point out why a discussion of migration and its 
inequality enhancing effect matters in the' present context. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DOES MIGRATION EQUILIBRATE LABOUR MARKETS OR NOT?: A 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON MIGRATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Oneofthe aims of thi s thesis is to criticise the assumption of the neo-class ical model of migrat ion 
that migration acts as an equilibrat ing force in labour markets. My conten tion is that migration 
often tends to worsen, rather than improve, inequalities between regions, classes of migrants. and 
migrants and non-migrants. In this chapter r provide a survey of theories of migration, starting 
with the basic neo-c lassica l theory of migration and then continuing with a discuss ion of further 
deve lopments within thi s trad ition. In addition r d iscuss some of the criti cisms that have been 
levelledat this tradition from a Marxist and dependency framework. I consider, finally, the debate 
around the impact of remittances on inequality in the sending region, which serves as a point of 
departure for the model that I am trying to deve lop. 
2.2 MIGRATION AS AN EQUALITY ENHANCING PROCESS 
2.2.1 THE BASIC NEO-CLASS ICAL MODEL OF MIGRATION 
In its s implest form , the model of migration that can be derived from neo-c1assical economic 
theory sees migration as flowing from the wage d ifferences between two areas (see for example 
Secker et a l. 1994:89). These two areas are typica lly (but not necessarily) an urban and a rural 
area. In terms of this model, wages are determined by the demand for and the supply of labour 
in both the rural and urban areas. Initially there is an oversupply oflabour in the rural, agricultura l 
sector and an undersupply o fl abour in the urban. industrial sector. This is because the ag ricultural 
sector is stagnant. due to a sho rtage of capital and the use of trad itional production techniques. 
The urban industrial sector. by contrast, is supposed to be the most dynam ic part of the economy 
with a high demand for labour. As a result of this imbalance between the two sectors the average 
8 
wages paid will be lower in the rural sector than in the urban sector. The difference in average 
wages provides. however, an incentive for labourers to migrate from the rural to the urban 
sectors. 
Due to this movement the imbalance between the rural and urban areas will be corrected. When 
people migrate, the supply oflabour in the fonner decreases and the supply of labour in the latter 
increases. This continues until the under- and oversupply aflabouc between the two sectors have 
been corrected. Because the imbalance in the labour supply between the regions has been 
corrected, the wages being offered in each sector also equalise: rural wages increase and urban 
wages decrease until the difference in the average wage level has been smoothed out (Beeker et 
al. 1994: 114). This is in turn the signal fortheprocess of rural-urban migration to stop. Migration 
. is therefore vital to removing income inequalities between urban and rural areas according to this 
model (Lipton 1980: I; Becker et al. 1994:89). 
It is clear that in this model migration fulfils an important equilibrating function. If there is an 
imbalance between the rural and urban sectors, with more unemployment and lower wages in the 
rural areas than in the urban areas, migration will solve the problem, The same is supposed to 
happen where imbalances exist between urban areas as a result of industrial restructuring (Gabriel 
et al. 1993). In South Africa, as in the rest of the world, the forces of globalization have forced 
many industries to restructure in order to lower costs and remain competitive. This has often led 
to large scale retrenchments in these industries. An example of this is the South African steel 
industry where production in the older plants of the major steel producer (lSCOR) was scaled 
down after a new plant with an export focus was opened in Saldanha. This had a considerable 
impact on the economies of places such as Vereeniging and Newcastle. According to neo-
classical theory. the unemployment created in the declining regions can be absorbed elsewhere if 
there are also expanding regions. 
Migration plays the role in neo-c1assical theory of removing the surplus workers in the former 
regions and relocating them to the latter (Gabriel et al. 1993). Eventually migration is also 
supposed to equalise wage rates between the two regions due to its effect of removing surp lus 
workers and rebalancing the demand for and supply oflabour between regions. The neo-classical 
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model assumes that labour. like the other factors of product ion such as capita l, is completely 
mobi le. The only reasons why labour may not be mobi le. according to neo-classica l theori sts, is 
state intervent ion in the operation of the free marke t. or rel uctance on the part o f rural dwe llers 
to leave their areas of origin. due to thei r emotional attachment to the place and its people. Neo-
c lass ical theorists do not have any conception that the mobi li ty of labour may be restricted as a 
result of fac to rs that are inherent to the migration process, and that the equ ilibrating function of 
migrat ion may therefore be very limited. 
What we have presented above is the simplest form of the neo-c1ass ical model of migration. It is 
possible to design more complex models using a neo-classical framework. S eeker et al. 
(1994: 182-186), for example, have fonnulated a neo-c1assical model with three sectors (an urban 
modernlfonnal, urban trad itional/infonnal and a rura l sector) rather thanjust the two mentioned 
above. Since their model is in many respec ts similar to that of the Harri s-Todaro model that we 
are going lO discuss presently, we shall not give it any further attention here. 
2.2.2 TH E LEWIS-FEI-RANIS MODEL OF TH E DUAL ECONOMY 
In the neo-class ical model outl ined above, there is, init ially, an oversupply ofl abour in the ru ral 
sector. This oversupply is not unlimited, however, with the result that migration can soon dispose 
o f it. Consequently, if labourers migrate from the rura l sector. wages will ri se there as labour 
becomes increasing ly scarce. Accord ing to Arthur Lewis ( 195 8:400-40 I ). the fo under of the 
famous dual economy model of economic deve lopment, th is is not a realistic assumption in the 
case of many of the unde rdeve loped countries of the world. In these countries, labour suppl ies are 
in fac t unlimited, and labourers can be ex tracted for a long time from the rural sector before 
labour becomes scarce. He fu rthennore says that because nco-classical economic theory does not 
deal with this scenario. he prefers to place his own writings in the class ical economics tradition 
o f Ricardo. Malthus and Mane 
His theory was later extended by John Fei and Gustav Ranis ( 1964), w ith the result that dual 
economy theory became known as the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model. In tenns of th is model, labour 
supply is unlimited if an unde rdeveloped count ry has a large popul ation relati ve lO the amounts 
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of capital and natural resources available (Lewis 1958:402). The most probable outcome of these 
circumstances is a dual economy where the urban and rural sectors each function according to a 
different set of rules. Most of the population live in the rural areas where there is a large amount 
of disguised unemployment. The existence of so much disguised unemployment has the effect that 
labourers can easi ly be extracted from the agricultural sector without any loss of production. 
Another element of Lewis's diagnosis of this economy relates to the fact that, because almost 
everybody in this country lives from hand to mouth, the savings rate is low. As a result, capital 
is very scarce. The bit of capital that there is, is concentrated in the urban areas and invested in 
modem industries. As a result, there are two sectors in the economies of most underdeveloped 
countries: a large and stagnant subsistence rural sector and a smal l modem, urban industrial sector 
(Fei and Ranis 1964:3). 
In this situation wage rates are not detennined by demand and supply. In the agricultural sector 
it is rather detennined by customary arrangements and is set at subsistence level. In the modem 
sector wages arejust slightly higher - according to Lewis (1958:41 0) there is typically a difference 
of about 30% in the wage rates of the two sectors. This premium is what is necessary to entice 
rural workers to leave their homes and relocate to the city. The reluctance of workers to leave the 
rural areas is due to "strong traditional attachments to soil and family" (Fei and Ranis 1964:40). 
Because the wage in the modem sector depends on the wage -in the agricultural sector, Lewis 
(1958:410) says that capitalists have an interest in making sure that the agricultural sector does 
not develop. This is because such development will cause the wages in the agricultural sector and 
thus ultimately the modern sector to ri se. In a remarkable section, Lewis (1958 :409-410) 
anticipates much of underdevelopment theory by remarking that this can be of great political 
importance in a poor country. Capitalists often use their political influence to make sure that the 
subsistence sector does not receive any development aid from the government, or they support 
policies to actively underdevelop the subsistence sector. As a result "the record of every imperial 
power in Africa in modem times is one of impoverishing the subsistence economy. either by taking 
away the people's land, or by demanding forced labour in the capitalist sector, or by imposing 
taxes to drive people to work for capitalist employers." Given this dimension to Lewis's work, it 
is indeed ironic that dualist analyses have later been subjected to so much criticism from a radical 
11 
perspective (eg. Arrighi 1970) fo r fail ing to see the explo itat ive relat ionsh ip between the capitalist 
and the subsistence sec tors. 
Having said this. let us return to the main thrust of the Lewis-Fe i-Rani s mode l. I have said above 
that it is possible to attract labour to the capitalist sector from the subsistence sec tor by paying 
wagesjust a bit higher than subsistence levels. (According to this model. labourers in the capi talist 
sector wi ll not be paid at the level of the marg inal producti vity of labour, which is the wage level 
that neo-classical theory predicts, but at a lower leve l. ) T he very low wages that are consequently 
paid in the capitalist sec tor makes it possible for the capita lists to generate very high levels of 
profits. If these profits are reinvested , the capi talist sector will grow. As more capital is 
accumulated in this way. more labourers can be reallocated from the subsistence sector, leading 
to higher profi ts, even more capital accumulation, and so on. 
In this way a virtuous circle of economic growth is created. Because the labourers who migrate 
from the subsistence agricultural sector are superfluous anyway, their loss to this sector does not 
lead to a reduction in agricultural production. At the same time, their reallocation leads to an 
increase in industrial production. It therefore seems that rural-urban migration in the dual 
economy model produces the ultimate free lunch! This virtuous circle will operate until all the 
redundant labourers have been reallocated out of the subsistence secto r. In that case the neo-
classical model wi ll start to apply. With a reduction in the supply of labour to the subsistence 
sector, wages in that sector will rise, and with it. wages in the urban industrial secto r. 
In temlS of this model , rural -urban migration does not have any significant impact on the levels 
of inequality between migrants and non-migrants. As we have seen, migrants have to be paid 
slightly more to induce them to leave, but it is not clear that this increase in income is not 
cancelled by higher consumption costs in town, among other things. Migration does have an 
impact on the distribution of income between capitalists and workers, however, in the sense that 
capitali sts wi ll be enriched (because of the low wage levels) relati ve to workers. Since capitalists 
have a higher propensity to save than workers, and since this income distr ibution wi ll lead to 
increased economic growth, there is a positive side to this growing inequality as we ll , according 
to Lewis ( 1958:4 17-4 19). 
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The Lewis-Fei-Ranis model was extremely influential , and much of the later work on migration 
and development has been written either by way of extension or critique of this model. One of the 
problems in the reception of this model is that, although it was specifically stated by the authors 
only to be applicable to certain countries, such as India, Egypt and Jamaica, and its relevance to 
parts of Africa and Latin America questioned from the outset (Lewis 1958:401 ; Fei and Ranis 
1964:2-3), it was in fact treated as a generally applicable model of development for the Third 
World. 
2.2.3 THE TODARO MODEL OF SURPLUS URBAN LABOUR 
The Todaro model departs from a criticism ofthe Lewis-Fei-Ranis approach to migration. Todaro 
(1976:23) argues firstly that Lewis-Fei-Ranis mistakenly assumes that there is a directly 
proportion~l relationship between the amount of extra capital accumulated as a result of previous 
labour transfers and the new job opportunities created in the modem industrial sector. What, he 
(1976:23) rhetorically asks, would happen "if surplus capitalist profits are reinvested in more 
sophisticated labour saving capital equipment rather than just duplicating the existing capital?" 
In such a case capital accumulation will not lead to increased employment opportunities in the 
urban industrial sector, and subsequent rural~urban migration will create surplus labour in this 
sector. 
Another questionable assumption, according to Todaro (1976:25), is that wages in the urban 
industrial sector will remain constant until all surplus labour in the rural , subsistence sector have 
been absorbed. According to Todaro (1976:25), "(O)ne of the most striking features of urban 
labour markets and wage detennination in almost all developing countries has been the tendency 
for these wages to rise substantially over time, both in absolute tenns and relative to average rural 
incomes, even in the presence of rising levels of open unemployment." 
This criticism of the Lewis-Fei-Ranis model isalso applicable to the neo-classical model outlined 
above (Todaro 1976:29). We recall that neo-c1assical economic theory predicts that if there is an 
oversupply oflabour to the modem urban sector, wage levels will fall until the wage differential 
that has stimulated rural-urban migration disappears. According to Todaro, this is not a very 
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realistic assumption in the case of less developed countries. As a result of a number of labour 
market imperfections caused. inter alia, by the power of trade unions and the effect of minimum 
wage legislation, wages are very inelastic in a downward direction. Wages will consequently no t 
move in the desi red direction in response to an oversupply of labour. One cannot therefore rely 
on changing wage levels to equi librate the imbalance in incomes and employment levels between 
urban and rura l areas. 
To fonnulate a more realistic model one has to take in to account that migration does not take 
place only in response to differences in wage levels between urban and rural areas (Todaro 
1976:28). A rational migrant, trying to maximise economic welfare in a context of urban 
unemployment, does not only take wage levels into account, but also considers the probability of 
finding employment in town. In Todaro's model, the probability of securing employment is 
expressed in tenns of the unemployment level in town. If the average wage in town is three times 
as high as in the rural area where a prospective migrant lives , but the unemployment level is 50% 
of the level in the rural area, the expected earnings of the migrant in town is 300x50/ 1 00=150% 
of the present earnings in the rural area. In this case the migrant will decide to move. It is under 
circumstances like these that migration wi ll continue even under conditions of large-scale urban 
unemployment. If, however, the wage level is only 40% higher in town, and the unemployment 
level 50% (compared to fu ll employment in the sending area), the expected earni ngs in town is 
140x501l 00=70% of present rura l earnings. Under these circumstances it is irrational for the 
prospective migrant to relocate. 
Todaro further assumes that migrants see migration as an investment that will only payoff over 
the long run. In this he fo llows the human capital approach to migration pioneered by Larry 
Sjaastad (1962). Prospective migrants consequently weigh up the long tenn returns to rura l-urban 
migration on the one hand and the long tenn returns to remaining put in the present ru ral 
residence on the other. In order to effect a comparison between the two, the long run returns are 
furthennore discounted at a sui table rate by the prospective migrants to arrive at the present 
values of the two future income st reams. The prospect ive migrant consequently considers the 
probabil ity of finding employment over the whole time horizon that is relevant for that migrant 
(this will obviously depend on age, with the result that young people have longer time horizons 
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than old people). The probability offinding employment over this period is then balanced against 
the wage differences between urban and rural areas and this sum is then discounted to arrive at 
a present value. 
According to Todaro (1976:31) rural-urban migration still fulfil the function of equilibrating -------- - . 
imbalances in income between urban and rural areas, just like in the neo-classical model. In his .. -_ ... - "'-'-'~-"'-- ... -. --.. . . .- -
model the process does not occur through the effect that migration has on lowering urban wages, . . - -- ,.-." •. ". . - . .. - - - .-
however, but ratherthrough the effect ofmig[attOl:ti!!.increasinRthe level of urban unemployment. ----_ .... -._ .. - _.-. . ~. - . 
Because differences in average wages between city and countryside persist after migration. 
unemployment levels in town increase. Under these circumstances rural-urban migration continues 
until the expected earnings in urban and rural areas are equal. They will be equal when the 
probability of securing employment in town has decreased enough, relative to the countryside. to 
balance out the wage differences between the two areas. If this state is reached, the labour market 
has returned to equilibrium and migration comes to an end in response to that. 
2.3 MIGRATION AS A FACTOR IN THE CREATION OF SPATIAL INEQUALITIES 
All the theories we have discussed up to now shared the assumption that migration does, over the 
long run at least, play a role in enhancing both equilibrium and income equality in a society. In the 
neo-classical model migration does this immediately and in the dual economy model migration 
does this only after a delay, necessitated by the, at first , unlimited supplies of labour in the rural 
sector. In Todaro's model, by contrast, migration equilibrates labour markets through its effect 
on the levels of urban unemployment rather than income levels. 
The belief that the free movement of factors of production, such as labour and capital, or of 
goods, as in international trade. eventually produces an equilibrium situation that is in some sense 
optimum, runs very deep in the conventional economics literature. It is this belief that I intend 
criticizing in my thesis by pointing to the constraints on labour mobility that prevents migration 
from fulfilling its equilibrating function. It is also this belief that the Swedish economist Gunnar 
Myrdal has set out to criticize in his work. In this section I give an overview of MyrdaJ's work 
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with regard to the role of migration in reinforcing inequality between regions. The bel ief in the 
inevitabil ity of stab le equilibrium in capi talist economies is also foreign lO the Marxist tradition. 
I consequently provide a very brie f and se lec ti ve discussion of some of the Marx ist views on the 
subject 
Most of the criticisms of the neo~c l ass ical model in terms of the fai lure of the free market to 
equilibrate regional disparit ies have been levelled in a Third World context and this is the focus 
f adopt in this thesis as well. In order to demonstrate that the same concerns can be raised in a 
First Wortd context I shall now briefly refer to two studies done in the US and the UK 
respect ively. Us ing data derived from the Internal Revenue Service on all interregional migration 
(between the nine census div is ions of New England, mid-At lantic states, etc.) in 1986-7 in the US, 
Gabriel et aL (1993) come to the conclusion that, although there is some evidence that migration 
lessened wage disparities between regions. th is did not apply to unemployment rates. In other 
words, most inte rregional migration is by employed people looking for higher sa laries (people 
who have quit their jobs or who were transferred). Few unemployed people moved away to search 
fo r work elsewhere. Migration therefore responded to wage differences, but not unemployment 
levels. Gabriel e t al. ( 1993) did not anempt to find out why this is the case, except for noting that 
increasing house prices in expanding regions seems to be, for the unemployed, a constraint on 
interregional migration. The perspective adopted in this thesis, wi th its focus on the role of the 
costs of migration in discouraging the migration of the poorest, w ill offer an explanation for the 
trend observed by Gabriel et al. 
Hughes and McCorm ick (1985) came to a similar conclusion with regard to the inability o f 
migration to equilibrate labour markets for some categories of people. They based their study on 
info rmation derived from the General Househo ld Survey of 1973 -4 in the UK and distinguished 
between a respondent's intent ion to migrate from his/her area of origin and the responden t's past 
migration behaviour (whether the respondent had migrated in the past o r not). They noted that 
those with low educational qualifications and employment in manual occupations were particularly 
unsuccessful in carry ing out thei r migration in tentions. Because their research design made this 
imposs ib le. they (Hughes and McCormick. 1985) d id not study the effec t of the past 
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unemployment of respondents on their actual migration behaviour in the present and recent past2• 
but they did find that unemployed manual workers were much less likely to consider migrating 
than unemployed non-manual workers. In combination these two findings suggest that, in the case 
of manual workers, the labour market was geographically segmented (Hughes and McCormick 
1985). The conclusion that one can draw from the work of Hughes and McCormick (1985) and 
Gabriel et al. (1993), is that one cannot count on the mobility oflabour to remove imbalances in 
the labour market, especially in the case of those at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The latter 
groups may be immobilised in their regions of origin, for one reason or another. 
2.3. 1 MYRDAL'S CRITIQUE OF THE EQUILIBRATING EFFECTS OF MIGRATION 
As was previously mentioned, Myrdal is critical of the idea that there is an inherent tendency for 
an economy to return to a state of equilibrium if equilibrium has been disturbed. To accept this, 
one must accept the idea that any change will always elicit a reaction that goes in an opposing 
direction to the original change, thus cancelling out the first change and eventually returning the , 
economy to its original state (MyrdaI1957:13). Although this type of reaction is possible, it is, 
according to Myrdal, in fact more likely that a change will lead to further changes that reinforce, 
rather than cancel out, the original change. This scenario later became known to systems theorists 
as a positive feedback cycle where a change leads to other changes that reinforce the original 
change. The concept of equilibrium in neo-classical theory depends on the opposite kind of 
scenario: a negative feedback cycle. 
An example of positive feedback is the relationship between the residential segregation of African-
Americans and crime in the United States' . It can be argued (see Massey 1990) that residential 
segregation in US cities worsens poverty in largely African-American neighbourhoods and that 
this leads to an increase in crime. Increased crime. however. worsens residential segregation as 
whites flee the neighbourhood. The interaction between these factors sets up a vicious circle 
whereby poverty, crime and segregation continually reinforce each other. If this vicious circle is 
, In other words they did not know whether the migrants were unemployed at the time of 
their migration or not. 
, This is an updated version of Myrdal's (1957: 13-16) own example. 
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unchecked, the position of African-Americans will continue to worsen re lative to that of others. 
If any of these factors start changing for the better, however, it will also have an ameliorative 
effect on the other factors. and in this way a virtuous circle may be started that will eventually 
alleviate the problem. Both the vicious and the virtuous c ircles are self-reinforcing , which means 
that it will drag the system ever further away from. rather than towards , equilibrium. Both of these 
circles furthennore demonstrates for him the principle of cumulative causation (see our discussion 
of Massey et al. 1994a in chapter 2 for an application of this principle). My own argument wi th 
regard to the role that migration can play in reinforcing existing inequality is another example of 
a vicious, self-reinforcing circle. 
Myrdal (1957 :27-31) then applies these two processes to the question of economic development. 
Ifdevelopment starts to occur somewhere in an otherwise undeveloped economy. virtuous and 
vicious circles of development and underdevelopment wi ll start spreading into the ar(;!a 
surrounding that growth point. Using the analogy of the effects of waves on a beach, he 
subsequently distinguishes between 'backwash' and 'spread' effects. 
Due to the backwash effect, resources are extracted from the surrounding areas and concentrated 
in the growth point, thus enriching the latter further and impoverishing the surrounding areas. One 
of the resources that will be siphoned off from the poorer areas is labour. But because migration 
is a selec tive process, it is the younger, more productive members of the poorer regions that 
migrate to the growth points. This deprives the poorer areas of labour, and leads to a less 
favourable balance of income earners relative to dependants. In the growth points this movement 
will however have the opposite effect. The same argument applies to the savings of the poorer 
areas, which are siphoned off to be invested in the growth points, thus producing a new cycle of 
growth there and starving the periphery of capital for growth. 
Whereas the backwash creates underdevelopment in the periphery, spread effects have the 
opposite impact. As a result ofthe increased demand for agricultural products in the growth point, 
the surrounding countryside may be stimulated to produce more agricultural products, for 
example. The same applies to other raw materials for industrial production, such as iron ore. In 
this way development in the core can stimulate development in the periphery. 
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Whether a particular peripheral region will develop or stagnate depends according to Myrdal on 
the relative strengths of the spread and backwash effects in that region. He (1957:33) then makes 
the point that in rich countries spread effects tend to outweigh backwash effects, while in the poor 
countries of the world, the backwash predominates. 
Since the growth points are in the majority of cases urban areas, and the periphery rural, we 
therefore see that rural-urban migration may, according to Myrdal, have the effect of increasing 
income inequalities between rural and urban areas. 
2.3.2 MIGRANT LABOUR AS A PROCESS OF EXPLOITATION 
In my discussion of the dual economy model I said that Lewis, Fei and Ranis doubted the 
applicability of the model to large parts of Africa. This is because they were unsure at the time 
(early 1960's) that the assumption of surplus labour could be applied to sub-Saharan Africa. 
Despite these reservations, the model was indeed applied in the Southern African context, which 
led to criticisms of the dualist model by Arrighi (1970) and Bundy (1979). 
Arrighi (1970) reconstructed the history of the development of the colonial Rhodesian labour 
market and came to the conclusion that initially, Rhodesia was actually characterised by a labour 
shortage rather than a labour surplus. Around the turn of the century, the first capitalist 
enterprises in Rhodesia paid such low wages that very few African labourers were prepared to 
work for those wages. Even the introduction of taxes by the colonial government, which were 
intended to force blacks into the cash economy, did not have the effect of increasing the labour 
supply. Black peasants preferred to produce food for the expanding urban markets rather than 
become wage labourers, and as a result the peasant economy flourished. It was only after the 
colonial state had taken a number of steps to underdevelop the peasant economy relative to white 
settler agriculture that more black labourers were forthcoming. As a result of measures such as 
land confiscations, denial of access to markets, rural blacks were increasingly forced to participate 
in migrant labour in order to survive. Arrighi (1970) then comes to the conclusion that Rhodesia 
started with a labour shortage, but that due to the extra·economic state actions, a labour surplus 
situation eventually developed. 
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A similar argument was advanced to account for the development of the labour market in South 
Africa, th is time by the historian Colin Bundy ( 1979). Like Arrighi , he focussed on the ro le of 
government intervention in forcing peasants on the labour market, thus helping to end an initial 
labour shortage. We shal l not go into the debate which ensued asa result of his work in any detail. 
Suffice it [0 say tha t the BlIndy~thes i s was criticized in the course oflater historical research by 
Delius ( 1983) and Harries ( 1983), among others, for overemphas ising the role played by coercion 
in start ing the labour nows into the capitalist sector of the economy (also see the critic isms o f the 
Bundy-thesis by Jack Lewis [1984]). It also seems to me that Arrighi's and Bundy's contributions 
should be seen more as extensions than criticisms of Arthur Lewis's work. I base this on the 
awareness ofLewis that, due to the reliance of the capital ist secto r on a cheap subsistence sec tor 
labour force, political pressures may be used to underdevelop the subsistence sector. 
The kind of economy described by Arrighi and Bundy is one in which there are three sectors, anLl 
not the two pos ited by Lewis. Bes ides the industrial capitalist and subsistence sectors, there is a 
third sector, which is the one based on capitalist agriculture . The existence of the third sector 
solves a problem that Lewis (1958:432-434) alludes to in his article. If the population of the 
country starts to grow, more food is needed. Unless capital is invested in the subsistence sector 
to make it more productive, shortages will develop which make food more expensive. This 
presents the economy with a dilemma: either it invests money in subsistence agriculture, in which 
case wages in the subsistence sec tor and therefore in the capita li st economy start to increase. o r 
it does nothing, in which case food becomes more expensive. This also puts upward pressure on 
wages in the capitalist sector. This problem can however be solved if the agricultural sec tor is split 
into two: a commercial agricultural sector responsible for food production and a subsistence 
agricultura l sector providing cheap labour. Lewis (1958:432) puts it like this: 
If the capita lists are investing in plantation agriculture side by side with their investment 
in industry . we can think of the capitalist sec tor as sel f-contained. The expansion of this 
sector does not then generate any demand for anything produced in the subsistence sector. 
and there are therefore no tenns of trade to upset the picture we have drawn. 
In this quote. Lewis draws the class ical picture of the labour reserve economy, which is precisely 
the one sketched by Arrighi and Bundy. South Africa, like colonial Rhodesia, proc la imed a 
number of African reserves (later called homelands) which were characteri sed by subsistence (and 
sub-subsistence) agriculture. Their main function was to export cheap labour to the capitalist 
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sector. At the same time a system of commercial agriculture was developed which specialised in 
food production. This sector could produce enough food to feed an expanding industrial capitalist 
sector without disrupting the supply of cheap African labour. 
What remains to be discussed is why the labour supply to the capitalist industrial sector was so 
cheap. An explanation was suggested by Harold Wolpe (1976), among others. He took his cue 
from the importance of migrant labour in the earlier South African economy. According to him, 
migrant labour was very cheap because, at least in the Segregation period (before 1948), the 
reserves provided part of the subsistence costs of workers and their families. Migrant workers 
could consequently be paid less than fully proletarianized workers, who needed to be paid enough 
to support both themselves and their families. Due to the subsidy that the subsistence sector 
. provided towards the wages of the migrant workers in the capitalist sector, the latter can be said 
to have exploited the fonner. Because of the advantages that this setup had for capitalists, the 
state took numerous steps to conserve the agricultural economy of the reserves. 
In terms ofWolpe's model, migrant labour was the vehicle through which the capitalist economy 
could exploit the reserves. Rural-urban migration, in the form of migrant labour, therefore played 
a role in increasing inequality between rural and urban sectors. 
Wolpe's writings stimulated a large amount of debate. He was criticised for, amongst otherthings, 
his conception of the cheapness of migrant labour (Burawoy 1976). It was inter alia pointed out 
that his theorisation of the cheapness of migrant labour (he argued that workers were paid below 
the value of their labour power) was not consistent with a strict Marxist understanding of the 
value oflabour power (Morris 1977). Given that our main interest is in understanding the role that 
migration can play at present in reinforcing social inequality , it will not be profitable to 
investigate this debate further. Since Wolpe wrote his article, the subsistence basis of migrant 
labour has to a large extent disappeared. At the same time the price oflabour in South Africa has 
increased to such an extent that it cannot be regarded as 'cheap' at a1l, irrespective of the 
measurement of cheapness that is applied. The dismantling of influx control in 1986 also removed 
the legal sanctions underpinning the migrant labour system - an important part of Wolpe's 
argument. The same applies to the disappearance of the homeland system in 1994. Wolpe himself 
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had doubts as to whether the capital ist sector cou ld count on a wage subs idy from the subsistence 
sector in the post-Segregation (after 1948) Aparthe id period. so it is highly unlikely that he would 
regard his argument as having anything but historical interest at present. 
It is for the same reasons that one can doubt the present-day app licabi lity of the dual economy and 
labo ur reserve arguments. These arguments also rely to a large extenl on the existence ofa stream 
of cheap workers moving from the subsistence to the capita list sector. From our viewpoint al l the 
theories d iscussed up to now have another drawback, however: all of them focus primari ly on the 
impact of rural-urban migration on inequality between the urban and rura l sectors as a whole. 
None of them give any particular attention to the impact that migration can have on ineq ual ities 
between migrants and non-migrants. 
2.4 MIGRATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INEQUALITY BETWEEN MIGRANTS 
AND NON-MIGRANTS 
This issue of the impact of migration on inequality between migrants and non-migrants has 
received some attention in the economics literature, however. It has occurred large ly in the 
context of a discussion on the impact that remittances have on income distribution in the sending 
areas. This is a special case of the more general issue of inequality between migrants and non-
migrants. Before I proceed to discuss this literature it is therefore important that I clarify the 
different kinds of inequality in which migration is implicated. 
One possibility is that rural-urban migration may worsen intra-urban inequality (Mohtadi 1986). 
This can occur when the rural areas send a bifurcated migrant stream to the urban areas. 
consisting ofa group of landless people who move to the urban in forma l sector on the one hand 
and a group of landed people who find work in the urban fo rmal sector on the other. As a result 
the rural pattern of stratiticat ion is recreated in the urban areas, with the former group working 
in a low wage environment and the latter group in a sector with higher wages. Mohtadi ( 1986 and 
1990) has found some evidence that this is occurring in the case of rura l-urban migration in Iran. 
It is evident that this pattern can only occur under the fo llowing circumstances: a) permanent 
22 
migration is the norm for both groups (if there are many circular migrants who send remittances 
to their home villages it will detract from this trend); and b) levels of rural-urban migration are 
high enough (and the urban population small enough) so that migration can have a significant 
impact on the size of the urban population and thus on patterns of urban inequality. 
Migration is implicated in another kind of inequality , and this is discussed in the next section. The 
authors discussed here are interested in the impact that migration has (through remittances) on 
income distribution in the migrant sending areas. rather than the receiving area. It is evident that 
this interest does not extend to the total income of migrants (only that part that is remitted is 
relevant here) or to the income ofrnigrants who have left permanently and who do not remit any 
more. Neither does it capture the effect that the differentiation of the migrant stream into different 
classes of migrants has on income distribution. 
All of these effects will feature in my thesis, not as separate aspects, but in combination. I shall , 
like Mohtadi, give attention to how migration can contribute to inequality between different 
classes of migrant (as well as migrants and non-migrants), but I shall, unlike him, not discuss this 
in tenns of migration leading to urban inequality. This is because the set of circumstances 
(outlined above) which are necessary for his kind of inequality to occur are becoming increasing ly 
rare as the level of urbanization in the Third World increases. My focus in ternis ofinequality is 
mostly on the contribution of migration to inequality in the community of origin between 
households with and households without migrant members, in other words those receiving 
remittances from circular migrants and those who don't. The argument advanced here also applies 
in principle to differentiation as a result of pennanent out-migration. In this case migration 
contributes to inequality between migrant and non-migrant in a less spatially explicit unit than the 
community of origin. It is perhaps best to see it as part of broader trends in inequality between 
rural and urban areas. The spatial entity within which inequality is created between different 
classes of migrant, on the other hand, is the country as a whole. 
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2.4.1 LlPTON'S PESSIMISTIC VIEWS REGARDING THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION ON 
THE DlSTRlBUTION OF INCOME 
In terms of the human capital approach (Sjaastad 1962), migration is an investment in future 
earnings. In an investment decision. both the costs and the returns have to be taken into account. 
In much of the literature on migration the focus is only on the returns, whether that be expected 
income or the reduction in risk. The other side of the equation, the costs of migration. are 
consequently often neglected as a factor in explaining migratory behaviour (Cannel et al. 
1976:29). In contrast , Lipton's (1980:9) argument departs tram the costs of migration. 
He regards the following costs as relevant to the decision to migrate: transport costs, the cost of 
lodging in town while looking for work , costs associated with acquiring infonnation about work 
and housing opportunities (,' likely to be higher for the illiterate, contact less or inexperienced" 
[Lipton. 1980:9]). and the psychic costs of adjusting to an unfamiliar cultural environment. Illegal 
cross border immigrants face the additional cost of paying the people smuggl ing them over the 
border and bribing officials to legalize their papers. The costs of migration help to explain why 
the poor are less likely to mig rate - they are simply unable to afford it. 
According to Lipton (1980:9) the costs involved in migration have to be paid upfront, whi le the 
benefits only flow later on. This is why migration can be seen as a capital investment: it entai ls 
initial expense in order to unlock later benefits. The initial balance of costs relative to benefits adds 
to the problems the poor have in undertaking migration, because to them the imperatives of basic 
survival over the short run looms much larger. To risk this in return for the uncertain benefits that 
may only be realised over the long term may not seem rational to them. 
Even if the poor can migrate, they are disadvantaged by the fact that they are the last to do so. 
Lipton ( 1980:9) sees the increas ing propensity to migrate over time as the diffusion of an 
innovation. The poor are the last to adopt this innovat ion since they are the most ri sk averse. By 
the time that they have done so. the best opportunities have al ready been taken up. This is 
especially the case since they also have the least access to information about new job opportunities 
and new migration destinat ions. 
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The costs of migration increase with distance. Because long distance migration is the most 
expensive, the poorest are least likely to be able to afford it. If they therefore do reach the 
metropole, where one would expect the best opportunities would be located, it will be through 
a series of steps (Lipton 1980: I 0). 
Lipton's argument about the role of migration in reinforcing inequality can be summarised as 
follows: Due to the costs of migration, the poorest are least likely to migrate. Ifthey do migrate, 
they are the last to do so (thus missing out on the best/early opportunities), or they only migrate 
over short distances (thus missing out on the best opportunities that may be the furthest away). 
If the poorest are least likely to migrate, one cannot expect them to benefit much from remittances 
from a family member in town, according to Lipton (1980: 11). According to Lipton (1980: 12), 
remittances are used to pay off the debt incurred in financing migration, or for consumption, or 
for the education of family members of the migrant. They are consequently not likely to be used 
by the more fortunate households who do have migrants in town for investment in either 
agriculture or some other employment producing activity, from which the poorest can gain. The 
poorest are therefore unlikely to experience even an indirect benefit from migration. 
2.4.2 ECONOMETRIC STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION: THE WORK OF ODED STARK AND HIS ASSOCIATES 
Since the groundbreaking work of Oded Stark and his associates (1986, 1988), others have 
followed their lead to assess empirically the impact of remittances on the income distribution of 
the villages of origin of circular migrants. After surveying Stark et aI's work on this issue, I re fer 
briefly to some of the more recent studies done in this field. 
Stark et al. (1986:723-724) argue that the impact of remittances on income inequality depends, 
inter alia"', on how migration has become diffused through the rural community. Like any new 
4 According to Stark et al. (1986) the impact of remittances on inequality is also 
influenced, in the case of internal migration, by the distribution of educational opportunities within 
the village. Educational level does not have much of an impact on inequality deriving from 
Mexico-US remittances because, as we shall see in chapter 3, there are few returns to schooling 
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idea. rural-urban migration starts among a few innovators in the community and then spread 
through the community as more and more households adopt the innovation. At tirst, the impact 
of migration will of necess ity be to create greater inequality, according to Stark et a!. ( 1986: 723). 
because only the early adapters of this innovation have access to its benefits and they come 
disproportionately from the better-off households. Later. however, ifmigration becomes generally 
diffused through the community, everybody is ab le to share in its fruits and it wi ll in fact make a 
contribution towards equality in the community. Whether or not this happens depends on whether 
assistance in the migration process as we ll as infonnation about employment opportunities are 
passed on to prospective migrants who are not household members of previous migrants. !fthis 
assistance is not 'household-specific' • as Stark et al. ( 1986:724) put it, the migration innovation 
will spread beyond the borders of the first , privileged, households, and thus the effect of 
. remittances will tend to be more equalising. 
From Stark's discuss ion it is clear that the phenomenon o f the selectivity of migration and how 
it develops over time is of crucial importance in dec iding what effect migration will have on 
inequality. lf select ivity decreases over time, migrat ion will worsen pre-existing inequality only 
in the initial stages of the development of migration. There is therefore a clear link between 
arguments about the impact of remittances on inequality on the one hand and the issue of changes 
in selectivity over time on the other. Due to its importance, we shall devote a large part of this 
thes is to investigate the issue of selectivity. Nobody has yet, to my knowledge. made an attempt 
to integrate the literature on selectivity with the literature on remittances and inequality. f see the 
contribution of this thesis to reside partly in my effort to do just that. 
Stark et al. (1986:727) test the effect of remittance income on inequality in two rural Mexican 
communities. The two villages were surveyed by them in 1983. In both of these vi llages there is 
Mexico-US migration as well as internal migration, but the mix of the two is different between 
the villages. In Village 2 there is more Mexico-US migration than internal migration and in Vi llage 
1 more internal migration than international migration. Residents of Village 2 are in general more 
involved in labour migration than residents of Village I . The effect of remittance income is studied 
by compiling four Gini indices of the distribution of income for each vi llage: one for total income 
for migrants involved in cross-border migration. 
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from all sources, one for remittance income from domestic sources only, one for remittance 
income from Mexico-US migration, and one for non-remittance income only. 
They find that in each village the distribution oCtotal income (income from remittances combined 
with non-remittance income) is more equal than the distribution of Don-remittance income, and 
consequently come to the conclusion that remittance income has a nett equalising effect in these 
two communities. The equalising effect of remittance income is greater in Village 2 than Village 
1, which lends support to their contention that the equalising role of remittances only comes to 
the fore as a community's exposure to migration matures. This is also confirmed if they break 
remittance income into its Mexico-US and internal components. In Village I, with its extensive 
involvement in internal migration and limited exposure to Mexico-US migration, income from the 
. former is relatively equally distributed whi le income from the latter is much more unequally 
distributed. Remittances from Mexico-US migration also accrue proportionately much more to 
those who are better-off. The situation is reversed in Village 2: much more unequal distribution 
of income from internal migration and less inequality with regard to Mexico-US migration. 
According to Stark et al. (1988) one's judgement regarding inequality depends on the weights 
attached to different income levels in the compilation of the Gini-index. In their earlier article 
(1986) they used the Gini-index in its normal incarnation where equal weight is attached to all of 
the income categories (poorest 20% of the population, next 20%, etc.). Subsequently they ( 1988) 
re-examined the Mexican data discussed above and came to the conclusion that remittance income 
does not have an equalising effect when more weight is attached to the lowest income bracket in 
the calculation of the Gini-indices. In other words migration reduces the income of the poorest 
relative to that of others and leads to greater inequality between the poorest and the rest, even 
while it leads to a more equal distribution among all the other income groups who are better-off. 
This is evident in both villages. In Village I, where remittances from internal migration were 
previously (see above) seen to be equally distributed, it now becomes clear that the poorest are 
excluded from them after all. In other words, if a village is extensively involved in internal 
migration, remittance income from this source spreads to all groups in the village except the 
poorest. The same conclusion is evident in the case of Village 2, where there is more involvement 
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in cross-border migration and remittances from thi s source was previously seen to be more equa ll y 
distributed. It is now evident that this does not extend to those at the bottom of the income 
ladder. Stark et al. (1988:320) then come to the conclusion that the poorest households do not 
have the resources to invest in Mexican-US migration. while they are at the same time denied 
access to the highest paying jobs in the Mexican labour market. This remains the case. even if 
migration becomes more generally diffused with in the community. The rule that greater 
communi ty involvement in migration spells greater equality of access to remittances therefore 
applies to everybody except the poorest. Stark et ai's findings are highly signiti cant. g iven my 
own interests. In later chapters I argue that the poorest do not have access to networks, and 
consequently cannot share in the advantages that networks hold to reduce the costs of migration 
and to therefore facilitate migration. One can therefore expect migration to operate as a 
differentiating force as far as the poorest are concerned, even though it may, over time. lead to 
a more equal income distribution for the rest. 
With their focus on remittances, Stark et al. can only study the effect of circular migration. or at 
least only those migrants who retain links with their households of origin and thus cont inue 
remitting. They consequently do not consider what effects migration has on the distribution of 
income between those who leave (pennanently and on a temporary basis) and those who remain 
behind5• A lthough there are numerous methodological problems inherent in doing such a study, 
it seems that it wi ll have to be done if a complete account of the effects of migration on the 
distribution of income is to be arrived at. 
One of the authors involved in the two articles discussed above, 1. Edward Taylor (1992). 
returned in 1989 to the two Mexican vi llages with the intention of seeing if the remittances 
received in 1 982~ had any indirect effects on income distribution in 1988. He was specifically 
interested in find ing out what effect the acquisit ion of farm animals bought with the 1982 
S According to them (Stark et al. 1988:313) there had been no permanent out-m igrat ion 
from the two vi llages they studied - so. in that case, their method did not introduce any biases in 
this regard. 
~ When the previous field research was done (in 1983), the authors inquired about 
remittances received the year before (1982). 
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remittances had on later incomes. As with the other studies, I shall not go into the detail of the 
complex econometric techniques used in his study. He found that reminances increased farm 
incomes in general over this period because they allowed increased investment in agricultural 
resources. He then tested what effect increasing 1982 remittances by 1 % would have had on total 
income distribution in 1988, and comes to the conclusion that it would have reduced income 
inequality marginally through the effect that it would have had on 1988 animal herds. The reason 
for this seems to be, inter alia, that those who received most remittance income in 1982 are not 
the same people as those who receive the most total income in 1988 (there is a low correlation 
between the distribution of1982 remittance income and the distribution of 1988 total income) and 
that the former group had their position raised relative to the laner group through their 
investments in farm animals. Another reason was that 1982 remittance income was relatively 
equally distributed, so that its subsequent effect through farm animals was also more equal. 
Taylor's study could not. in conclusion, perceive any cumulative effect of remittances on income 
inequality. It should be noted that this is only true for income distribution as a whole - he did not 
check the impact that remittances would have had on the income distribution of the poorest versus 
the rest, as was done in the 1988 article. 
2.4.3 ECONOMETRIC STUDIES ON THE IMPACT OF REMITTANCES ON fNCOME 
DISTRIBUTION: LATER CONTRIBUTIONS 
The three previous studies have one thing in common: they attempt to establish whether 
remittances derived from migration have a positive or negative effect on the total income 
distribution of the community of origin. In order to answer this question they compare two 
scenarios - one where there is no remittances and one where there are remittances plus a non-
remittance income. The fonner scenario is then regarded as the no-migration scenario. The 
question asked by Stark and his associates is a watered down version of another question: whether 
circular outmigration from a village improves or worsens income inequality. The latter should 
ideally be established through a longitudinal study which compares the situation in the community 
before migration has begun with the present state of affairs (or compares the present state of 
affairs with a later situation where migration has ceased) and which somehow isolates the effect 
of migration from other causes of inequality as well as from any pre-existing trend in inequality. 
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One respect in which (he work of Stark e l al. falls short of such a study is that it attempts to use 
a synchronic study to answer a diachronic question. This leads to numerous problems. For one. 
they assume that the workers who now send remittances did not contribute anything to the 
household budget before they migrated . In other words, when const ructing the no-migrat ion 
scenario their study assumes that one can mere ly subtract remittance income from total income. 
Many of the present migrants must however have contributed something to the household budget 
before migrating and this income must somehow be incorporated in the estimation of the no-
migration scenario (Barham and Boucher 1998, Rodriquez 1998). 
A number of attempts have been made to overcome this problem with in the constraints of a 
synchronic study. All of these involve the estimation of the potential home earnings of migrants 
if they would return at once. using information about their current demographic and socio-
economic characteri sti cs. It is evident that this increases the rea lism of the no-migration scenario 
to some extent. Adams (1989) used this method to estimate the impact of international migration 
on the income distribution of three Egyptian villages south of Cairo. He (Adams 1989:5 7) came 
to the conclusion that households from the poorer income groups benefited less from international 
remittances than richer households and that remittances had the effect of worsening the income 
distribution instead of improving it. The reason for this was that international migrants "were 
drawn quite disproportionately from the two highest income quintile groups" (Adams 1989:63). 
However he also found that this was a recent phenomenon and that the 'once-abroad' group 
evinced much less selectivity than the 'still-abroad' group. This is an example of the reverse of the 
supposedly typical scenario fo rthedevelopmentofselect ivity: from less select ivity to more. This 
finding does not necessari ly falsify the typ ical scenario since he concludes by finding a number of 
historica lly specific reasons for explaining this, such as possible discrimination against educated 
Egyptians in Arab oi l slates in the wake of the Egyptian-I sraeli peace accords. 
Two more recent studies (Barham and Boucher, 1998; Rodriquez 1998) tried to improve on the 
work of Adams with regard to the estimation of the no-migration scenario. Both found that 
remittances increase inequality relative to the no-m igration scenario. Of the two studies r sha ll 
discuss only that of Bar ham and Boucher (1998). One of the innovations in their study is that they 
( 1998:309) tried. in their estimation of the no-migration scenario, to account for the changes 
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expected in the labour force decisions of other household members in the light of the putative 
return of the migrants. One can expect, for example, that some non-migrants who previously did 
not work may now decide to work locally. Barham and Boucher(1998:311 , 315) tried to improve 
on Adarns's modelling of the no-migration scenario in another respect: he constructed his scenario 
without considering the selectivity of migration and thus did not take into account that migrants 
and non-migrants may differ systematically in terms oftheir income earnings capabilities when the 
former return. This weakened his modelling of the no-migration scenario. 
Barham and Boucher (1998) apply their model to the results ofa survey completed in 1991 in the 
town of Blue fields, Nicaragua. This survey inquired about remittances derived from both internal 
and international migration. In order to test the effect of alternative methods for estimating the 
no-migration income distribution, they used both the method employed by Stark and his associates 
(where the no-migration scenario merely subtracts remittance income from total income) and their 
own alternative (described above). When they used the first method, remittances were found to 
improve the distribution of income, and when they used the second, remittances were found to 
worsen inequality. These results are confirmed by Rodriquez (1998), who also found that the first 
method indicates a reduction and the second method an increase in income inequality. This 
demonstrates, according to Barham and Boucher (1998:327) that the choice of method have an 
important bearing on the results obtained. The increase in income inequality obtained by them 
using the second method does not, however, seem to be the result of migration selectivity. 
According to them (1998:327) the major explanation for this result is as follows: 
In the no-migration counterfactual, the effect of returning the migrants to Bluefields is to 
increase the earnings contributions of a group whose earnings are considerable more 
equally distributed in the population ... Thus, most of the reduction in inequality associated 
with the no migration counterfactual arises from the increased share of total income 
accounted for by a cohort whose income contributions are more equally distributed across 
households. 
Barham and Boucher's measurement of inequality is, like in all the studies discussed here except 
for Stark et al. (1988), the Gini-index with equal weights attached to all the income groups. It can 
therefore only indicate whether the overall income distribution has changed or not. and does not 
provide any information about what is happening to those in the poorest group. This is a major 
drawback, given that, as we shall argue below, it is at the bottom of the income distribution where 
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impediments to mobility will continue to exist. 
What isalso worrying about the whole exercise of imputing incomes and calculating Gini-indices 
is its sensitivity to the choiceofmethod. Besides the problems mentioned above there is the added 
one of having to decide whether a household is allowed mobility into another income group 
between the calculation of its non-remittance income and the calculation of its total income. 
Adarns ( 1989:61 ) does not allow mobility , whi le Rodriquez ( 1998:336) does . A household that 
relies on remittances for most of its income is classified at the bottom of the income distribution 
for both the tota l income and non-remittance income Gi ni-ind ices ifmobility is not a llowed and 
this obviously affects the outcome of the compari son of the no migration and migration scenarios 
(Rodriquez 1998). 
The attempt by Adams, Rodriquez and Barham and Boucher to estimate the putative home 
earnings of migrants leads, lastly , to a result that may be more realistic than that of Stark et aI., 
but is not without drawbacks of its own. The latter study does make the mistake of assuming that 
migrants will be unemployed on returning, hut the assumption of the first three that all the 
returnees wi ll find employment when so doing is sure ly also somewhat unrealistic. In order to 
rectify this problem, they will have to find a way of estimating the effect on the local. labour 
market of an increased supply of labour, which will introduce addit ional complexity into 
calculations that are already very complex. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In my brief overview of theories of migration I have identified two approaches to the impact of 
migration on inequality. In the first migration is seen as a process which smooths over differences 
in income and\or employment between regions. The second sees migration as part of a process 
of increasing di ffe rentiation between a core, developing region and a peripheral , underdeveloping 
region. None of these focus on the impact of migration on inequality between migrants and non-
migrants, which is what I am interested in. l have lastly discussed a number of econometric studies 
on the effect of remittances on the di stribUlion of income, which do give attention to this issue. 
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My conclusion is that, while these studies are certainly worthwhile, the methodological barriers 
to arriving at a satisfactory estimation of the effect of migration on inequality are certainly 
formidable. Estimating an effect that develops over time on the basis of synchronic daia is 
inherently problematic and reduces the realism of all such studies. I argue, instead, that the 
question should be pursued by investigating the factors governing the diffusion of migration within 
a community of origin. Linking this issue to the literature on the selectivity of migration will 
consequently allow us to gain more clarity about what is to be expected with regard to the effect 
of migration on income inequality . It is this literature that I discuss in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SELECTIVITY OF MICRA T10N 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
We have known since 1885, when E.G. Ravenstein presented his papers on the laws of migration 
to the Royal Statistical Society, that migration is a selective process. Ravenstein be lieved that 
women are more likely to be short-distance migrants than men, who are inclined to migrate over 
longer distances (Lee 1966:48). We notice two aspects here of the issue of select ivity that still 
feature in present-day discussions: the gender dimens ion of selectivity and the tendency fo r 
select ivity patterns to change depending whether we are dealing with shorter or longer distances. 
Both of these aspects feature in this chapte r - they come especially to the fore in the section 
devoted to an overview of selectivity patterns in Third World migration. Other issues that are 
discussed in this chapter are the explanations for selectivity, changes in the selectivity of migration 
over time and the measurement of selectivity. 
Most of the research on the selec tivi ty of migration is primarily interested in rural-urban 
migration. According to Brown and Lawson ( 1985) rural-rural and urban-rural migration are 
generally neglected by researchers, even though these two types of migration are very common 
in the Third \Vorld . The belief that rural-urban migrat ion is the norm and the other kinds of 
migration neglig ible is generally held, but incorrect. This leads Rhoda (quoted in Brown & 
Lawson 1985: 416) to say that: 
Rural-urban migration should not be confused with rural out-migrat ion or with urban in-
migration; many. and in some cases most, urban in-migrants come from other urban areas 
whi le a large percentage of rural out-migrants move to other rura l areas. 
The danger of assuming that these other kinds of migration have the same characteristics as rura l-
urban migration and can be subsumed under it. is that they may operate in different ways. This is 
ind icated by, inter alia, the effect of distance on rural-rural migration. Di stance is an obstac le to 
both rural-rural and rural-urban migration with the result that the migrant stream between two 
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places becomes less the further they are apart (Population Information Program 1983 :M255). The 
further two places are apart from each other, the more difficult the information flow (about jobs, 
for example) between them and the higher the costs of moving. In the case of rural-rural 
migration, however, the effect of distance is significantly stronger. According to Brown and 
Lawson (1985:425) the reason for this is that "knowledge of rural economic conditions is more 
severely attenuated by distance; thus increasing both monetary and psychic movement costs (per 
unit distance)." Because of the difference between the two types of migration, I shall distinguish 
from time to time between trends in the selectivity of rural-urban migration as opposed to trends 
in the selectivity of rural-rural migration. 
3.2 A SURVEY OF THE SELECTIVITY OF MIGRATION IN THIRD WORLD 
COUNTRIES 
According to Lee (1966:56), selectivity refers to the fact that "migrants are not a random sample 
of the population at origin". The stream of migrants are selected from the population of origin in 
terms of gender, age, income and education, with the result that the composition of the migrant 
stream is different from that of the population of origin. The migrant stream typically contains 
more young adults than the population of origin, for example. 
I now discuss each of the selection factors of gender, age, income and education individually . 
3.2.1 GENDER 
Men and women tend to have different propensities to migrate. Whether men or women will 
dominate in the migrant streams depends on which continent is being studied however. Boserup 
(1970) has distinguished between four regional patterns of male and female migration in the Third 
World: Arab, Latin America, Southeast Asian and African. According to her, women in Latin 
America are more likely to migrate than men, while in Africa, the Middle East and Asia the 
situation is the opposite with more men than women migrating. Because of gender differences 
between regions in the incidence of rural-urban migration specifically, the urban sex-ratio varies 
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between these regions as well. The following comparison of male-female ratios in urban areas 
gives an indication of the regional variations (0 wh ich Boserup re fe rs (these fi gures are based on 
census data recorded between 1965 and 1975). In Oceania there were 128 men for every 100 
women present in urban areas. in Africa and Asia 109 men for every 100 women and in Latin 
America 92 men for every 100 women (Gi lbert and Gugler 1982:59). Despite the general 
tendency for men to dominate in migrant st reams in Asia, there are. according lO Khoa et a!. 
( 1984). significant variations wi thin Asia, and even with in the same countries in Asia (as in India 
where women have a higher propensi ty to migrate in the South than in the more Islamic North ). 
In the Spanish-speaking and predominantly Catholic Philippines, women are more likely to 
migrate than men, as is the case in Latin America (Khoo et al. 1984: 1255). 
According to Chant and Radcliffe ( 1992:5 , also see Khoo et al. 1984), these regional differences 
in urban sex-ratios have not changed much since the time when the censuses providing the basis 
for Gi lbert and Gugler's fi gures were taken. There is an overall trend for the predominance of men 
to become less pronounced over time in the Third World, but this takes place very slowly 
(Simmons et al. 1977: 28, Chant and RadC\iffe 1992:5). Faste r movement towards evening out 
in the sex-ratios has however taken place in the rapidly industrialising countries of East and South 
East Asia (Chant and RadC\ iffe 1992:5). 
Boserup' s general observation with regard to regional differences is confinn ed by studies of 
individual countries in these regions. In the case of Brazil, Castro et al. ( 1978:39, 62) report a 
greater preponderance of women in migrant streams in 1970 (except for what would probably be 
the most dynamic and attractive dest ination, Sao Paulo prov ince). Male predominance in migrant 
streams has been observed in East Africa (Rempel 1981: 16,45) as well as elsewhere in Africa 
(Simmons et a!. 1977:27). The only countries in Africa where men do not dominate migration 
streams seems to be Cameroon (Simmons et al. 1977:28) and Ethiopia (Gugler 1989:350). Male 
dominance of the urban population has, however, recently declined somewhat in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Gugler 1989). 
Zachariah and Conde (198 I :9) have observed that in West Africa men dominate the long-distance 
migrant streams and women the short-distances (just as Ravenstein has predicted more than a 
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century ago). The tendency for women to migrate over shorter distances (and to smaller places) 
is also confirmed by Connell et al.'s ( 1976:43) survey of village studies in Asia, and by the work 
of Danesh (1987: 18) in Iran, who found that the proportion o f migrants who are females decline 
as the distance of the community of origin from Tehran (the major migration destination) 
increases. After surveying the literature on gender selective migration, Chant (1992b: 198-1 99) 
comes to the conclusion that in the Third World generally men migrate over greater distances and 
to a more varied range of destinations than women, even in countries where the latter have a 
higher propensity to migrate than men. This indicates that gender differences are not only 
observed with regard to the issue of whether an individual migrates or not. They also influence 
the distance of the migratory move and the type of migration destination. 
The gender selectivity of migration can be reduced over time if family reunification takes place 
(Zoomers 1986). If there is a tendency for men to predominate in migration streams initially, for 
example, one can expect that at some stage they will fetch the wives and children that have stayed 
behind in the rura l areas to join them. Ifwomen initially dominate the migrant stream they can in 
turn be expected to fetch their husbands and children. This is of course only true if we are dealing 
with permanent migration. In the case of circular migration. the gender selectivity of migration 
can continue indefinitely, or at least as long as the conditions giving rise to it are maintained. 
Family reunification will also not affect gender selectivity if a high divorce rate between urban men 
and rural women creates many female-headed households in the rural areas (as in the South 
African case). 
3.2.2 AGE 
Migrants are more likely to be between 15 and 30 years of age than any other age category 
(Conne1 at a1. 1976 :39, Simmons et a l. 1977:27, Population Information Program 1983 :M-256). 
This trend is observed all over the world. The age-selectivity of migration is generally associated 
with changes over the life-cycle of the individual in the sense that young adults are at the age 
where they have to find ajob, and migration is then part of this process (Ritchey 1976:379). 
The predominance of young adults in rural-urban migration streams has numerous positive 
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economic implications for urban areas (Williamson 1988:298), and presumably. negative effects 
for the rural areas. Young adults are more likely to be employed, and with their inrnigration the 
number of possible income earners relative to dependents (o ld people and chi ldren) increase. This 
increases the per capita income, as we ll as the savings rate, of lhe city, according to Williamson 
(1988:298.299). 
3.2.3 INCOME 
Because I am interested in the impact of migration on social inequality, and because income 
differentials are an important indicator of social inequality. the income selectivity of migration is 
of special interest to me. I fthe migrant st ream excludes the poorest people it means that they wi ll 
not benefit from the opportunities that migrat ion offers for improving their welfare. The issue is 
clouded. however. by the numerous methodological pro blems that crop up in determining ,the 
effect of income on migration. In the case of gender, education and age, the act of migration does 
not have any impact on the value of these variables. Migration cannot influence the gender of a 
migrant, or hislher age. Except in the case of tertiary education, where migration is often a 
prerequisi te for its acquisition, migration does not have any effect on educational status either. 
Even in the case of tertiary education, the effect of migration on educational status only appears 
over time, and would not be apparent ifsurveyed short ly after the act of migration. When it comes 
to income, however, migration has, in most cases, an immediate effect in the sense that it tends 
to increase income. 
In most cases selecti vi ty is measured through a cross-sectional comparison of migrants and non-
migrants (Ritchey 1976:383). The comparison is therefore made atte rmigration has occurred and 
not before. If it is found by such a survey (as is generally the case) that migrants have a higher 
income than non-migrants, there is no way of knowing whether the higher income was present 
before the act of migration and genuinely indicates the income selectivity of migration or whether 
it is a consequence of migration, only appearing after the act of migration. This is because of the 
impact , alluded to above. of migration on income (Ritchey 1976:383). 
One poss ible solution is to use another, more stable indicator o f household income in cross-
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sectional studies. The value ofthe house in which the household is living is such an indicator. The 
measurement will be done differently depending on whether we are dealing with permanent 
migration. in which case we compare the value of the destination area house of the migrant with 
the value of the area·of·origin house of the non-migrant, or circular migration, in which case the 
migrant has not left hislher area-of-origin house behind and one can compare these houses of the 
migrant and the non-migrant. While this strategy may work for middle class people. it can be 
problematic if we are dealing with the rural-urban migration of poor people in a Third World 
context. In that context the urban (destination) and rural (origin) housing markets are often very 
different, which makes the prices of houses in the two areas difficult to compare. Such a 
measurement is also particularly problematic when there is no meaningful market for housing. as 
in the fonner homeland areas of South Africa. 
Possibly the best solution to the problem of knowing whether income differentials have manifested 
themselves before or after migration, is to study the income-selectivity of migration in a 
longitudinal fashion (Davanzo 1981: 121, Connell et al. 1976). In this case, a particular sending 
area is surveyed at one stage. At a later stage, an attempt is made to find out which households 
have since relocated (in the case of permanent migration), or have dispatched migrant members 
to another location (in the case of circular migration). Income-selectivity can then be tested by 
comparing the pre-migration income of migrant households with that of non-migrant households 
in the community of origin. 
When testing the income selectivity of migration the distinction between absolute and relative 
measures of poverty becomes very important. The decision to use either a relative or an absolute 
measurement of poverty depends partly on the theoretical framework from which one is departing. 
For Oded Stark (1991) non-migrants start to experience feelings of relative deprivation when 
confronted with the consumer goods brought home by successful migrants and this motivates 
them to become migrants as well. In his case relative measures of poverty would be totally 
appropriate. On the other hand, if one sees the inability to afford transport costs, or boarding costs 
while looking for work, as the reason for the non-migration of some, relative measures of poverty 
are inappropriate. If somebody cannot migrate due to poverty it is the result of absolute and not 
relative deprivation. 
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Ifone's interes t is in absolute rather than relative poverty , as mine is here. it becomes difficult to 
interpret the results of empirical studies that are sometimes couched in tenns of relati ve 
deprivation. As Connell et al. ( 1976:20-21) point out. the poorest villagers in prosperous vi llages 
might well be better-off. in tenns of absolute measures of poverty, than the richest villagers in 
poverty-stricken areas. Another complication is that what sounds like a relative measure of 
poverty is in fact often intended as an absolute measure. If one says. as I am going to say here. 
that it is seldom the poorest who migrate. it is not only a statement about people who are at the 
bottom of the pile. It refers more accurately 10 those who are closest to destitution: those who 
are landless and unemployed and survive on handouts and piece j obs. This is the sense in which 
I am going to use the term here, and it is also the sense in which Lipton and his associates, who 
are my main sources for the discuss ion of the next paragraph, are using the term. 
Despite the problematic nature of measures of income-selectivity , it does nevertheless seem that. 
even though it is generally poor people who migrate in Third World countries, the poorest among 
them seldom migrate (Lipton 1980:7, Connell et aL 1976:21), Those among the poorest who do 
migrate are more likely to be rural-rural migrants than rural-urban migrants (Connell et al. 
1976: 12, Population Information Program 1983:M-254), o r to migrate over shorter distances 
(DaVanzo 1981 : Ill . Population Information Program 1983:M-25S). As a result the poorest are 
more likely to engage in step migration (Lipton 1980). They are more likely to approach the' major 
metropolitan areas (the major migration destinations) in a country step by step, o ften first 
migrating to a sma ll town close to their place of o rigin , then leaving for a secondary melropole 
after a period of consolidation and, if they are successful in this. mobilising their resources for a 
tinal move to the major metropolitan areas. 
Of the numerous studies thatcontinn the findings of Lip ton as we ll as Connel l and hi s associates. 
I shall ment ion on ly one. Commenting on the two villages in the Dominican Republic she has 
studied. Georges ( 1990: 118-119) remarks that the patterns of outmigration do not refl ect the 
beliefs of both neo-c1assica l as we ll as Marxist economists. It is not the case that migrants are 
drawn "from a 'surplus' rural population, which dispossessed of its land, is made 'free' to move to 
the cities to work for wages" . Instead, she ( 1990: 119) continues, "migrants are more like ly to 
come from households with a more pri vileged access to resources strategic in the rural context'·. 
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Not all studies agree with Lipton and Connell et al. 's assessment, however. Speaking ofintemal 
migration from the village of Acuitzio to Mexico City, Wiest (1984: 131) claims that there are two 
groups of people who migrate: the well to do and the " landless, unemployed poor who are 
destitute and who have no options in Acuitzio". The conflicting results can probably be partly 
explained as a reflection of the methodological problems, referred to previously, inherent in 
studying the income selectivity of migration. Another factor, however, is the changing patterns 
of selectivity that are observed as the migration stream matures. These are discussed in a later 
section of this chapter and [ shall not pursue this topic here. 
3.2.4 EDUCATION 
It is generally observed that educational levels are positively correlated with rural-urban migration 
(Simmons et al. 1977:28, Ritchey 1976:382). This relationship is stronger for longer distance 
(internal) migration than for shorter distance moves (Ritchey 1976:385, Levy and Wadycki 
[974:200). Rural-rural migrants are also more likely to have a low level of education (ConnelI et 
al. 1976 :68, Population Information Program 1983:M-253, Brown and Lawson 1985 :41 8). One 
of the reasons for the association between education and migration is that information available 
to rural households about urban employment opportunities is likely to increase as educational 
level s increase (Rempel 1981 :77, Ritchey 1976:385). The information-enhancing effect of 
education is likely to be especially strong with regard to migration destinations that are further 
away. The reason for this is that information about distant destinations is less likely to be carried 
by word of mouth, and more likely to be disseminated through formal communication channels 
where literacy is a prerequisite. This helps to explain why the effect of education is stronger for 
moves over a longer distance (Ritchey 1976:374). 
The strong positive link between education and long-distance migration does not hold in the case 
of, especially undocumented, cross-border migrants, according to Massey and Espino~a 
(1997:948, also see Stark et aI. 1986:732). The reason for this is that, because of the differing 
cultural context in the sending and receiving countries. the skills acquired by the migrant through 
education is not likely to be as useful outside the country of origin as within that country. A 
migrant with a secondary school education acquired in Mexico is much more likely, according to 
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Massey and Espinosa (1997). to prefer a job as a clerk somewhere in Mexico than a job in the 
unskilled labour market. which are the only positions open to Mexican migrants in the United 
States. Migrants are therefore positi vely selected for ed ucat ion in the case of internal migration. 
but according to them (Massey and Espinosa 1997) negative ly se lected with regard to 
international mi gration. Massey and Espinosa's argument seems to be true for secondary 
education, but I would be surprised ifit holds in the case of tertiary education as well. People with 
tertiary education are probably more likely to migrate in the case of both interna l and international 
migration. Tertiary education is less bound by the cultural context o f the country of origin than 
secondary education. It a lso provides skills that are high in demand in the knowledge intensive 
industries of the Fi rst World. This is reflected in the concerns abo ut the brain drain from Third 
World countries that causes these countries to lose many of their ski lled pro fess ionals. 
3 .3 EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SELECTIVITY OF MIGRATION 
Since I am primarily interested in the consequences of selecti ve migration (in tenus o f increasing 
inequality) rather than its causes, I shall not discuss the explanations advanced for the se lec ti vity 
of migration in too much detail. It is nevertheless important to give some attention to these 
explanations because they provide us with a better understanding of the context in which 
migration takes place. It is also necessary to investigate the explanations for se lectivity because 
they give an indication whether, and if so, by how much, se lectivity changes over time. We can 
c lass ify the explanations for selectivity into four broad categories: 
I) there are first ly those explanations that use the costs and benefits of migratio n as explanatory 
variables (we call these the human capital approaches); 
2) another explanat ion focuses on the impact of changes in the organisation of production on a 
world scale which create a demand for female workers (the world systems approach); 
3) the third set of explanations sees se lective migrat ion as the result of household decisions which 
try to optimise the econom ic welfare of the household (the household strategies approach); 
4) the last set of explanations are based on aspects o f social structure which retard or encourage 
the migration of particular groups in soc iety (the social structural approach). 
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3.3.1. HUMAN CAPITAL APPROACHES TO MIGRATION 
The first person to adopt a human capital approach to migration was Lany Sjaastad (1962). His 
work resulted from dissatisfaction with the previous econometric approaches to migration. These 
approaches explained migration as a response to income differentials between regions. Since 
everybody in the poorer region is exposed to these income differentials, the question arises why 
only a limited number of people migrate in response to these stimuli, rather than everybody in that 
region. Econometric approaches also found it difficult to explain why migration varies according 
to factors such as the age of the migrant (Sjaastad 1962:90, Speare 1971: 117). Sjaastad (1962:87) 
argues that if migration is viewed as a fann of investment in human capital, with costs attached 
to it as well as returns that will materialise in future, new light can be cast on many of these 
questions. In Sjaastad's tenns, the money spent on financing the move is the investment made by 
the migrant. If, in the new environment the migrant can earn more money, s/he has realised a 
return on this investment. Sjaastad does not pursue this question, but the reason why he calls it 
human, rather than any other type of capital, is probably that he thinks that the move increases 
the returns on the skills acquired by the migrant. The migrant is therefore more productive, with 
a consequent increase in human capital. 
According to DaVanzo (1981: 103) "(r)ecognitio n that the benefits of migration occur over a 
period of time is .. . the distinguishing characteristic of the human capital model." The benefits of 
migration is not immediately realised as a once-off payout, but occurs over the entire future 
income stream of the migrant as an increase in the wage commanded by the migrant. As in the 
case of all other investment decisions, the investor has to discount the value of the enhanced 
future income stream (earned as a result of the move) to arrive at the present value of that income. 
The younger the migrant, the longer the tenn of the enhanced income stream and consequently 
the higher the present value of the investment. The value of the investment increases with the tenn 
of the investment in the same way as the value ofan endowment policy increases over time. This 
explains, according to Sjaastad (1962:88) why young adults are more likely to migrate. Since the 
costs that young and old are expected to bear are the same. and since the benefits are higher for 
the young, it is more likely that the benefits of migration will outweigh the costs of migration in 
the case of the latter group. They are therefore also more likely to decide that migrat ion is a 
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profitable investment. In this way. the human capital approach offers an explanation for the 
observed trends with regard to the age-select ivity of migration. 
We have discussed the costs of migration in chapter one. Sjaastad (1962) distinguishes between 
the money and non-money costs of migration. Accord ing to him, the non-money costs are the 
psychic costs associated with a new cultural environment, as well as the costs associated with 
separation from family and friends . Sjaastad ( 1962:84) claims that the money costs are likely to 
be so low that it is improbable that it will significant ly limit the amount of migration expected. He 
believes that the non-money costs are much higher than is genera lly accepted . The results of 
migration models typically indicate thatan extraordinari ly large increase in the income differences 
between regions is necessary to elicit more migration from the poorer (0 the richer region 
(Sjaastad 1962, Ritchey 1976:373). Findings such as this can only be true, accord ing to Sjaastad. 
if the costs of migration are very high. In other words, if migration only takt:: s plat.:t:: if tht:: 
advantages of migration outweigh the costs. the high increase in the advantage of migration 
(reflected in the income differential) needed before more migration takes place suggests that the 
costs must be high as welL Given that he thinks that the money costs are low, it means that the 
non-money costs must be very high if we are to explain why migration is so inelastic in response 
to income differences between regions. 
Sjaastad's statement that the costs of migration are higher than genera lly assumed is very 
interesting since it explains why less migration takes place than expected. His statement that the 
money costs of migration are low is problematic, however. He does not consider the money costs 
as a proportion o f the income of different classes of migrants. but thinks in tenns of average 
incomes. Consequent ly the possibility that. in the case of the lowest income groups. the money 
costs relative to the income of the group might be (00 high to make migration an economic option 
does not arise for him. The fact that migration tends to se lect people in tenns of their income, 
suggests that monetary costs can indeed act as a disincentive in some cases and that Sjaastad is 
wrong to focus exclusively on non-money costs. 
When people make investment decisions, they also have to consider how they are going to finance 
their investment. The same appl ies to investment in migration. At this stage of the investment 
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decision, the operation of credit markets, and the creditworthiness of the individual investor 
becomes very important. Sjaastad assumes that prospective migrants will not experience any 
constraints in this respect. or that the costs will be so low that financing does not become an issue. 
According to Da Vanzo (1981 :96) this is an issue that needs to be considered, however, especially 
since banks are unlikely to finance a risky endeavour such as migration. DaVanzo (1981 :96) 
argues that people who already have some wealth, or who can obtain credit and board from 
relatives are in an advantageous position in this regard. Since it is well·known that the poorest 
encounter severe problems in gaining access to credit through fannal channels, this helps to 
explain the income-selectivity of migration. As we shall see in the next chapter however, poor 
people can use their social connections to gain credit in an informal fashion . 
It is generally the case that the money costs increase as the distance of the migratory move 
increases (Da Vanzo 198 1: 11 0-111). Distance is therefore less likely to be a deterrent for those 
with higher incomes, and this adds to our understanding of why the income-selectivity of 
migration tends to increase as the distance of the migratory move increases (DaVanzo 1981: 11 O-
II 1). The obverse of this is that income-selectivity will be nill for areas of origin that are very 
close to a destination area. 
Another element of the typical investment decision that has to be considered in the context of 
migration decision making is that of risk. The prospective migrant has to take into account the 
probability that s/he will find employment in the migration destination, and has to bear the 
opportunity cost (the earnings foregone by leaving the present place of residence) of that decision 
(DaVanzo 1981 :95, Taylor 1986:148-149). There are other factors that might act to make 
migration more risky, such as the levels of crime and political violence at the destination, and 
these also enter into the decision making about migration. 
The atti tude of the prospective migrant to these risks depend on how risk averse he or she is 
(DaVanzo 1981 :95). One can assume that the poorest are likely to be the most risk averse (Lipton 
1980:9-10), since they are the closest to the survival minimum and are the most powerless to 
defend themselves against ri sks generally. They are also the least likely to have access to reliable 
information about these risks, given that the acquisition of information entails certain costs 
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(Goodman 1981: 143). Infomlation reduces risks (DaVanzo 1981 :96), and the unequal access to 
infonnation to reduce these risks will act as an additional bias against migration among the 
poorest. 
The tendency for migration 10 be se lec ti ve with reference to education can partia lly be explained 
by the ri sk-reducing impact of in formati 011. and the higher leve ls of information prevalent among 
the better educated (Rempel 1981 :77). Another reason why education increases the probability 
of migration is that. at least for internal migration, the better educated are likely 10 rea lise higher 
returns by migrating to urban destinations than staying behind in the rural areas l . For most of the 
better-educated. rural-urban migration is a precondition for realising a return on their investment 
in education (Rempel 1981:77, Connell et al. 1976:59-63). Because agricultural jobs are generally 
unskilled. rural-rural migrants are likely to have a lower level of education (Connell et al. 
1976:65). 
Education and migration are similar from a human capital perspective in the sense that both can 
be understood as ways of investing in human capital. Because one needs resources if one is to 
invest in formal education (school fees, books, the opportunity costs of not working while 
studying, etc.) it can be assumed that households with a higher income are more likely to invest 
in education. The positive link between income and educational levels, as well as the link between 
education and migration provides additional ground for the observation that the poorest are 
un likely to engage in migration (Rempel 1981 :92, cf. also Connell et a l. 1976:28). 
3.3.2 WORLD SYSTEMS EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SELECTIVITY OF MIGRATION 
The world systems approach focuses on changes occurring in the international organisation of 
product ion. According to world systems theorists (Kentor 1985) production is increasingly 
organised on a world scale. This is due to technological changes (primari ly developments in 
information technology and telecommunications), as well as the rise oftransnational corporations. 
Because of these two developments, the labour process in manufacturing is broken lip and 
1 As we saw above, international migration may negatively select for education. at least 
up to secondary schoo l level. 
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reassembled geographically so that some parts of it (generally the higher value-parts, such as the 
design of the product) are retained in metropolitan countries and other parts (generally the low 
value, final assembly of the product) devolved to Third World countries. The final assembly is 
hived off to Third World countries in order to make use of the cheap and often rightless labour 
force that can be obtained there. As a result of this, we have seen the rise of so·called export 
processing zones in many parts of the Third World. These are cities where products are assembled 
by transnational corporations for international markets. An example is the factories of the Nike 
sport shoe company in places such as Vietnam. 
It is because of these developments that a demand for female workers arise in many parts of the 
Third World (Sassen-Koob 1984). Female workers are in demand because there is a perception 
that they are less likely to join unions and are more suited to the repetitive assembly line work 
needed at this stage of the labour process. The increased demand for female workers results in 
increased female migration to these export processing zones (Sassen-Koob 1984). Female 
selective migration in these cases can thus be explained with reference to the demand-pull forces 
operating from the industrialising areas. In Mexico, for example, women migrate to the northern 
border regions of the country where many American companies have built factories to take 
advantage of cheap Mexican labour (Young and Fort 1994). These factories (called maquiladora 
factories) specialize in the final assembly of products for the American market and employ a 
largely female labour force. 
3.3.3 THE HOUSEHOLD STRATEGIES APPROACH TO MIGRA nON 
In teons of the household strategies approach, the demand for female labour in destination areas 
does not by itself provide an adequate explanation for female selective migration. According to 
this model, this demand only becomes effective as a migration inducing factor if it dovetails with 
the labour allocation strategies of households, in other words if it is advantageous to the 
household to send out female members. The reference to household labour allocation suggests 
an important dimension of the household strategies perspective. This is that migration should not 
be seen, in tenns of this approach, as a decision taken by an individual migrant for the purposes 
ofimproving the welfare of only that individual, but as a household decision directed at improving 
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the welfare of the household as a whole. 
The poor household is thus seen as a un it engaged in pooli ng its avai lab le labour power so as to 
allocate it more eftic ient ly between the different jobs ava ilable. This can involve indust rial 
employment. work in fanning as well as domestic work (the household strategies approach takes 
into account that domestic tasks also have to be performed. a real ity o ften ignored by other 
approaches to migration dec is ion mak ing [Chant and RadcJifte. 1992:22]). According to the 
household strategies approach many poor households, unlike midd le class fami lies. cannot depend 
on a single (or even dua l, as in the case ofa married couple where both partners work) source of 
income. They have to combine income from a number of (monetary and non-monetary) sources 
in order to survive. This o ften includes income from agriculture, whether commercial, subsistence 
o r even sub-subs istence (as in the case of most former homelands in South Africa). A decision 
with regard to the migration of any household member the refore has to make sense in tem1s.of 
the househo ld's labour allocation strategy. In such a strategy the d ifferent jobs that need to 
performed. and that are avai lable to household members, have to be weighed up aga inst each 
other. 
From this it is clear that households wi th many able-bodied adu lts relat ive to dependants have an 
advantage when it comes to surviva l. The more labour power at the househo ld 's disposal. the 
more itcan diversify its income sources and stil l have labour power left to perfonn domestic tasks. 
The fewer dependants in the household, the lower the household's consumption requirements and 
the easie r it is to balance the household 's income with its consumpt ion. It is the need to strike a 
balance between these aspects that is responsible for the tendency of poor households in Southern 
Africa to foster out children temporarily du ring times of need (Spiegel 1987). 
The household st rateg ies approach predict that a rura l household will dispatch the member with 
the highest urban income poss ibilities and the lowest potential contribution to agriculture to the 
urban areas and retain the others to work its fi elds in the rural areas and do the domestic work. 
If that worker is female. as in most of Latin America, fe male selective rural-urban migration wi ll 
occur. If that member is male, it will bejust the opposite. This is the case in the Southern African 
context (and elsewhere in Africa), where the labour market genera lly favou rs men (Low 1984 : I 0). 
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In addition, women are for cultural reasons associated with agriculture in Africa and consequently 
they are more likely to stay behind to work the fields. In this way the household strategies 
approach can provide an explanation for the gender selectivity of migration. 
It is clear that this perspective is better suited at explaining circular rather than pennanent 
migration. The strategy of sending out some household members as migrants and retaining others 
on the family agricultural allotment is only possible if those who leave retain their membership of 
the rural household and engage in temporary, circular migration. 
There are numerous reasons why a rural household may follow this strategy of sending out some 
circular migrants and retaining others on the farm. It may do so to reduce the risks of migration, 
for example (Da Vanzo 1981 :96). I have previously discussed the risks of migration under the 
heading of human capital approaches to migration. but a consideration of the effects of these risks 
isjust as applicable here. According to Stark (1991 :39-40), theorists such as Todaro who focus 
exclusively on differences in expected income between rural and urban areas as a motivation for 
migration, overlook the role that can potentially be played by migration in a household's risk 
reduction strategy (see Stark 1991 :40-41). Agriculture is a risky business for rural, farming 
households. This is especially the case when the household is experimenting with new, high yield 
varieties of a crop. These give higher yields when all goes well, but they generally need more 
inputs. They are also often less drought resistant. In this context it may make sense to dispatch 
a household member to town to provide an income that the household can fall back on when 
things go wrong on the farm. 
The interaction between the migrant and the rest ofthe household should be seen as an implicit 
contract where the other household members subsidise the migrant initially while slbe is still 
looking for work (Stark 1991 :221). When the migrant adapts to the circumstances in town, and 
find some kind of work, slbe has to repay the initial investment of the household in their 
migration. This is when urban-rural remittances start to assume a greater importance for the 
members staying behind in the rural area. They can now rely on the household's urban-derived 
income to smooth over temporary income deficits due to drought, etc. Migration can therefore 
be seen as a mechanism to pool risks and spread them over a wider range of income opportunities. 
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Circular migration as a ri sk-reducing strategy is part icularly common in the fonner homelands of 
South Africa and revolves around an aHempt 10 retain access to rura l land (both for agricultural 
and residential purposes) to serve as insurance against the event that something goes wrong for 
the migrant in the urban area (Spiegel 1980). Insurance is thus provided as a resul! o f the 
household's pooling of its avai lable labourers and dispatching them to differen t occupations and 
places. Most members of the household stay behind in the rural area, but the household members 
with the h ighest urban income potent ial are di spatched as circular migrants. 
Another reason why a household may dispatch circular migrants is (Q take advantage of the 
earnings possibil ities to be found in urban areas while at the same time consuming the money 
earned there in the rural areas (Hugo 1985:78). This is done by send ing only the wage worker to 
town and retaining everybody e lse in the rural area. The rationale for consuming in the 
countryside is that consumption costs are often lower there with the result that the money earned 
in town stretches further (Hugo 1985; Nelson 1992). Consumption costs are lower because water 
can often be drawn for free from communal water sources while firewood can be collected for 
free, for example. The assoc iation of women with these consumption tasks (the reason for this is 
not examined by the household strateg ies approach) prov ides another reason why they, rather than 
men, stay behind in the rural areas. 
The home base from which circular migration is launched does not only have to be a rura l area. 
Todes ( 1998) describes how the town of Newcastle in KwaZulu-Natal serves as a home base for 
many migrant labourers. Newcastle is attractive for this function because it has better services 
than rura l areas, it is considered safer for a family than the metropol itan areas (less po lit ica l 
vio lence) and the condit ions for local income generation are more favourable (Todes 1998:46-47). 
Households also retain Newcast le as their home base, even after the breadwinners may have lost 
their jobs there. because they have already invested much in their houses in that area~ . Because 
of thei r assoc iatio n with reproductive activities, women are more likely to stay behind in 
Newcast le, with men leaving as circular migrants. Chant (1992a) describes a very s imilar situat ion 
2 This dec is ion has to be seen in the context of a shortage of housing in the metropo litan 
areas and the easy access to hous ing land in the fanner homeland areas surrounding the town of 
Newcastle, 
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in the case of female migrants to towns in the province ofGuanacasteco, Costa Rica. They move 
to these towns because land for housing is more readily available (land invasions are more likely 
to be tolerated here than in the larger cities - Chant I 992a: 61) and other consumption costs are 
also lower. In addition these towns are closer the areas of origin of the female migrants and this 
allows them to retain more links with their networks of family and friends. While the women (and 
their children) mostly stay behind in the Guanacasteco towns after migration, men leave these 
towns as circular migrants to work in seasonal agriculture and in the bigger cities, such as the 
capital city San Jose . It is, as in the case of Newcastle. women' s association with reproductive 
activities that is responsible for the fact that they are ·the one who stay behind to maintain the 
home base of the household (Chant 1992a:61). 
The household strategies approach can also provide an explanation for the age selectivity of 
migration. The predominance of young adults in migration streams is consistent with the 
developmental cycle of rural households in the Southern African context (cf. Murray 1981). 
Murray argues that social differentiation between rural households has a cyclical element that is 
not picked up by cross-sectional studies, and that temporary rural-urban migration is part of this 
cyclical differentiation. In the ideal typical scenario~ young men are initially landless, and are under 
an obligation to earn an income to support their parents'. In order to do this, they become 
involved in a limited period of circular rural-urban migration. Remitting income to their parents 
and supporting the rural economy in this way is, in terms of the prevailing tenure system, also a 
precondition far acquiring land at a later stage. When they get married and have children, they 
may be allocated a residential plot. The men generally want their wives to live on that plot in the 
rural area to look after the children, while they live elsewhere near their work. When they are 
older, and when they have accumulated rural assets such as a house to live in, canle, agricultural 
land, and implements such as a tractor that can be rented out to others, the migrant may retire to 
the rural area. At this stage in the developmental cycle the (now previous) migrant hopefully can 
depend on the reminances of his children in turn. According to the developmental cycle argument. 
households at this stage of their development are at the peak of their earning capacity. because 
) In sub-Saharan Africa women can generally only acquire land in terms of the tenure 
system if they are widows (Brysan 1981). They are also less likely to be migrants, as discussed 
previously. 
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they now have a rural income. as well as an income from the ir children's remittances. The 
implications of this argument for the age selectivity of migrat ion is therefore that while men are 
young. they are more likely to be migrants. and when they are o lder. they are more likely to stay 
at home. 
The developmental cycle argument only makes sense as long as there is enough agrit:uhuralland 
avai lable so that the migrant can eventually acquire some in the way described above. With the 
increasing pressure on land in the fonner homeland areas of rural South Africa and changes in the 
land tenure system. the possibility of eventually acquiring agricultural land is becoming less and 
less. which reduces the applicability of the developmental cyc le argument (Spiegel 1982). Men 
nowadays have fewer possibilities to retire earl y, given their lack of rural resources, and are 
increasingly forced to be migrant workers over the ent ire period in which they are econom ically 
acti ve. 
3.3.4 SOCIAL STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SELECTIVITY OF MIGRATION 
These explanat ions focus on the social structural forces that can either immobilise some categories 
of people in the rural areas or alternative ly force them to migrate. Because these forces operate 
selecti vely, they can also provide an explanation for the selectivi ty of migration. According' to 
Standing (198 1) for example. in a semi-feudalist rura l setup (as is fo und in parts of modem India) 
the poorest part of the rural population can be immobilised there through indebtedness. The 
relations between landlords and their tenants in these parts of India is typically structured in such 
a way that tenants do not earn enough money to survive on a permanent basis. They consequently 
need to borrow money from the landlord all the time and in this way end up in a kind of bondage 
to the landlord (not un like serfdom in medieval Europe) that does not allow them to move away. 
The influx control system in the rural areas of South Africa in the past was a similar semi-feudal ist 
setup in the sense that it also attempted to immobili se agricultural workers. 
According to Standing ( 1981) the situation changes, however. once agriculture becomes full y 
com mercialised. Landlords then want to get rid of thei r tenants. who are often forced off the land 
in one way or another. The previously immobil ised workers are now forced to join the migrant 
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streams to the urban areas. This scenario is described with telling effect by John Steinbeck in his 
work of fiction Grapes of Wrath. He shows in that book how sharecroppers are forced off the 
land in the 1930's in the American Midwest and how they leave for California to find work picking 
fruit on the Californian farms. A similar story is told by Sol Plaatje in his book Native life inSourh 
Africa when he describes the effect of the 1913 Land Act on black labour tenants in South Africa. 
The relevance of Standing' s argument for selectivity is thus that the poorest can either be totally 
under represented in migration streams when they are immobilised or they can join these streams 
in large numbers when they are pushed off the land. Which of the two predominates at any 
particular time depends, as we saw above. on trends in the development of the relations of 
production in agriculture. 
Social structural explanations have also been advanced for the gender selectivity of migration. 
They emerge in the context of a criticism of the household strategies approach. This approach 
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assumes that the household's decision to deploy a member ofa particular sex in town is a purely 
economically rational decision, depending on the possibilities for off-fann employment of that 
member and hislher potential contribution to agriculture. According to feminists this approach 
does not adequately confront the gender division of labour which is a reflection of both power 
differentials within the household and cultural traditions and which helps to decide how the 
household is going to allocate its labour (Radcliffe 1991). According to Radcliffe (1991) young 
single women in the Andean region of Latin America are more likely to migrate than young men 
because the gender division of labour does not give them an important role in agricultural 
activities. In sub-Saharan Africa. by contrast, the gender division oflabour gives women the lion's 
share of agricultural duties and this helps to explain why African women are less likely to be 
represented in migrant streams. 
The independent movement of women is not only constrained by the gender division of labour. 
It can also be limited by a number of other factors associated with gender, such as the 
stigmatisation of independent female migrants to town as prostitutes in parts of West Africa 
(Chant and Radcliffe 1992: 14, Brydon 1992:99) or cultural traditions such as seclusion which, 
in parts of South Asia with a strong Islamic influence. make independent movement impossible 
for women (Chant and Radcliffe 1992:7). According to llcan (1994:567), in the village ofSakli 
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in northweste rn Turkey. "it would be culturally imposs ible for a woman to travel by herself to 
seasonal wage work." On the same page she observes that "(I)n Sakli. it is considered 
inappropriate fo r women to \Nork outside the vi llage. as it is bel ieved that a woman's duty is to 
look after her family and the fields."' 
It has also frequently been observed that the mobility of women is more controlled than that of 
men, both by the state and by their families, In parts of Asia. daughters are often told by their 
parents when and where they might move, while their unaccompanied migration is discouraged 
(Chant and Radcliffe 1992: \5). They are also expected to retain morc ties to their households of 
origin (Chant and Radc li ffe 1992: 17) and do so out of their own accord because they attach more 
importance to kinship relations (Chant and Radcli ffe 1992: 17), In line with this, parents often 
demand a larger share of the remittances of daughters than ofsons(Chant and Radc lifTe 1992: 15). 
In the pas t there were even stronger controls over the movement of women. Bozzoli (1983 . 
199 1 :89), describing the women of Phokeng near Rustenhurg, relates how the migration of 
women was constrained during the 1920's: they could, for example, not purchase train tickets 
without the pennission of the chief. Brown (1983 :384) recounts a story of similar restrictions on 
women in Botswana that lasted until at least the 1940's (a lso see Sharp and Spiegel 1990:534, 
Brydon 1992:99). According to Pedraza (1991 :3 11 ), male emigration trom the villages. of 
Kostroma province in late 19th century Russia had the contrary effect of immobil ising women. 
;;'As peasants, the family was an economic unit of production. not just of consumpt ion, and 
marriage to a vi llage girl tied the young man who left more firmly to the family-economy as the 
wife continued to work in agriculture, in his place, and to live with her in-laws. Fami lies thus 
placed greater constraints on women's migrat ion than they did on men' s; hence. few women 
migrated." 
3.4 CHANGES IN SELECTIVITY OVER TIME 
3.4. 1 TRENDS IN THE COSTS OF MIGRATION 
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It is not clear whether selectivity is a temporary phenomenon. characteristic of the initial stages 
of the migration process, or whether it is a more permanent feature of the migration process. If 
it is the former, the migrant stream will eventually exhibit the same characteristics as the 
population of origin. The inequality inducing effect of selective migration is then restricted to the 
initial phases of the growth of a migrant stream between a community of origin and a particular 
destination area. Besides the impact of maturing networks, discussed in section 3.4.2, the major 
factor explaining these changes is trends in the costs of migration. The costs of migration will 
especially affect income selectivity. because, as we saw above, the poorest are least able to afford 
the costs of migration. If this constraint on their migration is reduced, one can expect more of 
them to leave their areas of origin. 
One of the major social processes occurring at present is 'time·space convergence' (Janelle 1968). 
Due to faster, and increased, telecommunication links, and improved transport facilities, the 
distance between places becomes less of an obstacle, and, for all practical purposes, shrinks. Marx 
called this process the armihilation of space by time. An example of this is the changes occurring 
among the Frafras of Ghana (Population Information Program 1983:M-255, also see the 
description of Pedi and Ndzundza-Ndbele migration in 19<h century South Africa - chapter 7 
below): 
The Frafras of northeastern Ghana who migrated in the 1930's had to walk for two or 
three weeks to cover the 330 miles to the city ofKumasi. In the 1970's they could travel 
the 500 miles to Accra in a single day by bus or truck for the relatively small sum of two 
pounds (UK). 
In South Africa, the rise of the kombi-taxi industry led to a similar rise in the mobility of the 
population due to increased access to transport. These changes reduce the cost of transport, and 
increase the amount of infonnation people have about migration destinations. In this way the 
deterrent effects of distance on migration is reduced. The implementation of universal education 
with its impact on literacy levels and thus the amount of information at the disposal of people will 
similarly reduce the costs of migration for most people. 
There are limits to the extent to which these changes will reduce the costs of migration. One of 
the reasons for this is that the fruits of the process of time/space convergence are unequally 
distributed, as pointed out by Doreen Massey (1991). Those with money, andlor information, are 
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far more able to take advantage of the new technology. and for them distance is less oran obstacle 
than for those who are poor. This is confimled by David Harvey ( 1989:265-266), who says that 
"low income populations. usually lacking the means to overcome and hence command space. find 
themselves for the most part trapped in space". 
Another reason why the costs of migration may not decline that much is that they may not have 
been so high to begin with. This will be the case if there is a significant amount of recruiting done 
by employers. In South Africa, for example, there was a labour shortage for most of the period 
of capitalist development until around the t 960's. Much of the work on offer was low paying and 
unpleasant, or dangerous (especially in the mining and farming sectors). and employers constant ly 
complained about not having enough workers (Greenberg 1980: 152). In an attempt to induce 
more migration employers recruited workers by usi ng touts, general dealers. and later on. labour 
bureaus in the former homeland areas of South Africa. '{'his system lowered the costs of migration 
because workers received cash advances and free or subsidised transport and lodging. This 
situation changed after the early 1970's when the economy moved into a permanent labour surplus 
mode. Recruitment stopped and job seekers had to make their own way to town to look for work 
The fina l reason is that although some of the costs associated with migration may be lowered. 
others may rise. Transport and information costs may be reduced, but in most cases the 
subsistence costs entered into whi le looking for work increase. This is due (Q the increased 
unemployment rates that characterise the development process in most Third World societies. It 
takes. on average, now much longer to find a job than before, with a resultant increase in 
subsistence costs while looking fo r a job. 
3.4 .2 MASSEY ET AL.'S STUDY OF CROSS-BORDER MIGRATION FROM MEXICO 
Besides changes in the costs of migration, selecti vity is influenced by migrant networks. Ifmore 
people get, over time, access to networks that link migrants and non-migrants, selectivity is likely 
to decline. This is because networks subsidise the costs of migration. [n a study done on 
transnational migration from Mexico to the US, Douglas Massey and his associates (1994a) argue 
for an interpretation along these lines. Their study is very important and is going to be the major 
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focus of my attempt to combine the literature on remittances and inequality on the one hand with 
a focus on the unfolding of selectivity as the migration process develops on the other. In the 
process of combining these two, I hope to shed some more light on both. [n particular it opens 
up a new approach to the literature on the impact of remittances on inequality. It also enriches the 
work of Massey et aI., since it shows that the discussion around changes in selectivity has 
implications for policy beyond those already recognized. 
According Masey et a1. the first crOss border migrants from Mexico to the V.S. in a typical village 
are selected in terms of income, age and gender, as previously indicated. This is because of the 
costs as well as the risks associated with cross-border migration. Soon however, there are enough 
people with migration experience in that community to act as bridge headers for the rest of their 
families. Chain migration then ensues. These networks reduce the costs and risks of migration, 
thus reducing the amount of selection in migration streams. Since their (1994a: 1495) argument 
is quite important in this context, it is worth quoting in full. 
International migration is a costly and risky exercise, and those who undertake it are 
usually selected on demographic. social, economic, and psychological grounds. Social 
capital, however, plays a powerful role in mitigating these costs and risks, and its 
accumulation over time tends to reduce the selectivity of migration. Variation in the 
amount and quality of social capital can, therefore, produce very different migration 
streams over time and across communities, making migration patterns appear to be 
discrepant when, in fact, they reflect the same underlying process. 
They argue as a result of this that variation in selectivity that appears in crossectional studies of 
villages will disappear once the length of time those villages have been engaging in cross-border 
migration is taken into account. A similar argument is advanced by Zoorners (1986:64-65) and 
Skeldon (1990:66, 185). Villages that have been engaged in cross-border migration for a longer 
time will exhibit less selectivity than those that have recently been linked into the process. 
Synchronic variation should therefore disappear if we can fit villages diachronically into different 
stages of a developmental process. 
In order to allow comparison between communities that are at similar stages in this developmental 
process but in different parts of calendar time, Massey et al. (1994a) developed what they call the 
migration prevalence ratio. They (1994a: 1495) describe it as follows: 
For any community in any year, the prevalence ratio is defined as the number of people 
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with international migratory exper ience di vided by the total number of people ali ve. It can 
be calculated retrospectively for any year in the recent past given just two pieces of 
infonnation: the date of each respondent's birth and the date of his or her first foreign tr ip. 
By applying this instrument, they argue, it is possible 10 see ifcommunities with a longer history 
of cross-border migration produce less selectivity and thus test their hypothesis. 
Massey et al (1994a) applied this instrument in a survey of 19 Mexican villages in Western 
Mexico, a part of Mexico that sends large numbers of migrants to the U.S. They (1994a: 1513) 
calculated migration prevalence ratios for each community for every year since 1940, and then 
ass igned each 'community year' to one oftive prevalence categories. Each category represents a 
stage in the evolution of migration, from low exposure to international migration to the stage of 
mass migration. A migration prevalence level ofless than 10% of the population defined the first 
category, less than 20% the second. and so on, until the category of mass migration where more 
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than 40% is involved in migration, is reached. All 19 villages fell into the first category, 18 of 
them reached the second, 15 the third , e ight the fourth, and only two of these evolved inlO (he 
stage of mass migration. 
The five categories of the migration prevalence ratio serve as the independent variables in their 
study (Massey et al. 1994a: 151 3). They attempt to find out if common patterns can be observed 
in the migration streams of these villages by comparing the characteristics of these streams 
between different prevalence levels. The indicator used to measure the amount of selectivity 
present in migration streams is the diversity index (Massey et al. 1994a: 1518). The diversity index 
for each dependent variable is compi led by looking at the distribution of the migrants between the 
different categories of that variable. Educational level, for example, is divided by them (Massey 
et aL 1994a: 1525) into 3 categories: none, 1-5 years, and more than 6 years. If all the migrants 
are concentrated in the lowest educational category, for example, diversity is zero. Conversely, 
if the migrants are distributed evenly between the three categories, diversity is at it s maximum 
( 100%). 
Given my interest in socioeconom ic selectivity I sha ll focus on their discussion of this aspecl. They 
(Massey et aL 1994a: 1525) investigate the educational levels, property ownership and Mexican 
occupation of migrants in the year before their first U.S. trip. According to them (Massey et al. 
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1994a: 1526) the diversity of the migrant stream with respect to educational levels increases over 
time as villages move from low to high prevalence. Diversity varies from 36% in the first stage, 
53% in the second, 55% in the third, 51 % in the fourth. and 63% in the last stage. Since the 
prevalence rate of the last stage is calculated using only two (largely agricultural) villages, by their 
own admission (Massey et al. 1994a: 1526) there has to be some doubt about the generalisability 
of the trends observed in this stage. This leaves us with a fairly stable pattern (that is 53%, 55% 
and 51 %) after an initial increase in diversity from 36%. 
Massey et al. (1994a) did not calculate a diversity index for land and business ownership. The 
reason for this is probably the fact that, in all the prevalence categories, only a small proportion 
of migrants were owners, with the result that the diversity index would give a low reading in all 
. the phases. Land ownership starts from 6% and 8% of migrants respectively in the first two 
phases, move to 5% in the third and fourth phases and ends in 0,5% in the last phase. Massey et 
at. (1994a: 1526) assert that these changes are an indication of a declining selectivity, but it is 
unclear why they think this. The very low proportion of land ownership in all the prevalence 
categories certainly cannot be an indication that it is at first the middle poor who migrate and that 
it changes later on. According to Massey et al. (1994a:1526) they could not discern a clear trend 
for business ownership, due to fluctuating ownership patterns between the prevalence phases. 
Massey et al. (I 994a: 1526-1527) also compared the proportion of migrants who were engaged 
in agricultural occupations over the prevalence categories. Here they found a curvilinear pattern, 
with the proportion of agricultural occupations starting off at a high level, then declining and 
rising again in the last two prevalence categories. In addition Massey et al. (1994a: 1527) 
calculated diversity indexes for occupational groups (such as skilled manual, unskilled manual and 
services). The trend observed is once again a curvilinear one, starting with low diversity, 
increasing after that and tailing off again in the last two prevalence stages. 
Ifwe, for the moment, accept Massey et al.'s (1994a) indicator of selectivity (the diversity index) 
as valid, one can conclude that they found a limited amount of confirmation of their thesis of 
declining socio-economic selectivity. as well as some contrasting evidence that selectivity may rise 
again after declining initially. Majordoubtsexist, however, about the validity of the diversity index 
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as an indicator of se lectivity. A migrant stream is se lective in so far as it deviates with regard to 
a particular variab le (say income) from the distribution observed in the village of orig in (see my 
defin ition of se lectivity a t the beginning of th is chapter). In order to make meaningful observations 
about selectivity one therefore needs infonnation about the distribution of th is variable both in the 
migrant stream and in the village of o rig in . Massey el al.'s ( 1994a) research design makes it. 
however. unlikely that they would have been able to tind the information abo ut village 
characteristics tha( are necessary for a proper study of selecti vity. They work with mig rants in 
community years stretching all the way back to 1940. and therefore need info rmation about v illage 
characteristics for every year since 1940. Since it is unlikely that such a data set exists. and since 
it is impossible to reconstruct it retrospective ly. they are forced to rely on an indicator such as the 
dive rsity index. 
The diversity index measures the unifonnity or di versity of the migrant stream as such. without 
any reference to the characteri sti cs o f the village of origin. There is. however. no guarantee that 
a high ly di ve rse migrant stream is a correct indicator of low selectivity. It was pointed out above 
that the diversity index is an indication of how evenly migrants are distributed over the categories 
of a particular variable . Consider the following example. Let us say that educational level is 
divided into four categories (e.g. no schooling, primary. secondary and tertiary). and that migrants 
from village A are distributed as follows between these categories. 
Table 3.1 
Educational levels of migrants in village A 
No schoo ling Primary Secondary Tertiary 
60% 20% 10% 10% 
Because the majority of migrants are clustered into the first category. it is clear that this migrant 
stream wi ll yield a very low di vers ity index. indicating. according to (Massey et a l. 1994a). that 
selec ti vity is high. I f. however. the total population of village A exhibits the same d istribution. that 
is 60% has no schoo ling, 20% only a primary schooling. \0% secondary and 10% tertiary. the 
selec tivity of migration will be zero far as education is concerned . In other words. migrants are 
a random sample of the population o f orig in in this regard . 
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Now let us assume that the distribution of educational level stays the same over time in village A, 
but that the composition of the migrant stream changes. The latter now looks like the following: 
Table 3.2 
Educational level of migrants at a later date 
No schooling Primary Secondary Tertiary 
30% 20% 30% 20% 
The diversity of the migrant stream has evidently become much less, and according to Massey et 
al. (l994a), it is now an indication of less selectiviry. Given that the distribution of the whole 
village has stayed the same, it is, however, very obvious that the migrant stream has in fact 
become much more selective. There is now a much greater tendency than before for migrants to 
be more educated than the population of origin. 
This leads us to the conclusion that the diversity index is a very poor indicator of migrant 
selectivity and that Massey et al.'s (1994a) conclusions with regard to selectivity cannot be 
regarded as carrying much weight. The only place where the diversity index will yield anything 
close to meaningful results is with a variable such as sex, which should, under most circumstances, 
be relatively evenly distributed among the population of origin. It is unfortunate (and ironic) that 
Massey et al.'s (1994a) very original attempt to account for diachronic variation (by standardising 
communities according to their stage of migration prevalence) should at the same make it 
impossible for them to take a proper measurement of changes in selectivity. 
3.4.3. AN AL TERNA TIVE APPROACH TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTIVITY: THE 
WORK OF RICHARD JONES 
For an alternative view of the development of selectivity I now turn to the work of Richard Jones 
(1998). lones's article is in fact about the effect of remittances on inequality, but 1 discuss his 
work here rather than at the end of chapter 2 or two reasons: he places much emphasis on changes 
in the selectivity of migration, and he uses a different approach from the authors discussed at the 
end of chapter one - he does not estimate non-migration income using econometric techniques and 
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he does not lI se Gini-indices to measure inequality. 
For lanes (1998: 11-12). rhe se lectivity of migration is an important factor in detennining how 
remittances will be distributed in a community. Like Lipton (1980) and Stark et al. (1986), lanes 
(1998: 14) explains changes in selec ti vity (specifically income selectivity) by regarding migration 
as the diffusion of an innovation. In tenns of this framework. migration goes through three phases 
as it spreads through a community, according to l anes: the innovator, the early adopter and the 
late adopter stages. In the innovator stage. the se lectivity ofrnigration is high. and only members 
of relatively well-off households migrate . In this stage, migration will worsen the pre-exi st ing 
income distribution. Income inequality decrease in the early adaptor stage as communication 
between the innovators and the other residents introduce more people to migration, especially 
those who are less well-off. In this stage the selectivity of migration decreases. This trend is 
reversed again in (he late adaptor stage. In this stage, the commuty becomes divided between a 
migrant class and an "expanding non-migrant class composed of poor families who have never 
sent migrants or who are inactive" (lones 1998: 14). The income distribution in the community 
becomes more skewed as selectivi ty increases. What Jones is therefore proposing is a U-shaped 
curve for the development of selectivity. Selectivity is first high, then it decreases and ultimately 
it increases again. 
lones unfortunately does not explain why selectivity should follow this trend. The changes 
occurring from the innovator to the early adaptor phases have been described numerous times by 
other authors and relates to the expansion of networks that lower the costs of migration. Why this 
process should be reversed in the last phase is not at all well explained by Jones. however. One 
gathers that it has to do with the observation that households who have previously sent people 
are not doing so anymore. but it is not c lear why this should happen. Presumably this is because 
some households are better able to establish migrant networks than others. The absence of an 
appropriate explanation for this is a major shortcom ing of Jones's theory. Through the addition 
of this third phase Jones's theory becomes very different from that of Massey et al. in its 
implications for inequality, but he does not identify any factors that are responsible for thi s 
reversal in the pre-existing trend. In chapter 6 I shall make an argument why I think that 
selectivity may ri se again after declining initially. r base this on changes in the costs of migration 
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as well as the capacity of networks to subsidise the costs of migration. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
From this discussion it emerges that the functioning of networks is crucial to our understanding 
of what will happen to the selectivity of migration over time. There does not appear to be any 
conclusive empirical studies with regard to how migrant streams change. as we saw from our 
discussion of Massey et al.'g work, and this question is thus still wide open. According to 
Dinerman (1978:498) the poorest do not have the resources to 'build and maintain wide social . 
networks linking them to other households' and will as a result not be represented in migration 
. streams. We therefore need to answer the question of whether resources are necessary to maintain 
access to networks or not. If the answer is 'yes', Massey et a\.'5 argument will at most apply to the 
age and gender selectivity of migration. and not to income selectivity. The next chapter is devoted 
to a discussion of networks in an attempt to illuminate this question. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIAL NETWORKS IN THE MIGRATION PROCESS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Interest in the role of networks in the migration process dates from the 1970's. The issue came 
to the fore for two, related, reasons. The first was the collapse of modernization theory as a 
description of social development in the Third World. Modernization theo rists such as Talcott 
Parsons claimed that the extended family will be replaced by the isolated nuclear family during the 
modernization process (Choldin 1973. Gelderblom and Kok 1994: 16-18). Over time it became 
clear, however, that extended families, as well as wide r kinship structures, continue to be 
important features of developing societ ies. Poor people, in particular, try to keep extended family 
structures intact , as we ll as maintaining intense contacts with wider kinship structures. Fami ly 
structures therefore become neither nuclear nor isolated from wider kinship structures during 
modernization, crit ics maintained. This is because kinship networks offer mutual support in times 
of crisis, as we ll as eas ing the migration process of individuals. Because of the continuing 
relevance of kinship networks, studies of rural-urban migration can consequently not ignore the 
role played by them. 
The second reason why an inte rest in networks developed concerns the critique o f the so-ca lled 
myth of marginality (Perlman t 976). Studies of the urban structure of Latin American countries 
used to assume, much along the lines ofmodemization theory , that recent rural-urban migrants 
are socially and poli tically isolated from the wide r urban community (this became known as the 
margina lity-thesis) and suffered from the social disorganisation caused by recent migrat ion. In 
contrast to this. analysts now stressed that rural-urban migration does not necessari ly sever the 
links between migrants and thei r communities of orig in and therefore does not have to lead to 
social disorgan isat ion I (Keamey 1986). It became evident that the social links between the areas 
I In th is chapter I shall show that. in some cases. these links are indeed broken. wi th 
negative implicat ions for the migration prospects o f those who have stayed behind . 
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of origin and the urban areas play an important role in facilitating the process of rural-urban 
migration. Within the urban areas there are also diverse kinship and communal networks that 
fonned the basis for organized community life (Gurak and Caces 1992: 154), once again focussing 
attention on the role of networks. 
Studies of networks in migration focussed largely on their role in reducing the costs of migration. 
A prominent example of this is the work of Massey and his associates, to which I referred at the 
end of the previous chapter. In this chapter I intend going beyond this focus by investigating what 
Boyd (1989) calls the dynamics of networks. She (1989:655) believes that we should in particular 
establish why networks may fail to appear or why they may weaken and disappear. Another issue 
that Bayd feels should receive attention is conceptual issues surrounding networks. In this respect 
I consider, amongst others, the insights to be derived from the sociological tradition of network 
analysis, which has developed largely independently of the migration literature's study of 
networks. I use Davern' s (1997) distinction between the structural, nonnative and resource 
aspects of networks to discuss the structure and functioning of migration networks. 
4,2 CONCEPTUAL ISSUES SURROUNDING NETWORKS 
4.2.1 DEFINING NETWORKS 
In the most fonnal sense, a network can be defined as a set of interconnected nodes (Castells 
1996:470). In the case of social networks, the nodes represent actors, whether these be individuals 
or organisations, and the connections are social bonds between actors (Davern 1997:288). A 
tradition of network analysis has developed in sociology that uses this definition of networks. This 
conception of social networks is more fonnalistic than the definition typically used by the 
migration literature, but it has the advantage of focussing attention on the structure of networks. 
I shall return to this issue when I discuss network structure. 
The migration literature has not made much use of the sociological tradition of network analysis 
up to now (Boyd 1989:654, Gurak and Caces 1992: 160). The contribution of urban 
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anthropologists and specilica tl y the work of Larissa Lomnitz (1977) on the soc ial ti es o f 
shantytown dwellers in Mexico city has been more influential in forming the migration literature's 
conception of networks2• According to her ( 1977:3 -4) shanty towns are inhabited by people who 
do not have access tajahs in the fonnal sector of the economy. They have low levels of sk i 11. are 
consequently bad ly pa id, enjoy little job security. and often work in the informal sector. This raises 
the question of how they manage to survive. The answer is that they use the only resource that 
they have in abundance. which is their kinship and fri endship ties. They help their kin or friends 
when these are in need or when they have something extra to share and expect to be helped in 
turn. Lomnitz calls this reciprocal exchange. Reciprocal exchange smooths over the irregu lar 
earnings of people who are frequently unemployed and provides security in the form of loans 
during times of crisis. Those who participate in these exchanges form a network. Lomnitz 
(1977: 132) consequently defines a network as 'the flow of reciproca l exchange of goods, services. 
and economically va luable information'. In terms of the formal delinition offered above. the nQdes 
are individual poor people and the connect ions are kinship and friendship ties. The purpose of 
the network determines the form that the network will take and this is captured by the term 
'organising focus' (see Gurak and Caces 1992: 162). The organising focus of the network in this 
case is reciprocal exchange for survival. 
In Lomnitz ' s case the organising focus of the network does not involve facilitation of migration. 
It is however not a great conceptual leap to broaden the conception of networks to include this 
as one of the organising functions of the network. This is done in Kearney's (1986) conception 
of the art iculatory migrant network. which she (1986:354) defines as a 'vascular system through 
which fl ows persons, information, goods, services and economic value'. Kearney's metaphor of 
the vascular system suggests that people and other things circulate within the network along well-
defined palhs. linkingat least two and sometimes a numberofplaces3 . When migrants leave home 
they continue to circulate between origin and destination areas. carrying information. money and 
' This paragraph is based primarily on Gelderb lom and Kok (1994:3&) . 
.3 Kearney's use of the term 'articulatory' to describe migrant networks is derived from the 
modes of production literature and is intended to focus attention on the way in which networks 
connect different modes of production in urban and rural areas. This aspect does not feature very 
strongly in my own conception of networks and I shall therefore dispense with the use of the term 
'articulatory'. 
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goods between the two. Besides calling attention to circulation, the metaphor of the vascular 
system also suggests images of well-worn paths traced through space along which the migrant 
can proceed more easily. 
It is evident that in a migrant network the actual spatial distribution of the individuals (nodes) in 
the network comes to the fore. This is different from the tradition of network analysis in 
sociology) where the distribution of individuals in social space is considered but their arrangement 
in geographical space is ignored. When considering the structure of the migrant network we 
therefore have to look at how people are distributed in space between origin and destination areas. 
It is clear that migrant networks can vary in terms of their spatial complexity. [n the simplest case 
the network will link one origin and one destination area. More complex networks can stretch 
over numerous origin and destination areas, and can facilitate any combination of rural-urban, 
urban-rural , urban-urban as well as rural-rural migration. It can also grow to include international 
destination areas. Networks are especially important in the case ofinternational migration. The 
cost of international migration is high and this brings the cost-reducing properties of the network 
to the fore (Gurak and Caces 1992: 153). 
Because of the physical distance covered by migrant networks more effort has to be put into 
maintaining them (Gurak and Caces 1992: 152) and the probability of being separated from such 
a network consequently increases.lfslhe does not like the responsibility of supporting the family 
left behind in a distant rural area a migrant family member can easily disappear in the big city, 
compared to a situation where the whole family lives together in the same place. In the case of 
migrant networks the rule of 'out of sight, out of mind' applies. It is consequently important that 
news in the fonn ofletters and phone calls, as well as gifts and visitors keep on circulating in the 
migrant network so that the social bonds sustaining it does not wither away. Boyd (1989:650) 
mentions four ways in which migrant networks are maintained over space: I) through return 
migration of previous migrants; 2) visits of migrants; 3) activities such as sports associations or 
village fetes linking the area of origin and the destination area; and 4) 'marriages which sustain 
kinship obligations across time and space .. .' (Boyd 1989:650). Gurak and Caces (I 992: 152) 
hypothesise that migrant networks may function differently than the community-based social 
support networks studied by Lomnitz because of the effort involved in sustaining migrant 
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networks. 
Another definition of migrant networks is offered by Massey et al. (1994b:728). According to 
them migrant networks are 'sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrams, fanner mi grants. and 
nonmigrants in origin and destination areas through ti es of kinship, friendship, and shared 
community origin.' Reciprocal exchange is, as in the case ofLomnitz's networks. the basis of the 
migran t network. Thi s implies that an individual wi ll be helped to migrate, let's say from a rural 
area to town. by connections living in town on the understanding that slhe will be able to help 
them some time in future (as we shall see, this aspec t of network functioning is important in 
determ ining how networks will develop over time and who will be included in the network and 
who excluded). Reciprocal exchange involves trust that the beneficiary at one stage wil! 
reciprocate at a later stage, as well as normative prescriptions that one should help others. It is 
here that the interpersonal ties referred to by Massey et a l. ( 1994) comes to the fore. Because they 
involve ties of long standing, they provide the basis for trust. This trust increases the likel ihood 
that an individual wi ll be helped by someone else in the network. The advantages accruing to an 
individual by virtue of network membership (such as the help received during migration) is called 
'social capital' (Massey and Espinosa 1997:95 1). It is therefore clear that networks generate social 
capital which can faci li tate migration. 
By mentioning former migrants in their definition, Massey et al. draw attention to the fac t that the 
faci litator of migration is often a previous migrant him/ herself. This is why migration that takes 
place with the help of networks has often been ca l!ed chain migration (see for example Banerjee 
1983). In chai n migration the process is set in motion by a pioneering migrant. Once the pioneer 
has established himlherself in the new location. they are now in a position to help others who 
belong to the network to migrate as well. As a result a chain is fonned between orig in and 
destination communities by which the initial migration leads to a stream of new migrants. 
Drawing all the e lements discussed previously together, we can define a migrant network as the 
soc ial ties between a set of geographica lly dispersed individuals that fac ilitate the circulation of 
people, information and goods. 
68 
4.2 .2 DEFINING THE HOUSEHOLD 
Given our definition of the migrant network, the question arises how the migrant network can be 
differentiated from the household, since the household is also a group of (sometimes spatially 
dispersed) individuals linked together by social ties. The question is therefore one of boundary 
maintenance and specifically in terms of what factors households maintain boundaries with 
networks'. While we need to conceptually distinguish between household and network, the extent 
to which households are in practice distinct from networks is always a matter of empirical 
observation. I point out below that households are not always clearly distinguishable entities. 
Bossen (1981) offers one way to distinguish between the two. Her (I 981 :29 I) solution to the 
problem of boundary maintenance is to associate the household with investment and the network 
with consumption and expense sharing. She is critical of the view of the household that regards 
it as being mostly concerned with short term survival of household members. According to her 
a household can be identified by the existence of a mutual long-term commitment to acquire 
durable assets. Households try to improve the long-term economic security of their members by 
acquiring assets such as land, housing and cattle. These are the savings of the household and can 
be sold to acquire cash when necessary. Whereas the household is concerned with long-term 
commitments and savings, the network is involved in short-tenn reciprocal exchange to facilitate 
consumption, according to her. Households therefore go together with ownership relations. It is 
in the nature of establishing ownership relations that it must be made very clear who has a claim 
on these household assets, and who has not. The boundary defined for this purpose is the 
boundary in terms of which boundary maintenance with the network is going to occur. The 
problem of boundary maintenance can thus be resolved, Bossen believes. 
It is certainly true that the household is more likely to be a unit of investment than the network. 
It is common knowledge that households acquire durable assets, such as housing. Because the 
network is more likely to be ephemeral than the household, it is not such a good vehicle for long 
term investment. Households by contrast are more likely to be stable, simply because they are 
often based on closer family connections than the network. It is not however true that households 
'This discussion is partly based on Gelderblom and Kok (1994:44-47). 
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are always units of investment, and sometimes the network can also be a unit of investment. 
Inves tment is therefore one of the distinguishing character ist ics of households but it cannot be the 
only one. Moreover. the absence of investment cannot di squalify a domestic unit from being a 
household. It is neither a necessary nor a sufficient characteristic of the household but certainly 
a common one. 
The first justification for thi s position is that households can sometimes be very unstable. 'n the 
South African context it has been pointed out (cf. Spiegel 1987, Spiegel et al. 1996) that ext reme 
poverty and violent urban conflic t can prevent household consolidation, with the resu lt that 
households keep breaking up and refonning. Household catastrophes such as the death or 
unemployment of a breadwinner, for example, may necessitate the transferral of househo ld 
members to other households. Household tiss ion and fusion is not restricted to South Africa -
elsewhere in Africa (and increasingly in South Africa itse lf) the death of caregivers in the 
household, caused by the Aidsepidemic, often leads to the fragmemation and then reconstitution 
of households. When subjected to so much instability, households cannot be vehicles for long term 
projects such as capital accumulation. 
In addition the household can be distinguished from the network by investment only as long as 
it has capital goods to share. Under ci rcumstances of extreme poverty there may be nothing to 
inherit. Gender and age divisions within the household must also be factored into the equation in 
the sense that a wife or a child may have a very tenuous claim on household assets. In the rural 
areas of South Africa the most likely asset a household will invest in, bes ides a house, is cattle. 
There are. however, cultural restrictions that prohibit a woman from being directly associated with 
cattle. By investing in cattle, a male migrant worker can acquire assets that his wife has no 
independent claim to (ef. Sharp and Spiegel 1990). This indicates that not everybody in the 
household participate on equal tenns in the investment fund and that some might be excluded 
altogether. In that case. they are also excluded per definition from being househo ld members. 
which in the case of a wife is clearly nonsensical. 
It is a lso possible to become part of two investment fund s, one belonging to the 'household' and 
one to the 'network'. Think for example of the case where a male migrant worker invests in cattle 
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that is grazed on his uncle's farm . These cattle are clearly identified as belonging to him, and as 
being distinct from his uncle's cattle, and thus a household is established around these assets. But 
what happens if he and his uncle decide to buy a light truck together and begin a small-scale 
transport business? There are now two investment funds, with the last one clearly belonging to 
the network and not to any individual household. 
All of the above lead to the conclusion that households are more likely to be ident ified by 
investment funds than the network, but this does not mean that they are the only entities to be so 
identified. Given that the long-tenn commitments necessary for investment is not always present 
in the household, we should perhaps return to the idea of associating the household with short-
tenn reciprocal exchange. 
According to Lomnitz, (1977: 132-134) the intensity of exchange within the network depends on 
the following four factors: 
a) fannal social distance, i.e. how closely people are related to each other (more exchange 
between brothers than between distant relatives and friends); 
b) physical distance (more exchange between people living together or between neighbours than 
between people separated over greater distances), 
c) economic distance: if the difference in the income levels ofpeopJe is too great, the poorest will 
not be able to reciprocate - given the necessity of reciprocity for the functioning of networks, they 
will thus be excluded from such exchange; 
d) psychosocial distance: in this case the intensity of exchange will depend on how closely people 
feel to one another. 
Except for the issue of economic distance which will be discussed below, the other three kinds 
of distance are relevant for our conception of the household. Networks consist of family. 
friendship and neigbourhood ties and. as discussed previously, the reciprocal exchange between 
network members depends on these ties. If the intensity of exchange between household members 
is higher, one can expect that the closeness of these ties must also be greater. Because households 
generally consist of closer family ties (at least the nuclear or extended family) the formal and 
probably psychosocial distance between household members are also less. This justifies the view 
of the household as a site of more intense exchange within the network. 
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One problem with this view. however. is that intense exchange obligat ions can exist between 
people who are not necessari ly part of the same household . Townsend (1997) refe rs to the 
obligations surrounding the position of mother's brother in Tswana socie ty. Because of the 
obl igation to help their s ister's child ren, men may have less money to share with their own 
household. accord ing to Townsend. We a lso have to take into consideration divisions within the 
househo ld with regard to the amount of exchange taking place. Kotze (1993:80-81 ) describes fo r 
example, the si tuation in Dixie, an impoverished settlement close to the Kruger National Park. 
Here households often contain members of the extended fami ly. A distinction is often madc. 
however. between the more extensive obligat ions between the nuclear (mother and child) unit 
w ithin the household on the one hand and obligations to other household members on the o ther. 
For example. if a mother leaves her chi ld in the care of her grandparents, she is supposed to make 
contributions to the upkeep of that child. The money she gives for that purpose is then earmarked 
for that chi ld only and other children in the household may go hungry as a resul t. The situat ion 
is the refore that even though the household is generally a zone of more intense exchange we also 
have to recognise the existence of smaller uni ts within the household that may be characte rised 
by even more in tense exchange. This makes it clear that we need more than the criterion of more 
intense exchange in order to dist inguish the household. 
This brings us to the third faClOrdetermining the amount of exchange tak ing place in the network. 
viz. that of physical distance. According to Lomnitz the amount of reciprocal exchange increases 
the closer people live to each other. I f you have to borrow money or the proverbial cup of sugar 
to help you out. it is much easier to run next door to your sister's place than to a re lati ve that lives 
three blocks away. Households for Lomnitz (1977: I 00) are un its where people share a common 
residence in the sense that they either live on the same plot or on adjo ining plots and this is 
another element of her defini tion of the household. She ca lls th is residential proximity. Besides 
being a factor in determining the amount of exchange going to take place. resident ia l prox imity 
is for Lomnitz important in its own right as part of the definition of the household. 
Although the not ion of co-residence (or res ident ial proximity) very often forms part of the 
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definition of the household in the literature, this is not a convention that I shall follow, however. 
In my previous discussion (in chapter 3) of the household strategies approach I indicated how 
poor households can improve their overall welfare by allocating their members between different 
places. If this can be such an important part ofthe sustenance strategy of households, it does not 
make sense to define them in tenns of co-residences. Boundary maintenance therefore does not 
have to take place around the idea that all household members live together. It is in fact quite 
possible for the household to maintain itself as a unit while being physically dispersed like that. 
According to Parson (1984: 15) 'such a household has an integrity of its own which bridges or 
rather incorporates its physical dispersion to a number of geographical locations, rural and urban, 
within the wider society: (Also see Caces et al. 1985 :7). Nevertheless, the notion of'co-residence' 
is used so commonly as part ofthe definition of the household that it is worth a closer look. We 
should perhaps try to establish what function the notion of 'co-residence' fulfills in the typical 
definition of the household and then see if we can retain part of the meaning suggested by 'co-
residence' without implying that all household members are presently residing there. 
1 shall start with Lomnitz' s' definition of the household. She (Lomnitz 1977:133) defines a 
household as a kinship group who live closely together and who share certain domestic functions 
such as child raising and cooking. By sharing these tasks, the household can utilize its labour more 
efficiently and thus improve its economic welfare. As will become evident shortly, this is a very 
important point for our conception of the household. The household can achieve economies of 
scale, so to speak, by pooling its labour in this way6. It is more time- and cost efficient to prepare 
food for a number of people than for one person, for example. The aspect of residential proximity 
and the functions of shared domestic tasks such as childcare and cooking are related. It is easier 
to do these tasks together if people also live together. Co-residence therefore fac ilitates the 
pooling of household labour for domestic tasks. Living together also makes for more efficient use 
of scarce residential space, for obvious reasons. For poor people the problems caused by 
overcrowding, such as lack of privacy, is easily outweighed by thecostsofbuilding another house 
' This is an extended discussion ofideas first ra ised in Gelderblom and Kok (1994:39-41). 
6 I ignore, for the moment, the gender divis ion oflabour that often goes with matters such 
as common food preparation. The existence of the gender division of labour does not, by itself. 
falsify the point that it is more efficient to pool labour. 
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to accommodate the overtlow. 
This discussion suggests that a household can gain material advantages from organising their 
residential behaviour in a co-resident way - it helps the reproduction of the household. In the 
previous chapter r have provided numerous examples of how households can increase the ir 
econom ic welfare through the spat ial diffusion of some of its members. Organising the ir residenlial 
behaviour in a different way from co-residence can therefore also provide material advantages. 
A household can for example 'l ive in the countryside and earn in the city' so that they benefit both 
from the cheaper consumption costs in the rural areas and the job opportunities of the town. It 
can also send its wage earners to different placesas a fonn of insurance against the possibility that 
an econom ic downturn in one place (such as a manufacturing plant shutting down) does not 
deprive them of their only wage earning possibilities. 
One can use Brown and Sander's conception of place utility to conceptualise this. It refers to the 
level of satisfaction experienced with a given residential location. They (Brown and Sanders 
1981: 150) regard migration as the substitution of one residential location for another 'in order to 
increase the place utility experienced at the residential site'. They are describing here the 
conventional scenario of permanent migration where migration involves the substitution of one 
residential place for another, but the concept of place utility canjust as easi ly be used to describe 
a situation where the place uti lity of diffe rent places are combined and the household does not 
loose the utility orone place if a new one is added to its portfolio of residential locations. In this 
case we are dealing not with the permanent migration of the household but with circulation of 
household members between different places. 
Spatial diffusion is therefore a different way of pooling the labour of household members. 
compared to the strategy of co-residence, but. I argue. the underlying principle is the same. In 
both cases a particular residential organisation helps to improve the welfare of household 
members. The idea of residential behaviour seems to be a fundamental part of our conception of 
the household and should be included in our detinition of it . Because of the advantages provided 
by co-res idence in the domestic labour and consumption aspects of the household, one seldom 
finds diffusion without at least some part of the household engaging in co-residence. The diffusion 
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part IS more useful for the income-generating function . In terms of the production and 
consumption distinction, diffusion often refers to the production (or income-generating) part of 
the household whereas co-residence makes more sense from the consumption (or reproduction) 
perspective. 
To return to the question I asked a few paragraphs ago: what function does co-residence fulfill 
in the typical definition of the household? It is clear that co-residence is, in tenns of Lomnitz's 
conception of the household, a kind of coordinated residential behaviour. For people to live 
to&..ether, there must be a mutual understanding of who sleeps where, for example, which suggests 
some degree of coordination. The existence ofa degree of coordination does not necessarily mean 
that there is complete consensus among household members about the way in which they are 
organising their res idential behaviour - it is possible to have a conflict over goals simultaneously 
with the coordination of behaviour. Res idential coordination merely suggests that people are 
orienting their actions towards each other in this respect. Being one of a number of kinds of 
res idential organisation typifying households, suggests, I want to argue, that co-residence is just 
a special case ofa more general phenomenon. This is an important point. The concept 'household' 
is closely related to the existence of some kind of residential behaviour, but this does not have to 
be the in the fonn of co-residence, or Lomnitz's version of it, residential proximity. Far from 
being the defining form of residential behaviour, it is just one of a number of forms of it. 
In my discussion up to now I have stressed the functional aspects of residential coordination, in 
other words the ways in which it helps to improve the household's material reproduction. But this 
does not mean that people only engage in coordinated residential behaviour because it improves 
their welfare - there are cultural reasons (for example the ideology of the nuclear family that 
prescribes living together) or simply reasons of habit why they do so. Neither does it mean that 
residential behaviour is always animated by the pursuit of material gain. Even if it has such a 
purpose it may not be successful in attaining it. Residential behaviour may have unintended 
consequences that results in household members being disadvantaged by it, rather than gaining 
from it. We also cannot assume that everybody gains to the same extent from a particular form 
of residential organisation - for a woman left behind in a rural area whose husband is a migrant 
worker, the costs can outweigh the benefits. The actual form taken by a household's residential 
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behaviour can consequently a lso the outcome of confli ct and negot iation of interests between 
household members. 
I have chosen to use the terms 'coordinated residential behaviour' rather than ' res idential strategy'. 
The concept 'household strategies' has been subjected to some criticism recently (see for example 
Wolf 1990). Not all of the critic isms are va lid , I think (e.g. I doubt that the existence o f a 
household strategy necessari Iy implies consenSlIS over the nature of that strategy). but onc 
problem I do have with the idea of a household strategy is that it presents household residentia l 
behaviour too strongly as the o utcome of stable and long-term plans. In some cases households' 
res idential behaviour are indeed coordinated with such plans in mind. but this is by no means 
inevitable. The amount of consc ious decision-making varies from household to househo ld and 
from time to time in the li fe of the same household. It can happen, for example, that a household 
develops a particular settlement pattern unthinking ly, and only comes to reali se its advantages 
after the fact. In general, residential behaviour seems to consist of a combination of unthinking 
adherence to habit, some sho rt-term responses to changing circumstances, and a degree of 
planning. 
The question can arise what advantage it can have to use an abstract concept such as 'organised 
residential behaviour' in one's characterisation of the househo ld. My answer is that the spatial 
aspect of the household is vel)' important. The argument I would advance in this respect is 
indebted to the mo re generali sed concern to incorporate time and space in the understanding of 
social development, as evinced in the work of the human geographer To rsten Hagerst rand ( 1969. 
al so see Pred 1977). Hagerstand makes the movements of individuals through time and space the 
central focus of his time-geography. For this purpose he constructs time-space paths (which look 
much like the world-l ines constructed by particle physicists for elemental)' particles) which trace 
the movements of individuals over different t ime scales. On a daily basis , individuals move fo r 
example between a number of 'stations' where they meet others to partic ipate in common 
activities. The movement from 'home' to 'work' is an example of this. Seen from this perspective. 
it becomes apparent that people weave complex paths through time and space, as they congregate 
and disperse over a number of stations. Over the longer run. social transformat ions. such as the 
destruction of labour tenancy, can be depicted in tenns of the impact it has had on the time-space 
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paths of individuals . 
. Using Hiigerstrand's perspective, I argue that a household comes into being around one (co-
residence) or a number of living spaces where the daily (and more long-term) time-space paths 
of a group of individuals intersect. Individuals circulate in and out of these spaces on a daily. 
weekly or longer term basis to go off to work, school or to go shopping, among other things. 
Congregation around the 'home-base' (ifit is a spatially diffused household) is typically important 
from the perspective of the reproduction of the household (domestic tasks, consumption and 
leisure time) , while the outpost living spaces ace important as a base from which to access 
employment. In order to maintain the integrity of the household, much circulation between the 
different living spaces of the household is required. Household members who occupy the outposts 
must return to the home base from time to time, while the outposts are used as a base for others 
to visi t the doctor, look for work, go shopping, etc. 
To summarise this discussion: I have identified a number of characteristics in terms of which the 
household can be defined. Households are units of investment that also function as intense nodes 
of exchange for day-to-day survival. In addition they are characterised by coordinated residential 
behaviour. Households are distinguished from migrant networks in the sense that they a) are more 
likely to be units of investment than networks, b) are more intense nodes of exchange, and c) have 
coordinated residential behaviour as their focus. They are distinguished from networks in terms 
of the latter criterion because the level of coordination of residential behaviour is higher in the 
fonner case. Migrant networks. by contrast, consist of individuals who make use of a spatial 
distribution of socially connected people that have arisen more by accident than design. I shall 
discuss this aspect of networks in more detail in the section on networks dynamics below. 
The household concept has been criticized by, among others, Spiegel et al. (1996) and Kotze 
(1993:82) as unworkable due to the amount of residential instability often perceived among poor 
people in South Africa. In their critique they refer inter alia to the tendency for people to be 
transferred between households. They argue that household boundaries can be very porous and 
that individuals, especially children, are often exchanged between households (Kotze 1993, 
Spiege1 1987). A boy might be sent to herd cattle for a friend or relative of the family, or a girl 
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to help clean and cook. for example. This is done to rei ieve the sender household of the strain of 
providing for that member, and/or to increase the labour power ava ilable to the receiv ing 
household. This practice seems to be espec ial ly common under circumstances of extreme poverty. 
Residential instabi lity can be so severe that an individual may s leep and eat at numerous 
households, because no particular household accepts the responsibility for that individual on a 
permanent basis (Kotze 1993:82). Kotze relates the case ofSammy, tor example. Sammy was a 
young boy who lived at first with his grandmother because his divorced mother, a migrant worker. 
was away from her own homestead for most of the time. Due to his grandmother's drinking 
problem he was not we ll looked after, however, and he left her household. With this move, 
Sammy isolated himself from the last household that accepted some kind of stable responsibi lity 
for him, and he now osci llated from household to household. Sometimes, when his mother returns 
home from work he sleeps at his mother's house. At other times he has to s leep at his friends' 
homes. 
Even though this is an extreme case, it demonstrates that the mutual unders tanding in the 
community of who li ves where can, for some individuals, be eroded. In the case of inter household 
transfers of people, the residential designation of a particular individual can change very quickly. 
This does not mean that the households concept is useless. Demonstrating that a particular entity 
has porous boundaries is not the same as saying that there are no boundaries at all. Spiegel and 
his co-workers do demonstrate, however, that households under circumstances of ext reme 
poverty can be prevented from consolidation. In middle class households, the residential behaviour 
of the household involves longer term commitments. A household will , for example, invest in a 
house that is big enough to accommodate everyone and for that purpose it will commit itself to 
a bond with repayments scheduled over, say. 20 years. Even in poorer households, longer term 
comm itments are not unusual. A migrant worker that remits money to the rural areas in order to 
tirst gain a residential site and then build a house there for his/her retirement is obviously involved 
in a longer term project. When household composition fluctuates, with households breaking up 
and reforming as in the examples provided by Spiegel, the residential behaviour of the household 
is of a short term nature with mere survival as its major aim. 
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4.3 NETWORK STRUCTURE 
I begin my study of network structure by considering the sociological analysis of network 
structure. According to Davem ( 1997) the structure of a network is concerned with two issues. 
viz. the geometric arrangement of the actors and the strength of the ties between them. Network 
analysts assume that the geometric arrangement (in other words the distribution of actors in social 
space) of actors in a social network conditions the outcome of the interaction between them. This 
is demonstrated by the following example (derived from Davem 1997). If three aclors are 
arranged in a triangular structure so that all the actors are directly linked to each other, the 
c 
Figure 4.1 Direct versus indirect ties 
outcome will be different than it would be in the case of a line structure where the two actors on 
the extremities are connected to each other via the actor in the centre (see figure 4. 1). Because, 
in the latter case, the central actor mediates the relationship of the other two, it can be assumed 
that that actor has more power in the relationship than the other two, for example. 
The strength of the network tie is measured by the intensity of the interaction between actors as 
well as the intensity of their emotional involvement (Davem 1997). Strong ties are obviously 
important to the health of a network, but they also have the disadvantage that, due to the amount 
of effort needed to keep them intact, they limit the number of connections that can be maintained 
to other networks (Gurak and Caces 1992:161). In this respect. Granovetter drew attention to 
the importance of weak ties in networks. He (as summarised in Gural< and Caces. 1992: 161-162) 
believes that '(w)eak ties serve as bridges, uniting diverse networks without requiring major 
investments by networks members and thus increasing the pool of resources potentially available 
to network members.' It is especially in tenns of access to infannation that weak ties are important 
(80yd 1989: 655). I discuss this issue in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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Davern's conception of network structure cannot be used without adaptation to describe the 
structure of migrant networks. The problem with his conception is that he represents the aspat ial 
social connections between individuals in a network in a quasi·spatial way (through his conception 
of ' geometric arrangement'). For example, in the triangular st ructure. the actors are not physically 
located re lative to each other in a triangle. but only in terms of the nature of their social bonds. 
The moment onc adds real spatial content to onc ' 5 conception o f networks (as in the di stribution 
of individuals between area of origin and destination area) it becomes confusing to Llse the quasi-
spat ial notion of'geometric arrangement ' to describe connections between individuals. I therefore 
substitute the question whether the links are direct o r indirect for the notion of 'geometric 
arrangement'. 
This brings me to the conclusion that four aspects are relevant for detennining the structure of 
migrant networks. These are the spat ial distribution of individuals. the nature of the linkages 
between them (i.e. whether these are direct or indirect) , the number of ties connect ing nodes 
(density of ties) and the strength of the ties between them (intensity of ties). It seems intuitively 
attractive to suppose that the structure and functioning of networks are closely interre lated. Given 
our focus on understanding the migration facilitating function of networks, it makes sense to 
consider the effects of different migrant network structures on their function ing. 
a) The simplest migrant network consists of two people, one in the area of origin and one in the 
destination area. They are linked directly and the bond between them is strong. One can represent 
this conti guration as follows: 
DESTINATION AREA OF ORIGIN 
NODE NODE 
Figure 4.2 Simple migrant network 
In this figure (figure 4.2), each node represents an individual. for example a husband and wife. 
who are united by a strong tie, indicated by the thick line between them. Neither of them has 
access to other networks. The presence of a st rong tie between the two suggests that thi s network 
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is also a household. 
b) The effect of network connections in particular places on the likelihood of migration is 
captured by the term 'auspices of migration'. This term was first used by Tilly and Brown ( 1967). 
Auspices refer to the 'social structures which establish relationships between the migrant and the 
receiving community before he moves' (Tilly and Brown 1967: 142). Tilly and Brown's notion of 
'auspices' is very similar to Massey's conception of social capital (see above p.56) and its 
facilitating role in migration. What is added however is the idea that social capital is invested in 
particular places and. that a migrant is more likely to go to a place where slhe has auspices. 
Moreover, 'if auspices are also available in other locations, then the probability of choosing the 
fi rst location may be reduced' (Caces et al. 1985: I 0). They also hypothesize that, in general, 
'intentions to move from point X to point Z are, celeris paribus. positively related to the presence 
and strength of auspices in point Z and negatively related to such links at any other point Y'. 
Caces et al. (1985) derives from this the idea of 'competing auspices', in other words the notion 
that the potential migrant may have a choice between alternative destination areas and that the 
choice is influenced by the amount of auspices available at these possible destinations. This 
scenario is pictured in the following figure (figure 4.3). In this figure the potential migrant (node 
A) is connected to people at possible destination areas Z and Y, as well as in the area of origin 
x. 
Area X 
Figure 4.3 Competing auspices of migration 
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c) Migrant networks have to be distinguished from support networks in the orig in or des tination 
areas (Kritz and Zlotn ick 1992:6). They are different because they link {WO areas, the area of 
origin and the desti nation area. whereas the latter two are located in either an orig in or a 
destination area. I give examples of each of these three in the figure below (figure 4.4). 
d) The intensity of the ties between network members vary. Some are united by strong ties. as 
in this case, and others by weaker ties. The thickness of the lines connecting nodes vary in the 
figures. indicating that the bonds between the nodes are of varying intensity. Weak ties typically 
function to link networks, as pointed out above. In the case of weak ties, the comm itment of 
network resources is limited to the exchange of information, and therefore does not imply a duty 
to help each other in more material ways, such as sharing food. In our next figure (figure 4.5) 
there is an added weak tie linking the network to another network. 
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Figure 4.4 Migrant network versus communal support network 
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Figure 4.5 Weak tie linking two networks 
e) Whereas the intensity ofthe ties iefers to the strength ofthe ties between nodes, I use the tenn 
density to refer to the number of direct ties connecting a node to a series of other nodes in a 
particular place. I illustrate the notion of density in the following figure (figure 4.6). It features 
two migrant networks: in the first one a node is connected via only one connection to a network 
in a destination area and in the second one the node has multiple direct links to the network in the 
destination area. 
f) It is possible to imagine numerous permutations of more and less dense networks, but here we 
restrict ourselves to a few cases that are theoretically interesting. The first case is the so-called 
'encapsulation' scenario (Mayer 1970). Migrants become encapsulated upon arrival when they 
forge a dense set of connections with others in the network but no connections to any other 
network (see figure 4.7). The dense set of connections within the network makes for stronger ties 
between members because they often interact with people who belong to the same group as they. 
As a result of the high frequency of interaction within the network they have less time, or 
inclination, to interact with people outside the group. The network becomes turned in upon itself 
and isolated from other networks. 
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Figure 4.6 Variation in density of connection to 
dcstinution area 
Destinat ion area Area of origin 
Figure 4.7 Encapsulation scenario Figure 4.8 Dense area of origin 
network 
This scenario is thought to have an impact on the ease of ass imilation of the migrant in the 
destination area. The dense set of ties firstly makes the emotional adjustment of the migrant in the 
destination area easier in the sense that s/he is less likely to miss friends and relatives in the area 
of origin. It furthennore helps the migrant to find a j ob and accommodation. Besides this helpful 
side to the dense network there is also a more negative side in the sense that it can reduce the 
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incentive for the migrant to become an active participant in the social life of the destination area 
outside of the network (Gurak and Caces 1992:155, Choldin 1973 :171, Pohjola 1991 ). The 
migrant may take longer to learn the language spoken at the destination area and may be less 
likely to make friends outside the network. This is especiaUy likely if the network members are 
themselves previous migrants from the same area. In that case the network forms a capsule that 
enfolds the migrant within a social context very s imilar to that found at home - from there the 
word 'encapsulation' (Mayer 1970). 
g) In another case, the potential migrant has a dense set of connections to people in the area of 
origin but not many in any probable destination area (see figure 4.8). These connections are 
supposed to influence the likelihood of migration (Gurak and Caces 1992), but the effect of a 
dense local network on the likelihood of migration can be quite contradictory. On the one hand, 
a dense local network can reduce the incentive to migrate because the potential migrant can call 
on the help of many others in times of need. The network therefore increases the economic 
security of the potential migrant at the area of origin (e.g. a rural area), especially relative 10 the 
largely unknown situation in the probable destination area (perhaps a nearby town). In addition 
the presence of many close friends and relatives serves as a factor binding him/her to that place 
through emotional ties (Ritchey 1976:389-391). A potential migrant may therefore choose to stay 
behind in that area, even though wages are higher elsewhere and sthe might be able to increase 
their income by moving away, The force binding that individual to the area of origin can, however, 
be outweighed by the fact that access to such an extensive network improves the ability of the 
potential migrant to finance the migratory move, There are more people to borrow money from 
and more people to offer advice and infonnation about the situation in possible destination areas. 
The costs of migration therefore becomes less of an obstacle to it taking place. This leads us to 
conclude that the effect of a dense local network is to reduce the incentive to migrate while 
increasing the ability to do so, 
4.4 NETWORK FUNCTIONING 
We start our discussion of network functioning by distinguishing between the structure and 
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function of networks. The st ructural functio nalist approach in sociology distinguishes between the 
two by associating struc ture with the static and functio n with the dynamic aspects of social life. 
but this w ill not do in our case (Giddens 1979). Network st ructures can be quite fluid. although 
they vary in tenns of their openness to change (Davern 1997:289). As social ties are iormed and 
dissolved. network st ructure changes. It is therefore a mistake to view network st ructure as being 
static. From the above discussion it is clear that network structure is concerned with the form of 
networks, in other words what they look like. Network function ing, by contrast, deals with what 
networks do. Weare specilically interested in the consequences they have for the indiv iduals who 
partic ipate in them. As we shall see, structure and function are closely related and it is not always 
easy to separate the two in practice. Because of the degree of overlap between the two 
sometimes repeat in this section issues that have been touched upon in the previous sect ion. 
4.4.1 THE FUNCTIONS FULFILLED BY NETWORKS 
Migrant networks fulfill the fo llowing funct ions in the migration process - they can: 
a) stimulate the migratory move; 
b) fac ilitate the migratory move; 
c) discourage the migratory move; and 
d) channel the migratory move. 
a) Networks can stimulate migration in the sense that the information they convey about 
successful migrants can moti vate others to follow suit. According to Stark ( 199 1) the example 
provided by successful previous migrants will increase the fee li ngs of relative depr ivation 
experienced by those who have not yet migrated. If the previous migrants form part of the 
reference group of the potential migrants (they may fo r example be old school classmates) those 
who stayed behind wi ll identify with them and think that they can also be successful. They wi ll 
now fee l deprived relat ive to their successful friends and this wi ll increase their des ire to move 
away. The information about the success of the previous migrants can e ither be communicated 
direct ly when they visit their o ld homes and flaunt their newly acquired consumer goods or 
indirect ly through gossip by others. It is especia lly in the latter case where the network. as a 
conduit of information. has an influence. The information carried by the network call st imulate 
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migration independent of the mechanism of relative deprivation. Simply by informing potential 
migrants about new opportunities for employment arising in a destination area it can encourage 
additional migration. 
b) The facilitating effect of networks has been referred to numerous times in this thesis. Network 
connections assist potential migrants at all stages of their move. They make migration easier 
because they firstly provide information about accommodation and possible job opportunities in 
destination areas. Information dissemination is the result of the social interaction that takes place 
between network members. The stronger the bonds between network members, the more 
information they share (Choldin 1973: 164). They keep in contact through visi ts, phone calls and 
letters while information is disseminated through goss ip or as a result of more directed inquiries. 
The information disseminating function can be so effective that potential migrants can find jobs 
before they leave the village through the agency of network members, as Banerjee ( 1983:195) 
reported in his survey of migrants in Delhi in India. 
Network connections assist migrants during the move by providing cash in the fonn of loans or 
outright gifts when the migrant needs to pay for transport. They can also be the basis for the 
pooling of the savings of potential migrants to finance the trip. Once one ofthem has left with the 
help of the network, slbe is then under an obligation to help those who have stayed behind to 
move as well (Choldin 1973: 164). In the case of illegal cross-border migration these connections 
provide money to bribe officials and pay the agents that smuggle the migrant across the border 
(Georges 1990). Another way in which networks facilitate migration is through the material help 
they offer to the new migrant in arranging jobs and providing accommodation once the migrant 
has arrived in the destination area. Network members render emotional support to the migrant. 
They also can help the adjustment of the migrant by fetching him/her at the railway station, for 
example, and generally 'show them the ropes' in the new environment (Fuller et al. 1990:535). 
Networks facilitate migration in a different but related sense in so far as they reduce the risks 
inherent in migration (Stark 1991). By pooling the risks of migration they can offer insurance 
against these risks much like a short tenn insurance policy gives insurance by pooling risks (l have 
described this process in chapter 3 in the context of a discussion of the household strategies 
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approach . Stark primarily has households in mind in discussing risk pooling. but his argument can 
also be applied to networks}. Thus the risks of a migratory step being a failure is offset by the 
probability that some of the migratory moves in the pool of risks will be a success. In practical 
terms this means that network members wi ll attempt lO diversify their sources of income (by 
combining urban and rural income. for example) so that the risk of one tailing is offset by the 
hoped for success of the others. 
All of the above are ways in which networks reduce the costs of migration. I use the term 
'network subsidy' to describe the contribution of networks in reducing costs. Because networks 
fu ltill this cost reducing function , it fo llows that their role in migration becomes more important 
if the costs of migration are high and migrants have fewer resources. If the costs of migration are 
low, we can expect networks to play a lesser role. As I pointed out in chapter 3 some of the costs 
of migration (such as transport and infonnation costs) may decrease over time while others may 
increase (subsistence costs while the migrant is looking for ajob). Consequently the contribution 
of networks may become more or less important over time depending on the trends in the costs 
of migration. If the costs are low, one can expect to see more individual migration. Conversely. 
ifthe costs are high, chain migration, which is associated with networks, will be more prominent. 
The cost reducing property of networks also have the effect of increasing the amount of migration 
that takes place among poor people. Because it makes migration less financially demanding and 
lowers the threshold income needed for migration, it allows poor migrants who otherwise would 
not have been ab le to move to do so. Due to this etfect on the poorer part of the migrant 
population, it reduces the income selectivity of migration. As I pointed out in chapter 3. the 
income select ivity of migration increases as the costs of migration escalate. Conversely. one can 
expect income select ivity to decrease if the costs are lowered by networks. This, however. only 
happens up to a point: networks themselves are selective in tenns of who they include and who 
they exclude. If. as I am going to argue below, they tend to exclude those who are destitute the 
income select ivity reducing effect of networks will not extend to the latter group (on the other 
hand. if the costs of migration have been reduced so much that they are no longer an obstacle to 
the migration of anybody, it does not matter that the poorest are excluded from networks, because 
they can move without the intervention of networks). 
88 
c) The information disseminated by networks is not always about new opportunities - it can also 
communicate that jobs are becoming harder to get in the destination area, or that circumstances 
are deteriorating generally in that area. Information about violent conflict in informal settlements 
in urban areas (as occurred in South Africa in the late 1980's and early 1990's) will be 
disseminated quickly back to the area of origin. Such information will discourage further 
migration. 
d) According to Caces et al (1985: I 0) networks affect both the likelihood of migration and the 
destination area chosen by the migrant. Besides a facilitating function one can consequently also 
distinguish a channelling function of the network (Tilly and Brown 1967, Gurak and Caces 1992, 
Banerjee 1983, Fuller et al. 1990:535, Population Information Program 1983:M256). The 
. network fulfil s a channelling function because it directs migration away from some poss ible 
destination areas and towards others. Migrants are more likely to go to destination areas where 
they have 'auspices', as I pointed out earlier. The existence of auspices at a particular destination 
area creates a channel in which migrants flow between the area of origin and that destination area. 
This is why migrants from a particular area of origin tend to cluster in specific neighbourhoods 
of a town or in specific towns. 
The channelling function of networks is not only limited to guiding migrants to spec ific 
geographical areas, but also involves a channelling into particular occupations or particular 
companies in the destination. This occurs because previous migrants are better placed to findjobs 
for new migrants in the occupations or companies where they are themselves employed. 
Employers often prefer to employ somebody who are recommended by an existing employee, on 
the assumption that that person is similar to the existing employee (Montgomery 1991 :1409, 
Kannappan 1985). It is also a low cost way of recruiting a new employee (Montgomery 
1991 : 1409). In addition previous migrants are more likely to know about job opportunities that 
exist in the company in which they are employed or in their own occupation (Banerjee 1983: 195). 
The channelling function of networks can be limiting to the migrant at the same time as it is 
helping himlher. By inserting the migrant into a particular place and into a particular job, the 
network restrains the migrant's options as much as it is advancing them. This is why Phojoia 
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(199 1 :439) claims that networks enta il support as we ll as social stratificat ion. According to him 
(1991 :439) 'social relations. in helping the migrants to get ajob. also socialize them into the types 
of jobs where migrants typically end up ... '. Because of their encapsulating tendency they shield 
the migrant from exposure to other social environments and other possibilities for employment 
and generate a homogenous class of migrants. Phojoia ( 1991 :440) believes that this dimension of 
networks has not been emphasised enough in the literature: 'Too often the role of social networks 
is seen as idea lly supportive , whi le the other side of the coin, their restrictive nature, is 
overlooked. ' 
Although I have stressed the fact on p.8S above that one cannot regard network structure as being 
static, one also has to accept that migrant networks cannot change overnight in tenns of the 
direction in which they channel migration. Networks embody a significant investment in social 
capital for people, and one cannot expect that potential migrants will find it easy to direct their 
attentions away to fami ly members/friends in different places at short notice. The constraining 
impactofinvestment in social capital on mobility is similar to the impact that investment in 'bricks 
and mortar' has on the mobility of companies: unlike investment in the stock market, it cannot be 
easily disposed of and makes companies less 'footloose'. As a result, networks impart a degree of 
inertia to migrant streams. In other words, once a migrant stream between two areas has come 
into being, a certain momentum has been built up which wi ll be difficult to change overnight. Our 
earlier discussion of network structure suggests that the degree of 'stickiness' imparted by 
networks to migrant streams increases as the network becomes more encapsulated and becomes 
less as the number of weak ties to other networks increase. The inertia of migrant streams 
provides an additional explanation fo r what one can tenn the 'Todaro effect' (see chapter 2 
above): the tendency formral-urban migration to continue in the face of increasing unemployment 
in the urban areas. It is also an indication that the supposed tendency of migration to equalise 
income and employment levels between regions through the regional reallocation of the poor and 
unemployed people (this is known as the equilibriating effect of migration) is unlikely to be 
consistently successful. The inertia imparted to migration streams by networks has the effect that 
migration cannot quickly respond to changes in the economic perfonnance of specific regions. and 
therefore neoclassical economic theory is called into question in th is regard. 
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4.4.2 NETWORK RESOURCES 
The extent to which migration is facilitated by the network in a specific case depends on the 
resources of the network, as well as the willingness of network members to support that particular 
migrant. Even though network members have the ability to help somebody, they may not be 
prepared to do so because slhe is not regarded as being related closely enough to network 
members or not deserving of help for other reasons (such as being unlikely to be able to 
reciprocate. or not having kept up relationships with network members). This aspect has to do 
with the nonnative dimension of networks and will receive attention in the next section. 
The concept of network resources derives from the sociological literature on network structure 
(Davem, 1997) and up to now, has not received much attention in the migration literature? 
Resources are those things that actors can use to help them achieve their goals (Davem, 
1997:290). In the context of migrant networks it refers firstly to the power, status and money that 
network members have, as well as the amount of infonnation at their disposal. From this we can 
deduce that the more resources a network control, the more of a facilitating role they can play in 
migration. A well-resourced network has more information and more cash at its disposal, and is 
better able to offer help in the fonn of accommodation and employment. 
Networks also vary in the amount of resources they control in a different sense from the more 
obvious one discussed above. This re lates to the chaIUlelling function of networks. Some networks 
channel migrants into more lucrative areas and occupations than others. This conception of 
network resources refers to the spatial structure of the network, as well as the regions and 
occupations to which the migrant is channelled. 
One can firstly hypothesise that a network that offers competing destinations is more likely to 
advance the migrant's career than a network that channels the migrant into only one region. The 
reason for this is that because it offers alternative destinations and increases the migrant's options. 
7 For an exception see Gurakand Caces (1992: 155), where they refer to previous research 
done by Caces which concluded that the poverty of Filipino migrants to Hawaii can be ascribed 
to the limited resources of the networks they belong to. 
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s/he is less likely to end up in a dead-end career. The diffe rence in outcomes may only be small. 
in practice, because migrants generally occupy the bottom of the occupation ladder wherever they 
go. but not necessarily insignificant. 
It is not only the number of places to which the migrant is channelled that increases the network's 
resources, but also the places to which and the occupations into which the migrant is channelled. 
A network that connects a rura l area with a decl ining urban area (for example the East Rand in 
the Gauteng-province of South Africa where the economy is dominated by the metal industry and 
gold mining, both of which have been shedding jobs) is less likely to improve the migrant' s 
position than a network articu lated wi th an expanding urban area (for example Richard' s Bay in 
the KwaZulu-Natal province of South Africa). In genera l lenns , rural-rural networks are a lso less 
like ly to offer good employment than rural-urban networks, largely because wages tend to be 
lower in agricu lture. S imilarly, ifnetwork members are employed in declining occupations. even 
in areas where the rest of the regional economy is expanding, resources wi ll be lower. As I argued 
above, network members are more likely to find jobs for migrants in their own occupations or 
firms. The odds are therefore that they wi ll channe l migrants into jobs where they are themselves 
employed, and migrant' s jobs will reproduce the characte ristics of the jobs of other network 
members. 
The etlect of network resources is described by Sharp and Spiegel ( 1990:539). With reference to 
the village ofMatatiele in the former homeland-areaofTranskei where there is a sharp distinction 
between long-standing residents and recent arrivals from white-owned fanns, they say the 
following: 
Men whose network of contacts included others already in secure employment had a 
significant advantage in entering the labour market over those whose fam ilies had long 
been farm workers wi thout close links wi th such networks. Long-standing location 
residents who also has some education managed to acquire relatively plumjobs ... (M)ore 
recent immigrants to the district , particularly those who been brought lip on white-owned 
farms and had no schooling, were forced to accept work on the mines or, worse st ill. as 
labourers on Natal sugar-cane estates or Western Cape fruit farms. 
Meagher (1997:89-90) provides another example of the di ffe rentiating effect that the channel ling 
of migration can have. She describes migration w ithin Northern Nigeria and notes that 
predominantly Christ ian migrants from Southeastern Nigeria into Northern Nigerian cities are 
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much better connected than largely Muslim migrants from rural areas in Northern Nigeria itself. 
The latter 'are largely channelled into low-income itinerant activities in the urban informal sector', 
The former, by contrast, 'have access to well-established and economically fairly buoyant 
commercial networks. which tend to channel migrants into more permanent and lucrative informal 
activities'. She (1997:90) concludes by saying that this has led to bloody ethnic clashes in 
Northern Nigerian cities in the early 1990's, when youths attacked Igbo street traders from the 
Southeast. 
In all of these cases, the limiting effect of the network will be greater the more isolated the 
network is from other networks. Consequently the encapsulation scenario will have the most 
negative effect on the migrant. The isolation of the network is lessened through the existence of 
weak ties. The more weak ties connecting the network to other networks, the more information 
the network will consequently be able to mobilise. One can therefore hypothesise that the 
existence of weak ties will lessen the limiting effect of the network on the migrant (Gurak and 
Caces,1992:165). 
There is consequently a greater chance that a migratory move that is sponsored by a well-
resourced network will be a success than one sponsored by a network that is worse off. This 
introduces the issue of differentiation between migrants. If network A is better off in terms of 
resources than network B before migration, and ifits chances of sponsoring successful migration 
is higher than that of network B, then its advantaged situation will be reproduced and in fact 
reinforced after migration due to the increased remittances that feed back into the network as a 
result of migration. This implies that networks can reinforce differentiation in ways that go beyond 
the excl usion of the poorest by networks. 
4.4.3 NORMATIVE ASPECTS OF NETWORKS 
By this time is should be clear that reciprocal exchange is the basis of network functioning. This 
reciprocal exchange is normatively sanctioned; in other words there are rules, derived from 
particular cultural contexts, that prescribe the form these exchanges will take. The idea of 
reciprocal exchange has its origin in the work of anthropologists such as Mauss, Firth and Polanyi 
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about the structure of primitive societies (Sahlins 1 972). Reciprocal exchange is typica lly 
dist inguished from the cash transactions that fonns the basis of modern capitalist economies (see 
for example Ilcan J 994: 568). Whereas in a cash transaction the reciprocity is up front. in the sense 
that one is contractually bound to reciprocate , and imm ed iate ('hand over the cash before yOll get 
the goods'), in reciprocal exchange the reciprocity is implicit (and often denied) and de layed 
(Sahlins 1972:194; Bourdieu 1990:112-121). Rec iprocity is de layed because the debt that is 
created by such helping is not expected to be repaid immediately, but lingers on until the previous 
benefactor is in need of help. Reciprocal exchange is often expressed in tenns ofa discourse of 
family or friendship obligations (' I must help this person because s/he is my s ister/brother') and the 
open expression of the reciprocal basis of the relationship (, I am helping you because I expect to 
be helped in return sometime in the future') is regarded as being impolite (Lomnitz 1988:44, 
Bourdieu 1990). 
It is not clear why the reciprocal nature of the relationship is so often implicit, but one can argue 
that it is not acknowledged because to do so would undermine the relationship (Bourdieu 
1990: 11 8). Reciproca l exchange is backed up by trust relations. In the Spanish-speaking 
communities of Latin America studied by Lomnitz (1977. 1988:45) the term conjianza is used, 
which refers to the trust between people who have a c lose relationship. One can argue that by 
stress ing the moral basis of the relationship , rather than their mutual material need, people can 
maximise the t[ust underlying their relationship (cf. Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993 : 1332). 
Whatever the reason, the conjianza aspect is so necessary to the relationship that people often 
invent kinship relations to bolster it. This can be seen for example in the common Latin American 
practice of godparenthood (Lomnitz 1977). 
Because of the culturally prescribed nature of these obligations there are regional differences with 
regard to the functioning of reciproca l exchange networks. There are differences with regard to 
the people one has special obligations to , although it is generally family members. friends and 
neighbours. Among the Tswana of Botswana, as I pointed out above. the position of 'mother's 
brother' carries special obligations (Townsend 1997). and this obligat ion is culturally specific. 
There are also differences about how one should reciprocate. Caces et al. (1985: 16) refer to the 
lowland Filipinos, where the accepted practice is that one must always repay a favour with inte rest 
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to make sure that one has repaid the debt (also see Sahlins 1972: 160 with reference to Maori gift 
exchange). The unintended consequence of this is that the previous beneficiary now becomes the 
benefactor, which creates a new debt that must be repaid some time in future, thus reproducing 
the cycle of reciprocity. 
One aspect of cultural variability that is relevant for the facilitating nature of networks is the 
transferability of sponsorship. This emerges in a study done by Fuller et al. (1990) of the network 
links between a community of rural Thais and their urban based contacts. According to them 
(Fuller et al. 1990: 552) many rural people feel that, on their recommendation, their contacts in 
town are willing to help strangers. These urban contacts are therefore willing to transfer their 
sponsorship from those they know to the laner's friends and re latives. If such behaviour is 
common, the number of people whose migration can be facilitated by the network is higher. This 
is indicative of a network w ith a more open structure. In general, the more open the network 
structure, the quicker migratory behaviour will become diffused through a community, with the 
result that the migrant stream will become less selective more quickly (in the way proposed by 
Massey et al.). If, as one suspects, the transferability noticed by Fuller et al. (1990) is restricted 
to people who have the same characteristics (in terms of age, sex, class, etc.) as the original 
network members, the selectivity reducing effect of the more open network w ill obvious ly be 
much reduced. That this is not so unlikely is borne out by the fact that one's friends are often very 
similar to oneself. Since Fuller et al. (1 990) did not probe this aspect of the transferability, it is 
unclear how significant their discovery is for our interest in selectivity. 
According to Sahlins (1972: 191-193) the time allowed for assistance to be repaid, and the very 
need to reciprocate at all, vary between different contexts. For him, reciprocal exchange lies on 
a continuum that varies from generalized reciprocity on the one end to negative reciprocity on the 
other. 'Balanced reciprocity' is the mid-point between these two and refers to a setup where g ifts 
are reciprocated fairly quickly and equitably. Examples of this are marriage transactions and peace 
agreements (where the peace is cemented through the reciprocal exchange of gifts). Generalized 
reciprocity occurs typically between close family members and comes the closest to the ideal of 
a free gift. 'This is not to say', according to Sahlins (1972: 194), 'that handing over things in such 
form, even to 'loved ones', generates no counter-obligation. But the counter is not stipulated by 
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time. quantity, or qual ity: the expectation of reciproc ity is indefini te'. At the other ex treme is 
transactions in which deception and vio lence can play a ro le - negati ve reciprocity. Sahlins 
( 1972: 199) believes that the closeness of the ki nship bond between people will detenn ine which 
kind of exchange wi ll predominate in a primit ive society. with generalized reciprocity occurring 
between close family. 
Sahlins therefore bel ieves that, in primitive societies at least, the poorest may not be forced to 
reciprocate if they are unable to repay the assistance they have received from close fam ily 
members. Although this may be the case in a primitive society, it seems unlikely that networks of 
poor people who have been incorporated into the capita list society still function in the same way . 
According to lames (1987). at least in the rura l areas of South Africa. the nature of such 
reciproca l exchanges has changed, even though the ideo logy in termsofwhich it is legitimated has 
stayed the same. The changes that have occurred is demonst rated by the tendency for people who 
cannot at least potentially reciprocate in future to be frozen out of these relationships (Sharp 
1994:78, Delius 1996: 152, also see Lomnitz 1977: 134 for ethnographic evidence to this effect 
from Mexico). 
Lomnitz ( 1977: 134, 1988:47) distinguishes between a patron-client relationship and one based 
on reciprocal exchange. In the former the economic distance between members of the network is 
too great for the beneticiary to reciprocate in kind. There is therefore no possibility that the 
beneficiary can respond by helping the benefactor some time in the future in the same way. Despite 
this, it is still an exchange relationship. What is exchanged in this case is the political support o f 
the bene ticiary for the ass istance (in getting a job or a house) of the benefac tor. Patron-client 
relationships are common in urban politics in poor neighbourhoods in the Third World and has 
given rise to a sty le of urban pol itics known as populism (Castells 1983: 175 , Perlrnan 1976). 
Because patron-cl ie nt relationships do not expect reciprocity they are in principle one avenue for 
the poorest of the poor to be supported in their migrat ion. If you are unable to reciprocate, and 
thus frozen out o f networks, a pat ron might be able to help you. This is, however, not very likely 
to happen in practice. While these relationships can be very important in the adaptation of the 
migrant in the urban area once the migration process is over, they are not very prominent in the 
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actual process of migration (one exception is Thailand where Singhanetra-Renard [1 992] discusses 
the importance of patron-client relationships in facilitating migration). Politicians help groups of 
people to get houses in exchange for political support, but they are less often in a position to offer 
help to the individual migrant stuck somewhere in a rural area. I shall consequently not give 
further attention to patron-client relationships here. 
From this we can conclude that, as far as the facilitation of migration is concerned. the poo rest 
among the poor will be excluded from networks because they cannot reciprocate. Networks are 
resources for poor people, hut may not be accessible for the poorest among them. If you have 
nothing~ the only way in which you can reciprocate is to offer your labour to your relative/friend 
by, for example, working in their garden or painting their house. Although this kind of exchange 
does happen (see for example IIcan 1994:568-569), it is not in the first place the type of 
reciprocity captured by networks. The help the benefactor expects in future is more likely to be 
along the lines ofa cash loan or the procuring ofajob - in other words something they can fall 
back on when they are in need themselves. The possibility of reciprocating through your labour 
does therefore not fundamentally alter the operation of networks in this regard: this kind of 
reciprocation is not typically the kind that is expected and consequently you may still be frozen 
out of networks if you are destitute. 
4.5 NETWORK DYNAMICS 
Under this heading we are going to discuss how networks emerge, how they develop and under 
what circumstances they can disappear. Network dynamics is one of the neglected areas that Boyd 
(1989:655) feels should be researched more thoroughly in future. 
Networks emerge when the first migrant from a community of origin leaves home and establishes 
himlherselfin a particular destination area. Whereas it is clear that broad historical transfonnations 
are generally behind the rise of a migration process towards a particular growing city (such as the 
discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand and the growth of the capitalist economy in South Africa 
as a result of it) . it is equally clear that the rise of a particular network linking one area of origin 
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and one destination area is to some extent a chance occurrence. Describing how a network linking 
the village of Yenikoy in Turkey and Gotenberg in Sweden developed, Wilpert ( 1992: 182) says 
the followi ng: 
The first migrant left in 1963, trying Belgium , Holland, and Germany_ until reach ing 
G5tenberg, Sweden, in 1966. After finding ajob in one of the city 's leading industries. he 
called for his brother to join him . Fourteen years later, 23 adults and 19 children from the 
Turkish refugee group were res iding in Sweden, all at the initiative of one man and all 
related to onc ano ther. 
It is clear that this migrant cOllld j ust as we ll have found ajob in Holland, in thi s case creat ing a 
network linking Holland and the area o f orig in. Or he could have died in a bus accident a long the 
way, thus removing the possibi lity for that network altogether. This reinforces the idea that chance 
factors play a large role in establishing any particular network. 
In one respect the rise of a particular network is not a chance occurrence. The propensity to 
migrate diffuse spatially from the large cities into the surrounding countrys ide as infonnation 
about urban opportunities spread outwards from the city. Zelinsky (197 1 :237) likens the 
propensity to migrate to 'a kind of prairie fire burning its path across the map'. According to 
Georges( 1990: 11 3) however, 'ifthe idea diffused from Santiago (the biggest city in the Domincan 
Republic - D.G.), it did so in a leapfrog fashion, skipping many communities along the way.' 
Georges (1990) refers here to international as opposed to internal migration, but her statement 
does ra ise the question about the mechanisms that determine the way in which the propensity to 
migrate diffuses and thus also the way in which particular networks develop. This issue is not well 
researched, but one can speculate that the spread of mass media, schools and roads will have an 
effect on the diffusion of the propensity to migrate . 
Wilpert' s ( 1992) case study is significant for another reason. This is that the first migrant belonged 
to the Turkish refugee group in the village rather than the majority Kurdish people or the 
ind igenous Turks in that vi llage. They were part of a group of people displaced in Turkey as a 
result of political confli ct. Later, when the migrant network had developed to include all the 
people mentioned in Wilpert's quotation, only members of the Turkish refugee group belonged 
to the network . This was because, in Wilpert's(1992: 182) words 'there was no tradition of mutual 
obligations o f assistance across kinship group boundaries'. She then continues by say ing: 'Given 
the social cleavages in the village, the first migrants saw no reason to help those outside their 
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group who desired to migrate.' Wilpert's case study therefore points to the limitations that social 
cleavages in the area of origin, in this case ethnicity, can place on the later growth of the network 
and thus the number of people in that area whose migration can be facilitated by the network. 
Recruitment agencies often play a role in stimulating a migration flow between an area of origin 
and a destination area (Georges 1990:81). Because, among other reasons8, the cost of migration 
is very high, workers have at first to be assisted to migrate. Recruitment agencies do this by 
providing a job placement service and assisting with the transportation of the migrants. This is 
especially the case where we are dealing with the migration of unskilled labourers over national 
borders. The bracero program instituted by the American authorities after World War 11 to attract 
Mexican workers into low-wage jobs in agriculture and other industries is an example of this. 
Closer to home the activities (since the end of the previous century) of the Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association (WNLA) to recruit workers from the subcontinent of Africa for the South 
African gold mines comes to mind. Labour recruitment is not restricted to international migration 
however. In South Africa. labour bureaus were scattered all over the former homeland areas of 
South Africa until the 1970's, by which time the country started to move from a labour shortage 
to a labour surplus economy and it was no longer necessary for industries to recruit people in that 
way. 
As the migration flow matures and as the first migrants become established in their new home, 
networks start to form between the area of origin and the destination area. Previous migrants are 
now in a position to sponsor the migration offamily members, thus lowering the cost of migration. 
The initial migration flow, started off as a result of organised recruitment, now calls forth 
additional migration (Boyd 1989:645). What is ironic about this is that the new migration flow 
often occurs when the authorities no longer wish to encourage migration, either because of a 
downturn in the local economy or because of anti-immigrant sentiment. By that time a migration 
flow has become institutionalised between the two areas that continues despite the ending of 
8 Another important reason why rural people initially do not migrate is that the jobs on 
offer at the beginning of a process of migration are generally not very attractive - they are 
typically to low wage and dangerous occupations such as agriculture and mining. More attractive 
jobs only become available later on with the growth of secondary industry and increased 
unionization. 
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recruitment or even active border control measures to limit migrat ion (8oyd 1989:645). This is 
why Boyd ( 1989:64 1), among others (a lso see Massey and Espinosa 1997) claims that '(O)nee 
begun, migration fl ows often becomes self-sustaining, refl ec ting the estab lishment of networks of 
info rmation , assistance and obligatio ns which develop between migrants in the host society and 
friends and relatives in the sending area.' 
Banerj ee (1983: 195) explains why previous migrants arc wi lling to help potential migrants in their 
home vi llage to migrate . They firstly want to recreate in their new environment the networks o f 
mutual support in which they participated in thei r home vi llage, and for this purpose they sponsor 
the migration of network members. Another motivation is that they plan to return to their home 
vi llage on retirement or when something goes wrong in their new home (such as unemployment) . 
Because they feel that they cannot afford to alienate people back home, they maintain thei r 
connections there by_ inter alia , ass isting the migration of their relatives and friends. According 
to Banerjee ( 1983: 195) thi s willingness to help po tential migrants is a reflection of the lack of 
assimi lation of previous migrants into the new environment. Bes ides this, it is also a reflection of 
the economic insecurity that often characterise conditions in the destination area and which make 
people feel that they may need their rural base in future. Georges (1990:96) suggests another 
motive for the support offered by previous migrants to potential migrants. By sponsoring the 
latte r's migrat ion, previous migrants can change them from dependants to people who are in a 
position to help carry the burden of subsidising those left behind. 
There are a number o f reasons why previous migrants may become unable or unwilling to support 
the migration of others. One of these is poverty in the dest ination area that limits the ab ili ty of 
network members to maintain the network connections. Spiegel et al . (1996: 14-15) refer to cases 
where recent migrants to Cape Town are too poor to visit family members in the ir Transkei area 
of origin, or otherwise keep in regular contact. They are also unab le to sponsor visits by family 
members to Cape Town. As a result the network (and even househo ld) that the recent migrants 
previous ly formed part of cannot be mainta ined, with obvious impl ications for the migration 
prospects o f those who were left behind . 
Once a network member becomes successful , the incentive to remain part of the network is 
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reduced. While networks offer good ways for poor people to accumulate capital through mutual 
savings clubs (called stokvels in South Africa) this is only true as long as everybody is more or less 
on the same economic level (see above where I refer to Lomnitz'$ claim that reciprocal exchange 
only takes place as long as the economic differentiation between network members is not too 
great). If differentiation starts occurring the better-off might experience the claims of others on 
the resources they have accumulated as a strain rather than as a source of security. According to 
Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993: 1339) ' .. cozy intergroup relationships ofthe sort frequently found 
in solidary communities can give rise to a gigantic free-riding problem. Less diligent group 
members can enforce on successful members all types of demands backed by the same normative 
structure that makes the existence of trust possible.' They (1993 : 1339) then relate the example of 
entrepreneurs in a predominantly Catholic community in the Ecuadorean Andes who are often 
Protestants. The reason for this is that by leaving the Catholic church, they can isolate themselves 
from many of the obligations they have to others in the community. 
Sharp (1994:80) similarly describes how social di fferentiation in the former homeland ofQwaQwa 
created a group of migrant workers who increasingly felt secure enough with their town base to 
lose interest in networks in QwaQwa. According to him this has had devastating consequences 
for social relationships in QwaQwa. QwaQwa was designated as the homeland for the Southern 
Sotho people in 1969 and soon after that hundreds of thousands of former farmworkers settled 
there, some having left the farms voluntarily and some being forcibly resettled there' . This process 
caused large scale destitution in the area as the new arrivals had to compete in an already 
overcrowded job market for migrant jobs elsewhere in the country (QwaQwa at first having no 
local employment opportunities). One reaction to this was initially the growth of social networks. 
According to Sharp (1994) '(N)etworks of mutual assistance, such as savings clubs ... burial 
societies, and neighbourhood lending and borrowing had grown up in the 1970's, predicated on 
the shared trauma and suffering of the experience of relocation. ' Since the government did provide 
schools (if nothing else), and as a result of changes in the labour market that created permanent 
and better-renumerated jobs for skilled migrant workers, a class of better-off workers emerged 
during the 1980's. They held down unionised jobs in metropolitan areas like Johannesburg. Even 
though they still lived in QwaQwa among their former friends and neighbours, these workers 
9 This discussion is based on Sharp (1994) and Sharp and Spiegel (1985). 
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diverted more of their income into the const ruction of brick houses and the acquisit ion of domestic 
appliances. and less was ava ilable for sharing with previous network members. The result of this 
was that the networks created in the 1970's lost much of their vita lity in QwaQwa in the 1980's. 
One can deduce from this that people only remain part of networks as long as they feel that over 
the long tem they are likely to gain as much as they contribute to the network. This decision is 
of course seldom taken explicitly and calculatingly, g iven the nonnative prescriptions that onc 
must help others because oflhe close relationship one has with them, and given the denial oflhe 
need for reciprocity. Better-off people do seem disengage from networks, however, perhaps 
because, due to the growing economic gap, they do not feel as close as before to their relatives 
and friends. 
As discussed previously, those who do participate in networks in turn exc lude those who are 
totally destitute. Sharp and Spiegel (1985) provides us with numerous case studies of how those 
without income opportunities were excluded from the networks that flouri shed in QwaQwa during 
the 1970's. There is therefore ample evidence that, besides the ethnic cleavages referred to by 
Wi lpert (see above), class barriers can also restrict the extend to which migrant networks can 
grow beyond the first migrants. 
The effect of social cleavages on networks should alert us to the fact that, despite the idiom of 
mutual help and communal solidarity that infuse networks, both networks and households are 
often riddled wi th conflict. Grandparents may consent to look after their grandchildren while the 
latter's parents go of to work somewhere, but under much protest, as attested to by Kotze 
( 1993:81) in his study of Dixie in the fonner Gazankulu homeland. As a result of unrelenting 
pressure from the grandparents to relieve them of the burden oflooking after add itional chi ld ren, 
the children may do so . Confl ict over obligations to significant others can therefore lead to the 
breakup of these connections. These conflicts do not only occur between the generations, but also, 
and especially, between husband and wife. Sharp and Spiegel ( 1990, also see Delius 1996:162) 
refers to the conflicts that often take place between husband and wife in the rural areas of South 
Africa abou t how money remitted is supposed to be spent. Male migrant workers may want to 
spend most of their money on themselves and remit the minimum for the upkeep of their 
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households back home, orthey may have specific instructions about how the wife in the rural area 
is supposed to spend the money remitted by them. The husband often wants the money to be spent 
on the purchase of cattle which improves the long-term security of the household but reduces the 
amount of money available for immediate consumption. 
The conflict can become so severe that the family splits up. This can have devastating 
consequences for the partner (generally the wife) that stayed behind in the rural areas and 
depended on the remittances of the migrant worker (generally the husband) for her livelihood. 
There are many female-headed households in the former homeland areas of South Africa (as well 
as the rest of South em Africa affected by high rates of migrant labour) that developed in this way, 
or as a result of the death of a spouse (Brown 1983). Households often also break up when the 
migrant worker husband finds a girlfriend in town and divorces the wife in the rural area. Because 
networks are often structured around family obligations, the breakup of families can result in the 
family members who have remained behind in the rural area losing their access to the migrant 
network, with obvious negative consequences for their ability to migrate in search of a job. 
The same argument that Spiegel (see above, p.99) makes with regard to the inability of household 
members to consolidate their households for long term projects, also applies to networks. If the 
households which are the building blocks of networks cannot maintain themselves over the long 
run, and continually break up and reform, household members will struggle to keep their network 
connections intact. The conditions that cause instability in household membership, and that lead 
to the breakdown of households, such as poverty, violence, and diseases such as AIDS, for 
obvious reasons also affect the viability of networks. To maintain networks, and especiaIly migrant 
networks that can stretch over considerable distance, members have to expend considerable 
amounts of time and money. I referred to this above on p.66. Friends and relatives have to be 
visited, or contacted in some other way. savings clubs and sports associations that link the 
migrants with the area of origin maintained, and so forth. All this is impossible under 
c ircumstances of extreme poverty. 
This is confirmed by Meagher (1997:89) when she discusses the effect of structural adjustment 
policies on migrant networks in Nigeria. These policies. imposed by international institutions such 
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as the World Bank, led to a 'severe contraction of real incomes in both ru ral and urban 
areas .. ,(which) ... left households on both sides less ab le to maintain ties and contribute to extended 
family needs'. Rural households cannot any more afford the input prices to produce food surpluses 
that can be sent to urban relatives , while the steep ri se in transport costs has reduced the frequency 
of visits between urban and rural households. As a result of the latter, the remittance fl ow from 
the towns has declined. Increasing poverty has also made both rural and urban households 'less 
willing to take in relatives and clansmen. a cent ral mechanism for migration in both directions' 
(Meagher 1997:89). 
For networks to function, and to mobilise resources to support the migration of network members, 
there has to be some stability in household membership as well. Network members need to fonn 
stab le relationships, and residential instability will not help with this. Moreover. the disorganis ing 
effect that violence and AIDS have on households also applies to networks. Under the conditions 
outlined above. networks will cease to exist , or at least struggle to perfonn their functions 
adequate ly. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
A number of conclusions emerge from this discussion that are relevant to my overall argument 
about the inequality-inducing effect of migration. It is firstly clear that although networks do not 
play a significant role in the initiation of a migrant stream between an area of origin and a 
destination area. it can stimulate and facilitate additional migration once that stream has begun. 
Networks stimulate migration by creating the motivation among non-migrants to migrate. large ly 
through the demonst ration effect. Networks fac il itate migration by subsidi sing the costs of 
migration. The effect of this is what Massey et al. (1994b) call the cumulat ive causation of 
migration. In other words, the more migration has occurred between places, the more additional 
migration will take place, due to the institutionalisation of migration between those two places that 
occurred as a resu lt of the development of networks. As networks develop. more people from the 
community of origin get a chance, the refore, of migrating to that dest ination area. This deepening 
of the migrant stream has the effect of reduci ng the selectivity of migration. 
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The model that I propose as an alternative model to that of Massey et al. incorporates these 
central insights of Massey and his co-workers. It goes beyond it however in so far as it stresses 
that the extent to which selectivity is reduced is likely to be limited, and unequally distributed 
between the different kinds of selectivity. In the case of circular migration, more than permanent 
migration where family reunion wiU play a role, considerable gender selectivity is expected to 
remain, as was discussed in chapter 3. This is due to household survival strategies and gender 
dynamics within the household. Gender selectivity is not directly attributable to the costs of 
migration in the first place, with the result that the network subsidy is unlikely to have much effect 
on it any way. Income selectivity will continue to exist as far as the poorest of the population of 
the community of origin is concerned. This occurs as a result of a number of reasons. 
The poorest people within the community of origin are less likely to migrate because they are not 
able to join migrant networks. This is because the emphasis on potential to reciprocate disqualifies 
them from joining networks. The migrant networks that do exist will thus not grow to include 
everybody within the community of origin. Other social cleavages within the community of origin 
such as ethnicity can have the same effect of reducing the growth potential of networks. Social 
differentiation within the community of origin can further lead to the decline of networks, as those 
with the strongest urban base experience a decreasing need to remain part of migrant networks. 
Social factors such as poverty, disease and violence can also lead to the collapse of migrant 
networks as both the urban and rural residents within the network find it impossible to maintain 
those networks due to a lack of resources. The (especially income-) selectivity reducing effect of 
networks is therefore limited in two ways: on the one hand social cleavages such as class and 
ethnicity limit the growth of networks and on the other those networks may collapse due to a 
number of reasons. 
Even if a network continues to function well, there is no guarantee that it will continue to spur on 
additional migration. This is firstly because the network may happen to channel migration to an 
area with decliningjob opportunities. In this case, the information transmitted via the network may 
work in the opposite direction. The network now signals that opportunities are becoming fewer 
in the destination area and that it is not worth the effort to go there. Another reason for this is that 
the network may have such limited resources that it is not able to offer much help. The network 
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subsidy has to be seen in the context of the cost of migration. The more expensive migration is, 
the more help has to be offered by the network to make it happen, depending on the level of the 
indiv idua l migrant ' s own reSources. of course. Network resources are more oran issue the refore 
if the cost of migration is high and the resources of the individua l migrant is low. In chapter 3 it 
was pointed out that some of the costs of migrat ion may be lowered over time, but that others. 
such as the costs assoc iated with the job search period, may increase. It is therefore evident that 
the effect of the network depends in this case on a number of variab les, such as the cost of 
migration, network resources and the individual migrant ' s resources. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON SOCIAL INEQUALITY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The theory of inequality that I am developing consists of two parts. The first part concerns the 
selecti vity of migration and the way in which it develops over time. J am saying that, over time. 
the poorest will cont inue to be underrepresented in migration from a community of origin. r have 
dealt with this issue in the previous two chapters: chapter 3 dealt with the selectivity of mi gration 
and chapter 4 was concerned with the role of networks in changing selectivity over time. The 
second part of the theory is based on the assumption that migration improves the position of the 
migrant re lati ve to the non~migrant. This chapte r is concerned with this part. 
Although generally true, the assumption that migration improves the position of the migrant has 
to be expressed in a more qualified way. Factors such as the type of migration, the channelling 
effect of networks, and gender play a role in detennining how advantageous migration is for the 
migrant and most of this chapter is occupied with a discuss ion of these factors. These issues are 
discussed in the following order. After a few preliminary remarks (sections 5.2 and 5.3), I look 
at the factors that can detennine how advantageous migration is for the migrant. The first of these 
is the type of migration (push versus pull migration and rura l-urban versus rural-rural migration) . 
This is di scussed in section 5.4. The second factor, discussed in sect ion 5.5, has to do with the 
timing of the move, i.e . whether the migrant is a leader or a follower in the migration process. 
Gender is the last fac to r that can detennine the outcome of migrat ion and this receives attention 
in section 5.6. 
My intention with this discussion is to introduce more complexity into the theory of the inequality 
producing impact of migration and to make it more adequate in dealing with the real world . 
Clearl y, under some circumstances migration may produce more inequality than under others (or 
even none at all), because the degree to which migrat ion is advantageous varies from case to case. 
A consideration of the factors mentioned above a llows us to get a greater gr ip on what the 
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relevant circumstances may be. 
There is another factor complicating the relationship between migration on the one hand and 
inequality between migrants and non~migrants on the other. Even if migrants do extract significant 
advantage from their migration, with the result that migration can potentially worsen inequality. 
this effect will be softened if the migrant's remittances are redistributed through the community 
of origin to a significant extent. In this scenario non-migrants may also gain as a result of the 
migrant's movement. thus reducing the extent to which they are worse offrelative to the migrants 
post-migration. In sections 5.7 and 5.8 I investigate how the migrant's earnings are redistributed 
through the community of origin, first to family members as a result of kinship obligations, and 
then throughout the community of origin by way of the cash nexus. 
5.2 THE OBSERVED CONDITIONS IN THIRD WORLD CITIES AND THE 
ADVANTAGES THAT MIGRATION IS SUPPOSED TO BRING: IS THERE A 
CONTRADICTION? 
As is clear from the previous discussion, much of my argument with regard to the inequa lity 
producing effect of migration depends on the assumption that migration improves the position of 
those who participate in it. One obvious objection to this assumption is that there is so much 
overcrowding and unemployment in Third World cities that moving to them can hardly be said 
to constitute an improvement. To answer this objection it is necessary to do a brief survey of how 
the attitudes of academics and policymakers to urbanization have evolved over the years. 
It has been remarked that their conception of urbanization has gone through three stages over the 
last couple of decades (Population Information Program 1 983:M-245). In the first stage rural-
urban migration was seen in an overwhelmingly positive light. Modernisation theorists of the 
1960's and earlier regarded urbanisation as an essential part ofthe industrialisation process which 
in turn formed the basis of the process of modernisation. Urbanisation represented the transfer of 
surplus population from the agricultural sector into more productive urban industrial occupations 
(see for example my discussion ofLewis's dual economy model in chapter 2). In the second phase, 
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which started soon after the world recession brought about by the 1973 oi l cris is. rural-u rban 
migration was viewed as contributing to the overurbanisation of cities in the Third World. There 
was now an acute realisat ion that large parts of the Third World do not industrialise fast enough 
(if at all) to accommodate the numbers of people stream ing into cities from the rural areas. 
Scholars started to focus on the negative consequences ofurhanisation in tenns of the ecological 
pressures, housing shortages, crime and unemployment thought to be caused by uncontrolled 
population concentration in mega-cities. 
Since then, both planners and academics have adopted a more balanced outlook about rural-urban 
migration. It is now more generally recognized that urbanisation has both pos itive and negative 
implications for Third World countries and that policy should be about trying to maximise the 
fOlmer and minimising the latter. Even though my focus in this thesis is on the inequality 
producing eftects of migration, and is thus on one of its more negative aspects, I agree with this 
sen timent. I funder some circumstances rural-urban migration can exacerbate inequality. this does 
not mean that it cannot also have positive effects which may outweigh the bad, especial ly if policy 
measures are in place to minimise the negative aspects. 
One of the reasons for the more balanced view of rural-urban migration is that it became clear that 
even though rural-urban migration may have negative consequences for the c ities concerned, 
individual migrants generally reported improving their position as a result of migration (Dogan 
& Kasarda 1988:21, Population Information Program 1983:M-245, Miro & POller 1979). Cit ing 
numerous studies to support their conclusions, the Population Infomlation Program (1983:M-
257) report: 
Most migrants are glad that they have moved ... They believe that their living conditions 
have improved ... , that they are making progress ... , and that their ch ildren are better off. .. A 
substantial minority, however, are dissatisfied with city life ... and may return or move 
on ... 
Migrants feel that they are better off because they compare their present situation with conditions 
in their rural areas of origin. If one realises that however bad conditions are in the urban areas. 
things are even worse in the migrants' areas of origin, one starts to see rural-urban migration in 
a new light (Dogan and Kasarda 1988:22). This is true even if one acknowledges that. in most 
cases in the Third World, migrants do not leave the rural areas for formal sector jobs in town. 
Instead, as Danesh (1987: 12) says, jobs are not there to be taken, but have to be created by the 
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migrants themselves in the informal sector. Despite this Danesh (I 987: 12-13) believes that in Iran 
in particular (where he did his research) and in the Third World in general, rural-urban migrants 
still improve their position overall as a result of their move. This is because conditions in the rural-
areas are so bad in comparison. 
It is therefore important not to generalise from the observed conditions in mega-cities to the 
experiences of individual migrants of these conditions. The consequences of migration for the 
individual migrant himlherselfmay very well be positive. even if the move may have negative 
consequences for the urban destination area as a whole, in the sense of contributing to housing 
shortages and congestion. !fthe consequences for the migrant are positive, it follows that the bad 
conditions in urban areas cannot be used as an objection to my argument about the inequality 
producing effects of migration. 
5.3 URBAN BIAS, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE ADVANTAGES OF 
MIGRATION 
It therefore emerges that it is necessary to make a comparison between conditions in the area of 
origin and the destination area before one can get an idea of how migration between the two 
affects the welfare of the individual migrant. Bad conditions in the destination area may be 
outweighed by even worse conditions in the area of origin. In the last few decades Third World 
countries have undergone a period of wrenching adjustment as a result of the debt crisis of the 
1980's, the structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and World Bank and recently the 
fall-out from the crisis in South East Asia. These changes have affected the welfare of urban areas 
relative to that of rural areas. It is therefore worthwhile asking whether it is still true that urban 
areas are better off than rural areas, especially in the light of Douglas Massey's (1996) observation 
that poverty is increasingly an urban and not a rural phenomenon. In order to answer this 
question, I discuss in this section the changes that have occurred in the life chances offered by big 
cities, smaller cities and rural areas respectively in the last few decades as a result of structural 
adjustment programs. This will provide an indication of how advantageous rural-urban migration 
is at present to the individual Third World migrant. Because there is so much regional (that is 
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from one continent, country and province to another) variation in the distribution of life chances 
between urban and rural areas. any answer arrived at is bound to be very general. To establi sh the 
situation in a specific case, an empirical ana lysis will have to be undertaken. This is however not 
so problematic, given the leve l of abstraction at which the argument about the inequality 
producing impac t of migration is couched. 
Since the 1980's a series of diagnoses of the underlying problems of Th ird World economies and 
their solutions. known as the 'Washington consensus' , have predominated in discourses on 
economic development. These emphasised in the first place high interest rates (to fight inflation 
and restore the confidence of international investors), the reduction of budget deficits (to fight 
inflation and reduce the 'crowding out' of private investment by government expend iture), the 
opening of markets to foreign competition and deregulation and secondarily (and less consistent ly) 
lower exchange rates (to supposedly fuel export led growth). Although the Washington consenslls 
has recent ly been questioned by establishment economists sllch as Joseph Stig litz o rlhe World 
Bank and Jeffrey Sachs ofHarvard, for twenty years it represented the policy of institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank (the World Bank has of late started to question this line of 
thinking and is increasingly at odds with the IMF over policy issues). During this period, refonns 
along these lines (known as structural adjustment) became a precondition for help from these 
institutions for Third World countries. 
The insistence on market led policies came in reaction to the unsustainable economic policies 
pursued by (often) corrupt and incompetent Third World governments, but it is a moot point 
whether the so-called cure was often not as bad as the disease it was supposed to address. For the 
most part, the impact of these refonns on the poor in the cities of the Third World countries 
proved to be devastating (Gilbert 1994, Partes 1989). Because of the abolition of subsidies, food 
and transport prices rose. As a result of tight fiscal and monetary policies, as well as forei gn 
competition, many industries closed down and forma l sector employment fell sharply. Urban 
unemployment increased sharply in most Third World countries (Portes 1989:24, Gilbert 
1994:5 1). The only exception to this trend were the South East Asian countries, who exhibited 
high rates of economic growth until 1997 when they too were forced by the IMF to implement 
adjustment programmes following a financi al panic . In addition the real value of wages for those 
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who still had jobs fell drastically (Gilbert 1994:47). Deregulation of the labour market led to 
increasing subcontracting and generally more insecure employment (Gilbert 1994:54). The 
informal sector expanded significantly as a result of deregulation and increasing unemployment, 
but it is clear that it could not accommodate everybody who became unemployed (Portes 
1989:25, Gilbert 1994:53). Moreover, per capita income earned in the informal sector fell 
significantly as the market for informal sector jobs became overtraded and fannat sector income 
available for recycling in the informal sector declined (Portes 1989:33, Gilbert 1994:53). 
As a result the distribution of life chances between metropolitan areas on the one hand and smaller 
urban areas and rural areas on the other seem to have shifted in most parts of the Third World. 
Brockerhoff and Brennan (1998: 91) provide figures that compare infant mortality rates for 
selected Third World countries between bigger and smaller cities (those with more and less than 
I million inhabitants) as well as towns (less than 50 000) and rural areas. According to them, 
(Brockerhoff and Brennan 1998:89) these figures can be used as an indicator of overall living 
conditions in the different kinds of settlements (their rationale being that infant mortality rates are 
very sensitive to changes in socio-economic conditions). After comparing these figures, they 
(Brockerhoff and Brennan 1998) come to the conclusion that some of the disadvantages 
previously imposed on the smaller settlement types (smaller cities, towns and rural areas) relative 
to big cities have lessened in most regions of the Third World between the late 1970's and the 
early 1990's. The only exception is Africa where conditions in smaller cities relative to other areas 
seem to have worsened. Even though the disadvantages of smaller settlement types compared to 
big cities have been reduced somewhat, Brockerhoffand Brennan's figures also make it clear that. 
with a few exceptions, big cities still have more favourable conditions than smaller settlement 
types in most regions of the Third World. One of the reasons why cities and towns continue to 
do better in tenns of service provision. despite attempts to reverse urban bias, is that it is much 
more economically viable to deliver services to urban than to rural populations. Because of the 
relative distance from the existing distribution network in the case of water. electricity and 
telecommunications, it requires far less capital outlay to install services in an urban or peri-urban 
informal settlement than in a remote rural area. The capital outlay is especially critical given the 
small income the utilities will probably derive from the poor consumers they are servicing in both 
the rural and urban areas (due to low consumption) and militates against providing services to 
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rural areas. 
Part of the improvement in infant morta lity rates that Brockerhoff and Brennan (1998) ascribe to 
improved li ving cond itions generally is probably more a result of reforms to the health care sector 
specifically , rather than improved overall living conditions. According to Gi lbert (1994:48) 
governments have become more aware of the need to target the remaining health care subsidies 
(such as feeding schemes for underweight children, clinics, etc.) at the poorest people li vi ng in the 
most deprived regions. Thi s should have led to improvements in health care in previously 
disadvantaged places, such the smaller settlement types. Nevertheless, there are indications that 
some economic grovvth has been diverted to places outside of the major metropoles over this 
period. The developmental model that was fo llowed in most of the Third World during the 1970's 
was import substitution industrialisation. Because industries find it advantageous to locate close 
to their markets. it made sense for them to be in the biggest cities during thi s period. According 
to Partes (1989:34) however: 
(T)he shift toward an export-orientated model during the late 1970's and 1980's has been 
accompan ied by the growth of industries that are not located in the large cities, such as 
commercial agriculture, forestry, mining, and product assembly. The proliferation of 
export-processing zones in several countries have added to the trend because these 
industrial enclaves are generally located away from national capitals. 
Consistent with this trend, it seems that the growth rate of most of the largest cities in the Third 
World has slowed recently relative to that of smaller cities (Portes 1989: 14, Brockerhoff and 
Brennan 1998:80-81). This indicates that some rural-urban migration has been directed away from 
the fanner to the latter. Armed with this information, we can now return to the question with 
which we started this section: in the light of the structural adjustment policies of the last two 
decades, is it still true to say that migrants improve their situation when they migrate to urban 
areas? It seems that the answerto this question is still 'yes' , albei t a qualified one. Brockerhoffand 
Brennan' s figures confirm that cities in general are still better off than rural areas, as I pointed out 
above. Some of the urban bias that previously characterised developmental policies has indeed 
been addressed, and some improvements in rural areas have taken place in things such as health 
care due to the better targeting of subsidies. As we saw above, some migration has also been 
redirected away from the largest cities to smaller cit ies, but this does not take anything away from 
the privileged position of the urban sector as a whole. 
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In chapter 4 I made the point that networks channel migration into particular places and into 
particular occupations (see above pp. 88). It also became evident from that discussion that if the 
network channels migration into an area or an industry with rising employment opportunities, 
migration will be more advantageous than in the case where migration is channelled into a 
declining area or a declining industry. The channelling effect of networks imparts a degree of 
inertia to migration streams, which means that it can take time before migration adjusts to 
changing circumstances. How fast migration adjusts depends critically on the resources of the 
network, as we saw above. One can therefore expect that the changing distribution oflife chances, 
discussed in the previous paragraph, will not affect all migrants in the same way. Some will be 
better prepared to cope with it than others, which imparts a further differentiating effect to 
migration. In this case migration differentiates between different classes of migrant rather than 
between migrants and non-migrants. 
5.4 THE IMPACT OF THE TYPE OF MIGRATION ON THE ADVANTAGES OF 
MIGRATION 
[n this section (5.4), as well as the next section (5.5) devoted to a discussion of the impact of 
gender on migration, I discuss a number of factors that influence the degree of advantage that 
migrants can derive from migration. This is done as part of the broader goal of this chapter to 
quality the statement that migrants benefit from migration. It seems that this advantage is variable, 
depending on the factors discussed below. 
5.4.1 THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN PUSH AND PULL M[GRA TION 
One objection to the idea that migration improves the situation of migrants is that this statement 
applies more to pull-migration than to push-migration. The migrant responds to pull-forces if slhe 
decides to move to an urban area because conditions there are very attractive in terms of high 
wages, good services, etc. Push-migration occurs when the migrant is forced off the land in some 
way or the other. Pull migration is discretionary with the migrant having a choice in the matter, 
but push migration occurs out of necessity. The rationale for the argument that only pull migration 
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improves the migrant" s position is that when the migran t is forced to leave his/her community of 
origin, as in the case of a sharecropper that is kicked off the land as a result of the 
commercia lisation of agriculture (I described this scenario in chapter 3 under the heading of 
social-structural explanations), migration is an act of distress. The careful planning of and 
preparation fo r the act of migration that is implied by the notion of pull-migration do not apply 
in this case of push-migration and therefore one cannot expect push-migration [Q be as 
advantageous to the migrant as pull-migration (Lipton 1980). 
The issue is made more complicated because push and pull migration are not only types of 
migration , but also feature respective ly in two different theoretical perspect ives on migration. The 
push-migration theoretical approach is more interested in migration from a macro-theoretical and 
structuralist viewpoint, while the pull-migration approach v iews migration from a micro-
theoretical and agency angle. In a sense then, push and pull migration are not only rea lit ies on the 
ground, but also theoret ical constructs created by the tendency of the push perspective to view 
people as merely reacting to social and economic forces operating on the macro scale , and the pull 
perspective's focus on the rational and microscale decision making of the individual actor. The 
term 'macro' refers to large-scale social processes occurring on the level of society as a whole, 
while 'micro' indicates a focus on the smallest scale social forces structured by the indi vidual's 
interaction with other individuals. The difference between macro and micro is therefore the 
difference between a perspective that sees the 'big picture' and one that zooms in on small scale 
phenomena. From the pull-migrat ion perspective one is therefore more likely to interpret the 
migration one encounters as a planned and unforced decision by the individual actor. If one adopts 
a push perspective, on the other hand, there is a tendency to view the migrant as a victim oflarge-
scale social and economic transfonnations (such as the commercialisation of agriculture) over 
which the individual has no control. 
The distorted image of migration that an exclusive focus on each of these aspects of migrat ion 
provides has given rise to calls for a new perspective that avo ids the extremism of either (Wood 
1982). In response, meso level concepts (concepts that in other words focus on a level of analys is 
between the large and small scales) slleh as 'household' (Wood 1982) and 'network' (Boyd 1989) 
have been otfered to overcome this dualism. According to Boyd ( 1989:642), adop ting th is 
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perspective "pennits understanding migration as a social product - not as the sole result of 
individual decisions made by individual actors. not as the sole result of economic or political 
parameters, but rather as an outcome of all these factors in interaction", That this is the case 
becomes apparent once one reviews the discussion in chapter 4. Households respond to 
constraining macro-structural forces by spreading their members over a number of tasks and 
places. By engaging in reciprocal exchange, networks can overcome the constraints imposed by 
the high cost of migration and in so doing allow more network members to migrate than would 
otherwise be the case. Sometimes, however, social forces are so strong that networks degenerate 
and become unable to sponsor migration. 
It is thus the case that from a more balanced perspective that takes into account forces operating 
at the macro-, meso- and microlevels. and that allows for the interaction of structure and agency, 
pure push and pure pull migration are unlikely to be very prominent. People are not just passive 
victims of social forces as suggested by the push perspective, but can often respond creatively to 
these conditions. At other times, however, the social forces are so strong that (poor) individuals 
are very constrained in their reactions to these forces. This leads to the conclusion that it is better 
to see the amount of control that an individual has over his or her movement as variable, although 
it is unlikely ever to be complete (as in pull-migration) or totally absent (as in push-migration). 
In so far as pull-migration responds to attractive conditions in town and push-migration results 
from pressure from the rural side, pull-migration is oriented to the urban end and push migration 
to the rural end of the rural-urban continuum. The exclusive orientation to either the urban or 
rural side of the equation is another reason why push and pull migration always have to be seen 
relative to each other and never as absolutes. The pull of the urban areas is only effective, after 
all, because it is better relative to the conditions the potential migrant is facing at the rural home 
(Danesh 1987:20 makes a similar argument). As a result, urban pull does not make sense without 
some level of rural push. It is true that if one is evicted from a fann there is in most cases no 
alternative but to leave, but even in this case a destination is chosen l from a number of 
I This is true in most cases but not all. It has happened before that migrants were forced 
to wander aimlessly through the countryside because they had nowhere else to go. See our 
reference to Sol Plaatjie!s work in chapter 3, as well as our reference to Steinbeck!s novel.) 
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alternatives. The rural push therefore also has to be seen in tenns of pull factors sugges ting a 
particular destination above others. 
The conclus ion to be drawn from this is that the amount of control an individual has over his/her 
migration is variable. This creates a continuum with two extremes ranging from absolutely 
necessary migration to absolute ly discretionary migration, although neither of these two 
alternatives are likely to occur in practice. Because the terms 'push' and 'pull ' migration is so 
commonly used I shall continue to use them, although it must be understood that they refer to 
degrees of control over movement rather than the total presence or absence of it. We now need 
to return to the quest ion whether it is true that the more control an individual has over hislher 
migration, the more beneficial the move is going to be for the migrant. 
Besides the element of planning and preparation referred to above, there are other reasons w.hy 
the migration of those with less control over their movement (and by implication those with less 
power) is likely to offer fewer rewards. These are all related to the observation that poverty and 
powerlessness go hand in hand. As a result, push migration is more likely to apply to the 
movements of the poorest, and pull migration to those of the better off (Lipton 1980, also see 
Mohtadi 1986:719). It was mentioned previously that the poor migrate over shorter distances, and 
tend to go to rural rather than urban locations. Unless a relatively privileged urban area is within 
striking distance from where they live, the poor, because they cannot afford to migrate over long 
distances, therefore have to make do with the destination area that is within their reach. Their 
chances of reaching the better-off areas are therefore lower, with the result that the average return 
from their migration is also less (Lipton 1980:4). This strengthens the argument that those who 
exercise little control over their movements are also less likely to gain from them. 
From this we can conclude that a migratory move is not likely to cause as much inequality 
between the migrant and those who have to stay behind when the migrant is pushed into migrating 
as when the migrant is pulled by better opportuni ties. This is because in this (push migration) case 
the migrant does not benefit as much relative to the non-migrant as a result of hi s/ her migration. 
Pull migrants are much more likely to improve their s ituat ion relative to those who stay behind. 
But if in this case the extent of inequality created between migrants and non-migrants is less, it 
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still has the potential to worsen inequality between different classes of migrants. Here inequality 
is not worsened through the mechanism of the non-migration of the poorest and the migration of 
the better-off, but through the better prepared migration of the latter and the more constrained 
migration of those who are worse-off (cf. Lipton 1980). As a result the migrant who is pushed 
benefits less than the migrant who is pulled. This is a similar argument to the one I am going to 
make in the next section for the difference between rural-urban migration and rural-rural 
migration. 
5.4.2 THE DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF RURAL-RURAL AND RURAL-URBAN MIGRATION 
In chapter 3 I referred to Brown and Lawson' s (1985) claim that rural-rural migration is a 
neglected phenomenon. According to Chant and Radcliffe (1992:9) rural-rural migration is more 
prevalent in the regions of a country where there is a seasonal demand for agricultural labour 
(especially during harvesting). They mention specifically tropical export crops such as cotton, 
sugar and coffee which have high labour demands at some stages of the growing season. In South 
Africa rural-rural migration takes place to satisfY the labour demands of the sheep farming 
industry (sheep shearers), the sugar industry and fruit and vegetable farms of various kinds (Sharp 
and SpiegeI1990:539). Many South African mines are located in rural areas and consequently the 
migration that takes place in response to their labour demands can also be classified as rural-rural 
migration. Rural-rural migration takes place in response to these labour demands, but because the 
extra labour is only needed at some stages of the growing season, it is more likely to be circular 
than pennanent migration. 
From chapter 3 it is evident that rural-rural migration takes place over shorter distances and 
generally attracts poorer and more unskilled migrants. The question now arises if rural-rural 
migration advantages migrants relative to non-migrants to the same extent that its counterpart, 
rural·urban migration, does. Because rural-rural migration is largely of a circular nature, the 
general conditions in the (rural) destination area are not as important for our answer as the wages 
to be gained from such migration. In general 2, it seems that wages are lower in agriculture than 
2 Because there is so much regional variation in wage rates, our answer can obviously only 
be of a very general nature. 
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in formal urban occupat ions, espec ially where the urban occupations are unionised. Ifrural-rura l 
migration is not so advantageous as well-prepared rural-urban migration to formal sector jobs, 
thi s does not mean that rural-rural migrants are not better-off compared to those who are 
immobilised in thei r home village, however. This form of migration still allows individuals to make 
use of opportunities spread over a wider geographical area than the home village. 
The different rewards offered by rural-rural and rura l-urban migrat ion and the unde r-
representation of the poorest in the latter migration stream is another way in which migrat ion can 
reinforce inequality_ As in the case of push versus pull migration, the inequali ty is here created 
less between migrant and non-migrant than between di fferent classes of migrant. Better-prepared 
rural-urban migrants, who are already privileged relative to rural-rura l migrants, can reap more 
rewards from their migration than the latter group. In a self-reinforcing cycle the privileges 
afforded this group not only get reproduced but are also amplitied once they reach their 
destination. 
5.5 THE IMPACT OF THE TIMING OF THE MIGRATION DECISION ON THE 
ADVANTAGES OF MIGRATION: LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS 
MIGRATION PROCESS 
IN THE 
I am now going to discuss another factor that influences the extent to which migrants benefi t from 
migration. This has to do with the distinction between leaders and foll owers in the migration 
process. According to Lipton (1980:9), migrat ion can be understood with re ference to models of 
the di ffusion of innovations. Innovations, such as the decision to use high-y ielding seeds in 
agriculture, are fi rst adopted by the leaders in the community (who are also prepared to carry the 
higher ri sks usually associated with innovations) and then spread slowly to others. Innovat ions 
not only diffuse down the soc io-economic hierarchy, but also geographically. Some villages. 
usually those closest to the major urban areas, are the firs t to adopt an innovation. I f successful. 
other villages will then fo llow the leader village in this innovation. As in the case of other 
innovations, the migrat ion innovation diffuses slowly down the socio-economic hierarchy as well 
as the settlement hierarchy (Ske ldon 1990). 
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Generally, those who are the first to adopt the migration innovation gain the most from it, 
according to Lipton (1980:9). This is because once the first migrants have succeeded in 
establishing themselves in town, factors come into play that reduce the advantages that later 
migrants may derive from migration. Lipton (1980:9) claims that this is due to the initial job 
opportunities that gave rise to the migration stream being oversubscribed, while the creation of 
new jobs are limited by the downward inelasticity o( wages as a result of trade union pressure 
(Todaro [1976] makes a similar argument - see chapter 2 above). Lipton 's argument does not take 
cognisance of the possibly that the first migrants, instead of just taking up jobs, may eventually 
be job creators themselves. This will happen if the earlier migrants become entrepreneurs in an 
ethnic enclave (for example grocers who supply Mexican foodstuffs to the Mexican immigrant 
community in US cities). In this case they would be able to employ later migrants, with the result 
that their migration does not disadvantage later migrants in the sense of taking up their jobs. 
Because they had time to take up the opportunities for entrepreneurship offered by the enclave 
economy, earlier migrants are however advantaged relative to later migrants in the sense that they 
are the entrepreneurs and the latter (sometimes) their workers. Lipton's argument must of course 
also be qualified with reference to the discussion of networks in chapter 4. Later migrants may 
not be disadvantaged so badly if they have network connections to previous migrants. These 
connections facilitate the migration of later migrants and are thus able to compensate for the 
disadvantages that later migrants may face. 
The impact on social inequality of the timing of the decision to migrate also occurs through the 
inflation of land values. Migrants typically invest their earnings in the acquisition ofland in their 
area of origin. The first migrants are often able to acquire land rather cheaply (Wiest 1984: 127) 
This is because the lack of agricultural opportunities which is in the first place responsible for their 
decision to migrate generally feeds into low land values. As more migrants leave, the demand for 
land increases relative to the supply, with the result that migration is often associated with the 
inflation ofland values (Russell1986:687, Georges 1990: 186). Those who leave later, therefore, 
are disadvantaged relative to the first migrants in the sense that they cannot buy land at those 
cheap rates. It is not clear that the acquisition of land has such an important impact on social 
inequality in the community of origin, however, because land acquired by migrants is generally 
not used productively. Mines (1984:152) reports that US bound migrants from a village in the 
120 
Mexican state ofZacatecas buy land, not to invest in agriculture, but "tor prestige, security, and 
to raise food for their parents. " In that vi llage migrant landowners tend to become absentee 
landlords fanning the land through sharecroppers or family members, who do not have the 
motivation or the capital to raise the productivity of the land (Mines 1984: J 53). That migrant 
earnings are often not used to improve the productivity of agricultural land is con finned by 
Georges (1990:243) in her study of a village in the Dominican Republic, as well as by general 
surveys of the effect of remittances on agricul tural productivity in the Third World (Russell 1986), 
Under some circumstances earlier migrants can be p laced in an advantageous position relative to 
later migrants due to the timing of their migrat ion decision. As the previous discussion shows, it 
is not clear how common this is, however, because there are so many factors that can influence 
the degree to which they benefit. To the extent that it is the case, the amount of differentiation 
between late r migrants and non-migrants will be less, as the former is not advantaged as much 
by their migration. As was the case for the other factors discussed above (e.g. push versus pull 
migrants), differentiation between migrants and non-migrants is replaced by differentiation 
between c lasses of migrant if some categories of migrants benefit less as a result of migration. 
Here we are referring to differentiation between leaders and followers in the migration process. 
5.6 THE IMPACT OF GENDER ON THE ADVANTAGES OF MIGRATION 
Recent research on women and migration has demonstrated that gender helps to determine the 
outcome of migration (see for example Pedraza 199 1 :321). In other words, men and women are 
not alike in their experience of migration, and may not benefit in the same way and to the same 
extent from migration. Sometimes women gain more from migration than men, as the ir moves 
give them greater opportunities for education and employment than men (Pedraza 1991 :321), and 
at other times it may be the opposite. To what extent women gain or lose from migration, and the 
circumstances under which either outcome appears , is not at al l clear, however (Tienda and Booth 
1991). Studies done on women and migration in different parts of the world attests to a large 
amount of regional variation in the advantages of migration for women. As we shall see, the 
answers arri ved a t are often inconclusive with regard to this question, and one has to accept that 
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it is largely an empirical question for which an answer has to be established afresh in each case. 
The difficulty involved in interpreting the literature on migration outcomes does not only reside 
in the complexity of empirical reality, however. The biases of scholars with regard to development 
theory also play a part in detennining their perception of migration: those who depart from a 
modernisation framework are likely to see migration as part of a process of modernisation that 
erodes the extreme patriarchal restrictions imposed on women in the countryside (migration is 
therefore seen as overwhelmingly positive), while those adopting a more critical perspective tend 
to see migration as part of a process that destroys the productive role that women previously 
performed in the precapitalist economy and casts them into a marginal role in the capitalist one 
(cf. Gilbert 1994). In this section I shall try to avoid either of these (ideologically loaded) 
extremes and attempt to account for some of the empirical variation by identifying critical 
variables that determine the outcomes of migration for women. 
The question whether or not women improve their economic welfare as a result of their own 
migration has to address the following two components of economic welfare: changes in income 
earning possibilities for the female migrant that occur as a result of migration, and the ways in 
which income is redistributed within the household. Why we should look at the first issue is 
obvious: if migration improves the chances of the woman to earn an income, at least the 
household to which she belongs (if not the migrant herself) will register an increased income. 
Whether or not the individual migrant improves her own position depends on the amount of 
control she has over her own income (as well the income of other members of her household). 
Relations of redistribution within the household therefore affects who within the household is 
going to benefit as a result of the migration of one of the household members. Is it going to be 
the migrant himlherself or the migrant's household as a whole or other members within the 
household? This question forms part of the broader imperative to consider the unit which is 
regarded as being advantaged as a result of migration. Do we mean the migrant as an individual, 
or the household of the migrant? The validity of this question is demonstrated by the following 
examples. A rural household that depends on the earnings of a circular migrant may not do well 
if the migrant does not remit regularly, even if the wages of the migrant himlherselfare high. In 
this case the migrant does well, but not hislher household of origin. At the opposite extreme is the 
case of a female migrant that may not have much control over her earnings, and must give up 
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most of it to her parents' household. In thi s case the household benefits at the expense of the 
individual migrant. 
We shall now look consecutively at the two components of economic welfare that were isolated 
above. 
5.6. 1 MIGRATION AND THE INCOME EARNING CAPACITY OF WOMEN 
Although it may seem obvious that migration should improve a woman 's income earning chances. 
a study of US statistics by Maxwell (1988) suggests that things are not so clear-cut. In an analysis 
of results ofa longitudinal survey of young women and men, she found that married women did 
not improve their earnings upon migration, while unmarried women did. This suggested that 
married women were tied migrants, tollowing their husbands rather than migrating for job related 
reasons on their own account. As a result they suffered an (at least initia l) earnings decline upon 
migration. Leaving aside for the present the question whether things may have changed in the US 
since the time the survey was done (in the late sixties and late seventies), it nevertheless suggests 
the important ro le gender may play in our understanding of the consequences of migration. 
THE ROLE OF MARITAL STATUS IN DETERMINING INCOME EARNING CAPACITY . 
Since Maxwell ' s study was done in the US we need to ask the further question about the 
applicability of her results in a Third World context. According to a survey of the literature on 
gender and migration in the Third World by Tienda and Booth (1991), marital status does seem 
to be an important variable in detennining migration outcomes for women. Although they are 
specifically interested in the impact of migration on the status of women relative to men (and not 
on the economic welfare of women in general), their findings are general enough to be applicable 
here wi th the necessary qualifications. In most (but not all ) of the cases investigated by them 
(Tienda and Booth 1991 ), it was found that women who migrate {O join the ir husbands do not 
benefit from migration, in contrast to single women, who are generally better-off. One can 
interpret this as a special case of our assertion above (section 5.4) that the less control the migrant 
has over his/her migration the less benefit will be derived from migration. An important variable 
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here seems to be cultural prescriptions against the employment of married women, and the ability 
of women to contest them. This is borne out by the observation that where the position of married 
women improves upon rural-urban migration (among Yoruba migrants to a small Nigerian city), 
they do not face any proscriptions against employment (Tienda and Booth 1991 :62). On the other 
hand, if a woman leaves her home village where she had some income-generating possibilities to 
live in a family where she is not supposed to work, her own income-earning capacity will 
obviously not improve. This may be off-set by the share she receives of her husband 's income, so 
one cannot deduce from the above that her economic welfare will necessarily take a turn for the 
worse. Because Tienda and Booth (1991) afe interested in changes in the position of women 
relative to men, they do not investigate this possibility, but it is nevertheless an important 
consideration for our purposes. It will feature again when we discuss the issue of the control the 
women can exert over the income of other members of her household. 
RURA L INCOME EARNING POSSIBILITIES 
Besides marital status, another variable affecting a female migrant's income earning possibilities 
is the possibilities for income generation in both the rural origin and urban destination. In the rural 
area, women's income earning capacity depends on the amount of agricultural land available 
coupled with the place occupied by them in the gender division of labour in agriculture. Starting 
with the last of these two issues, it is well known that there are important differences between 
regions with regard to the position women occupy in agriculture (see for example Chant and 
Radcliffe 1992). In Latin America, women have a limited role in agriculture, whereas in most3 of 
sub-Saharan Africa, women perfonn a much greater role (they do most things, except for land 
clearing and ploughing - cf. Bryson 1981). Where women have a role in agriculture, fa rming 
provides them with part of their (and their household's ) subsistence. In the rural areas of South 
Africa, women are allowed to use part of the grain crop for beer brewing and this provides them 
with an additional cash income (Sharp and Spiegel 1990:532). According to Sharp and Spiegel 
( 1990:540), because migrant men recognise the importance of investment in agricultural 
resources, they are more prepared to remit money to their rural wives when they have agricultural 
3 The exception seems to be areas (especially in West Africa) where cash cropping 
predominate (Bryson 1981 ). 
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land. These remittances provide the women concerned with resources they can invest in informal 
sector activities such as hawk ing, beer brewing and clothes making. 
This in only possible. however, in cases where there is some agricultural land ava ilable. Many rural 
households all overthe Third World are in fact landless. This is certainly the case in South Africa. 
where there are big differences in terms of the amount of agr icultural land availab le between rural 
areas. Sharp and Spiegel (1990), for example. contrast the situation in the Matatie le d istrict in 
Transkei where there is relative ly limited landlessness with the former homeland areaofQwaQwa 
where most households are landless. Rural landlessness is also common in other parts of Africa 
(see for example Nelson 1992: 124) and elsewhere. The income earning possibilities fo r women 
in agriculture is consequently limited by the extent of landlessness. 
To sum up: women can earn some income from agriculture in the rural areas if they have land 
ava ilable and if they have a culturally sanctioned ro le in agriculture. Where these two conditions 
are not met, they have to depend on whatever other possibilities are open to them. such as 
hawking (see below, 5.7, for a discussion of the jobs availab le in the rural areas). But, as we saw 
above, an agricultural income is, at least in the South African context, an important fac ilitating 
factor for access to those possibilities. Landless women are consequently at a disadvantage in this 
respect. The gender div ision of labour also limits the non-agricultural jobs women can perform 
in the area of origin. Women are unlikely to become taxi drivers in most places in the Third 
World, for example. George~' s (199 1) discussion of the prejudice against women tax i drivers in 
the Dominican Republic sounds very similarto the attitudes one fi nds in South Africa in parti cular 
and in the rest of the Third World in general. 
URBAN INCOME EARNING POSSIBILITIES 
The gender division of labour is also an important factor in determining the urban income earning 
possibi li ties of women. Certain occupations are thought to be more suitab le for the employment 
of poor women than others. large ly because they are closer to the domestic ro les performed by 
women. The garment industry. for example, makes extensive use of fema le labour because it 
depends on needle working sk ills many women already possess given their domest ic ro les. The 
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extent of home working in this industry also makes it easier for women to combine employment 
and domestic labour (Pedraza 1991 :315). Other occupations that are held to be particularly 
suitable to female employment is domestic service' (Pedraza 1991 :314), as well as those service 
occupations that are associated with the domestic role, such as cleaning services and waitressing. 
Women are also a very prominent part of the labour force in export processing zones, where they 
are typically involved in the final assembly of products (Georges 1990, Sassen-Koob 1984). 
Besides these fonnal sector jobs one also needs to consider the informaJjobs open to women in 
the urban areas. In this regard the gender division oflabour is once again an important factor, with 
certain jobs closed to women. In South Africa, women are concentrated in the hawking of 
foodstuffs and clothes, as well as shebeening, and are, as in other parts of the world, unlikely to 
be backyard mechanics. The above discussion therefore leads us to conclude that income earning 
possibilities for women at the urban end depends on the number of jobs available in those sectors 
of the economy that are open to poor women. 
A PRELlMINARYCONCLUSION 
The question now remams whether rural-urban migration improves the income earning 
possibilities of women or not. As far as marital status is concerned, it seems that migration 
improves the income generating possibilities of single women. In the case of married women, the 
possibilities for improvement depends on the cultural prescriptions regarding the employment of 
married women. This finding must be combined with a consideration of how many jobs are open 
to women in both sending and receiving areas. The latter depends on the gender division of labour 
as well as the size of those sectors of the economy in a particular country that offer employment 
to women. In a country with a big textile and clothing industry, as well as many export-processing 
zones, rural-urban migration will obviously offer a bigger improvement in income-generating 
capacity than in a country without strong sectors of this kind. The service jobs associated with 
the domestic role of women are almost invariably more urban than rural oriented (except for 
ecotourism destinations). In addition the scope for the informal sector is greater in town than in 
rural areas, largely because there is far more money in circulation in the former than in the latter. 
The only advantages offered by the rural areas occur in those cases where there are large numbers 
" Except for West Africa, where domestic service is more male dominated. 
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of agricultural jobs open to women. One can therefore conc lude this sec tion with the observation 
that in most cases urban areas wi ll have better income generating poss ibilities for women than 
rura l areas , but that there are exception to thi s trend. 
5.6 .2 M IGRATION AND CONTROL OVER INCOME 
If a woman earns more money in town this is no guarantee that her economic welfare will 
improve. If she does not control the income earned by her, and has to hand over most of it to her 
husband or to her parents, she will not benefit as much as she otherwise would (Tienda and Booth 
1991 :54). On the other hand, if a woman's husband earns more money upon migrating to town, 
and she shares in it, her economic welfare can improve even if her own income generating 
capacity has not changed. It is therefore important to combine a focus on income earning capacity 
with a consideration of income redistribution within the household. 
MARITAL STATUS AND CONTROL OVER INCOME 
In general , women have less control over their household 's income than men (Tienda and Booth 
1991:54). As Tienda and Booth (1991:54) point out "equal shares in production do not (their 
emphasis) automatically translate into equal shares in consumption" . An improvement in women 's 
income earning capacity therefore does not necessarily mean that they will have more money in 
their pockets, as I pointed out in the previous paragraph. As in the case of income generating 
capacity, it seems that marital status is one of the factors detennining how much women reta in 
of their own income. Widowed and divorced women do not, by definition, have husbands who 
can compete w ith them for control over their own income. They sometimes have to compete with 
the ex-husband ' s family for control over his assets, but this is another issue. S ingle, never-married. 
women are in a similar position5 of greater control over their own income, although in their case 
their parents ' expectation that they remit homea higher portion of their income, compared to their 
brothers, complicates the issue (Chant and Radcliffe 1992: 17) 
5 Things are of course not always so simplistic: there are often in Third World countries 
many shades of grey between being married or not married. The distinction between being married 
and being divorced, for example, can be vague when the couple had a customary marriage (Peters 
1983). 
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RURAL-URBAN DIFFERENCES IN CONTROL OVER INCOME 
There are pronounced differences between urban and rural areas in terms the amount of autonomy 
women have. The act of migration, by taking them from the one to the other, is therefore itself 
a factor in determining how much of their own income women will retain. Unfortunately, there 
does not seem to be a clear pattern to these rural-urban differences and thus there is no simple 
answer to the question of how migration affects income redistribution within the household 
(Tienda and Booth 1991). In our analysis of the effects of migration on the control women have 
over their own income, we consequently need to consider all the outcomes that, logically 
speaking, are possible: migration may worsen their control, or it may stay the same, or it may 
improve as a result of migration. With regard to the control women have over other household 
members' income, the same three possibilities may arise. In the case where the woman's migration 
coincides with her marriage to an urban based man, she may loose some control over her own 
income, but gain some control over her new husband's income. As a result, change in the two 
variables discussed here may not be in the same direction, which complicates the issue even more. 
In the next three sections I discuss each of these three possibilities. [n each case I consider the 
woman's control over her own income together with her control over her husband's income. 
a) The possible negative effect of migration on autonomy 
It can be argued that migration may worsen the autonomy enjoyed by women in those cases where 
they perfonned the role of fann managers in the rural areas, and where they moved to live with 
their husbands in the urban areas as their dependants. As was previously discussed, women only 
occupy the fann management role in those areas where the gender division oflabour makes it 
possible (most of sub-Saharan Africa) and where rural landlessness does not curtail farming 
activities. The argument in favour of the belief that rural women have some autonomy in those 
cases is that when men are absent as labour migrants for most of the year they are forced to leave 
many of the decisions regarding household affairs to the women who stay behind. As we saw in 
the previous section, Sharp and Spiegel (1990) make a similar argument when they refer to the 
sphere of autonomy opened up for rural women by their husband's remittances. These are 
intended for investment in agriculture, but women manage to divert a portion for investment into 
128 
their own income generating activ ities. 
The extent to which women do indeed have some autonomy in those cases where they are farm 
managers has been conrested, however (see Nelson [1992:128] with regard to women in rural 
Kenya as well as Brown [1983:386-388] for a summary ofrhe arguments regarding the situation 
of women in southern Africa). One of the factors determining the ~utonomy enjoyed by women. 
at least in sub-Saharan Africa, seems to be the settlement pattern upon marriage (Nelson 
1992: 126). in most of sub-Saharan Africa the pattern is for women to move to the husband"s 
home village to live with his family upon marriage. This is known as a patrilocal se ttlement 
pattern, which places the woman effectively under the control of the husband's fam ily and reduces 
her chances of autonomy, even in his absence (Ramphele 1989:40 I, Nelson 1992: 129). According 
to Nelson ( 1992: 125) other factors influencing the degree of control exercised by rural women 
are the distance from the husband' s place of employment (if husbands can visi t more often, they 
are obviously in a better position to exercise control) and the level of the husband 's earnings 
(these determine in the Kenyan context whether the husband is going to invest in cash crops or 
not: cash crops are under the husband 's control with wives reduced to unpaid fann labourers). 
The case for the so-called autonomy enjoyed by rural women has to be qualified however by 
Nelson's ( 1992: 128) observation that in many cases this autonomy means that husbands feel less 
responsibility for the welfare of their wives (this is obviously not true for all rura l women in this 
category , as Sharp and Spiegel' s [1 990] study attests). I fth is translates into reduced remittances, 
the position of rural women can hardly said to have improved. One factor militating against the 
abandonment of women by their migrant husbands is the latter' s need for a rural home to return 
to upon retirement (Sharp and Spiegel 1990). This need does not always trans late into continued 
support for their wives however, with the result that there are large numbers of rural women in 
southern and eastern Africa who have to surv ive without regular remittances. Given that 
agriculture resources are, though variable, generally insufficient to provide rural fami lies with their 
own subsistence. and that most rural households in southern and eastern Africa are dependent on 
external income sources for their own survival, the fa ilure of some men to continue remitting to 
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their wives is an important factor in the feminisation of poverty in these areas (Brown 1983)'. This 
leads both Brown (1983:387) and Nelson (1992: 137) to remark that increased autonomy under 
conditions of impoverishment is hardly an attractive bargain. In other words, when women 
improve their control over their own income in the rural areas, there is a chance that their control 
over their husband' s income might decrease. 
Their nett control over resources will under these circumstances not be enhanced by their role as 
farm managers. In these cases, migration to the urban areas will not necessarily mean that their 
autonomy is reduced. Their reduced control over their own income may very well be outweighed 
by their chance to increase their claims on the husband's income, given that their physical presence 
in town discourages the husband from pursuing extra-marital affairs. The latter are often a threat 
to the wife's welfare since they represent another claim on his wages (Ramphele 1989). The 
upshot of this discussion is therefore that under some circumstances migration may reduce the 
control women have over their own income, but only in a very limited number of cases. Moreover, 
in some of these cases migration will entail an increased control over their husband's income, thus 
cancelling out the effects of the former change. 
b) The possible neutral effect o/migration on autonomy 
RampheJe's study of women migrants who live in the migrant hostels of Cape Town as 
dependants of male bedholders provides an interesting example of how migration may leave the 
nett position of some migrants unchanged and improve the conditions of others. In this case 
migration entails exchanging the patrilocal rural family in Eastern Cape province where they are 
under the control of their husband's family (as previously described) for a position as a dependant 
of a male bedholder. With a few exceptions all the bedholders in this male hostel are men (the 
' This statement has to take cognizance of Peters's (I983) criticism that not all female 
headed households are disadvantaged. She bases her criticism on, among other things, the 
observation that inter household links (such as that established by the role of mother's brother in 
Botswana) may lessen the isolation of female-headed households in rural Botswana. In the same 
context of rural Botswana, Brown (1983) has however remarked on the decline of these kinds of 
interhousehold transfers. This difference of opinion among observers suggests that the exact 
conditions under which female-headed households in the rural areas of southern Africa become 
isolated and in danger of impoverishment is a complex issue that cannot be pursued here. 
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exceptions having inherited the beds from their deceased husbands). Since accommodation for 
black women in Cape Town was at the time extremely difficult to find, given the heritage of the 
government's influx control policies, these women did not have any a lternative accommodation 
to the bed1 their husband controlled in the hostel. Their dependance on their husband's consent 
for their cont inued stay in town made them extremely vulnerable. Under these c ircumstances they 
sometimes merely exchanged one constrained position for another. In other cases, however. their 
physica l presence in town forced their husbands to accept some responsibi lity for their welfare and 
provided the only alternative to starvation in the rural area. 
c) The possible positive effect of migration on awonomy 
In contrast to the above, there are also case stud ies that found that migration improves the 
position of women. According to Pessar's (1984) study of women migrants from the Dominican 
Republic to New York, the move resulted in an increase in the control women have over 
househo ld budgets. After migration most households pooled their income, with decision-making 
about the disposal of the income shared between husband and wife. This was in contrast to the 
premigration s ituat ion in the Dominican Republic, where, in most households, the wife e ither 
received an allowance from her husband, or the husband totally determined how the income was 
to be spent. The major reason for this change, according to Pessar ( 1984), was the increased 
participat ion of Dominican women in the labour force after migration. Survey results confinned 
that as many as 91 ,5% of Dominican women had worked for a wage at some time after their 
migration, whereas only a small minority were employed previous to their migration (Pessar 
1984: 1195). Women's experience of work outside the domestic sphere increased their self-esteem. 
At the same time their increased contribution to the household's income pool provided them w ith 
more leverage to demand an equitable share in household decision-making. Other factors 
responsible for this change, according to Pessar 1984: 11 94) were a) the shared experience of 
migration between men and women and its role in bringing men and women closer together, thus 
reducing power disparities~ and b) the influence of the more egalitarian American model of 
7 The hostel was originally intended to house men only in a dormitory fashion. S ingle 
rooms do not exist - thus the use of the tenn ' bed ' . 
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marriage with its greater stress on shared household decision-making. 
A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION 
It is therefore clear that there is much regional variation with regard to the effects of migration 
on the control exercised by women over both their own income and those of their husbands. 
Migration in some cases seems to have a positive effect, in other cases a negative effect and in still 
more cases a neutral effect. This observation is in line with the previously discussed findings of 
Tienda and Booth (1991). Ifwe conceive of the economic welfare of women as consisting of both 
their income generating possibilities (discussed in section 5.5.1 above) as well as their control over 
income, and assume that in most cases migration improves the first of these two, then we can 
conclude that migration will improve female economic welfare in those cases where the control 
of worn en over income improves or stays the same (a static share ofan increasing income is st ill 
an improvement). It will also improve the position of women in those cases where the increase 
in income generating possibilities outweigh their reduced share of household income. 
It seems to me therefore that the balance of probabilities are still in favour ofa nett improvement 
in their welfare. Nevertheless, the fact that we do not know how common the experience of a 
worsening income distribution within the household is, reduces the confidence with which we can 
make this assertion. It is therefore also difficult to say that in all cases female migrants are better 
off than female non-migrants, although it is probably true in the majority of cases. Returning to 
my assertion that migration can worsen inequality between migrants and non-migrants, it becomes 
evident that gender is an important variable in detennining the extent to which migration can do 
so. 
We saw in my discussion of push versus pull migration and rural-rural versus rural-urban 
migration that ifmigration does not discriminate between migrants and non-migrants, it does tend 
to do so with regard to different classes of migrant. If gender intervenes to lessen the distinction 
between female migrants and female non-migrants, in the sense that migration does not materially 
improve the position of women migrants, while male migrants do benefit, it follows that migration 
will differentiate between female and male migrants. Unfortunately the literature is as unclear with 
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regard to thi s issue as it is with regard to the question whether migration improves the position 
offemale migrants at the expense offemale non-migrants (Tienda and Booth 1991). It seems that 
in the majority of cases it tends to do so, but there are many exceptions, as we noted above. 
5.7 REDISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT EARNINGS AS A RESULT OF FAMILY 
OBLIGATIONS 
The statement that migration advantages migrants re lative to non-migrants needs to be qualified 
in yet another way. Research done in rural communities in the Third world has demonstrated that 
there are often mechanisms by which the migrant 's income is redistributed beyond the migrant" s 
own household. This occurs either as a result of network obligations to others or as a result of 
the products and services the migrant buys from people in the community of origin with hi s/~e r 
wages. It is on the lirst of these that I focus in this section. Both of these redistribution 
mechanisms have the capacity to ameliorate the inequality producing effect of migration and 
consequently need to be addressed. 
These obl igations have featured prominently in anthropological studies done in the rural areas of 
Southern Africa. Spiegel (1980) has demonstrated, for example, that in the early stages of the 
typ ical developmental cycle of rural households, migrants are often expected to remit money to 
the rural household of their parents as well as their own. This can lead to conflict between them 
and their parents, especially if their parents cannot (e ither because the land has already been 
promised to somebody else or they don' t have any land) offer the inducement that they might 
' inherit'S their agr icultural land later on (SpiegeJ 1980: I 17, 141 ). Conflict can also occur between 
their wives and their mothers, as they compete for a share of the migrant 's earnings. Obligations 
to others are not restricted to immediate family members. In the context of a critique of the belief 
S ' Inherit' is written in brackets here because land can, in tenns of the tenure system in 
Lesotho studied by Spiegel, not be inherited. Strictly speaking land reverts back to the chief on 
the parent's death. There is provision, however, for land to be transferred to sons whi le the parent 
is still alive and when the parent does not need it (Spiegel 1980: 116). This is different from the 
situation in Transkei, where the introduction ofbettennent has meant that land can fonnally be 
inherited (Sharp and Spiegel 1990:539). 
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that female-headed households in rural Botswana are necessarily deprived, Peters (1983) has 
referred to the exchange relations that can exist between such households and other male kin, such 
as brothers, and that protect them from total isolation. This point is also taken up by Townsend 
(1997), who stresses the obligations that male migrants in Botswana have in their role as 
'mother's brother'. 
Although it may appear that these obligations have the potential to moderate the inequality that 
can arise between households with and without migrant members, they are not as significant as 
may appear at first glance. Recall that my discussion of changes in selectivity in chapters 3 and 
4 have found that network connections have the potential to reduce the selectivity of migration 
over time, with the important proviso that some people may be isolated from networks and that 
they will therefore not join the class of migrants over time. My argument about the inequality 
producing impact of migration is in the first place focussed on those people. It is also this group 
ofnon~migrants that will fail to gain as a result of the redistribution of the migrant's earnings to 
others, simply because they are isolated from those networks within which this redistribution takes 
place. Their isolated position is in fact the reason why they find it difficult to migrate in the first 
place. 
5.8 THE DIFFUSION OF THE MIGRANT'S EARNINGS THROUGH THE AREA OF 
ORIGIN AS A RESULT OF THE CASH NEXUS 
Once the migrant has parcelled out his/herearnings as indicated above, some cfit is recycled into 
the community of origin beyond the immediate beneficiaries. The migrant's remittances are used, 
for example. to buy goods and services in the community of origin. This diffusion of the migrant's 
earnings allows non-migrants to gain access to the earnings of the migrant and is a further way 
in which the inequality-producing effects of migration can be ameliorated. I am going to review 
some of the ways in which income is diffused through the communities of origin in this section . 
It should be borne in mind that circular migrants are more likely to remit money to their 
communities of origin than permanent migrants. Most of the members of their households still live 
there and they intend returning to that community - therefore they have an interest in remitting 
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money back to that community (Russell 1986:685), This discussion consequently appl ies more 
to circular than to permanent migrants. 
In the Southern African context the payment of bride wealth is an important mechanism through 
which migrant income is diffused through rural communities (Spiegel 198 1 :9). Bridewealth lIsed 
to be paid in catt le but it has in recent years become increasingly based on cash payments (Brydon 
198 1). [t also used to be a transaction between the families of the man and woman, with young 
men dependent on their fathers to provide the cattle. Since migrant labour has become 
commonplace in the rural areas of South em Africa, young men have however developed a degree 
of independence in this respect and often finance the bridewealth payments from their wages 
(Harries 1983 ). Bridewealth is typica lly paid in installments and the marriage contract is not 
regarded as being completely valid until al l the outstanding money have been handed over (Peters 
1983). It is clear from this that city-bound migrants who take rural wives are bound to hand over 
part of their wages to the latter's fam ily as long as some of the bridewealth is outstanding. 
Many commentators remark on the tendency of migrants to spend a large part of their earnings 
on the consumption of liquor in the company of their friends upon their return (cf. Durand et al. 
1996:428, also see SpiegeI 1980: 123, Wiest 1984:126). This is a further mechanism for the 
recycling of their income into the rural community (Durandet al. 1996:428). Non-migrants benefit 
because they are involved in the brewing of beer (in Southern Africa - see Spiegel 1980: 123) or 
because they own (both legal and illegal) drinking places. Money is also recycled when male 
migrants make use of the services of prostitutes or when they give gifts to faci li tate their illicit 
love-affairs (Spiegel 1980: 152). Women who stay behind can sometimes also find employment 
as child minders or domestic workers by taking over the household duties of absent female 
migran ts (Georges 1990: 133). 
It is well known that migrants spend most of their earnings on increasing their consumption and 
very little on investment in their villages of origin (Russel 1986:688, Georges 1990: 150, Mines 
1984: 154, Kearney 1986:346). Consequently only a few pennanentjobsare created in their home 
villages as a result of the ir investment activity (Georges 1990: 148). Among the little that is 
invested, investment in land fea tures very strongly (Russel 1986). Depending on the land tenu re 
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system, they will either buy land, as in the rural Dominican Republic (Georges 1990: 186), o r ply 
the chief and histher councillors with gifts or bribes to get land allocated to them in terms of the 
' communal' land tenure system of the rural areas of Southern Africa (Spiegel 1981 :9). Both of 
these are mechanisms for the redistribution of their income through the rural community. Besides 
the acquisition of land, the construction and upgrading of housing is an important priority for 
migrants (Georges 1990: 129, Wiest 1984: 126). This leads to the employment oflocal craftsmen 
in the form of bricklayers, thatchers and carpenters (Spiegel 1980: 122-123, Georges 1990: 129), 
the use of local unskilled labour to clear the land and collect building materiel, as well as the 
consumption of locally manufactured bricks (Wiest 1984: 126). 
Migrants typically also invest money in cattle (Georges 1990:182, SpiegeI1980:122, Durand 
1996:433). !ftheir own households do not have rurally-based labourers to look after the cattle, 
they need to hire people to do so (Spiegel 1980: 124). They may also leave their cattle in the care 
of others who then benefit from the milk and skins of the cattle (SpiegeI1980: 122). Migrants w ho 
invest in cultivation also need to employ people to assist with ploughing, weeding and harvesting 
in order to compensate for their own absence in the fields (Spiegel 1987: 119). Due to the 
importance of agricultural activities in recycling migrant income, non-migrants in villages with 
limited agricultural potential are potentially worse off than those in agriculturally better-off 
villages (Sharp 1987:142, Sharp and SpiegeI1985:146). 
Other priorities as far as investment is concerned are the acquisition of beer halls, grocery stores 
or taxis (Sharp 1994:77, Georges 1990). These are logical investments for migrants, given the 
economic conditions in their villages of origin. Other investment possibilities are absent: the 
absence of investment opportunities and thus sluggish local economic conditions is in the first 
place the reason why migrants leave their home village (Georges 1990:244). In addition, as 
subsistence agriculture declines with the onset of migration, households become more dependent 
on grocery stores to provide them with food (Georges 1990: 142). The investment in taxis is, 
lastly, easy to explain: large-scale (especially circular) migration leads to a situation where people 
regularly travel between the place of employment and the home village and this creates a big 
market for fast and flexible transport options such as small buses and kombi-taxis. 
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Georges (1990) describes a setup in a rural Dominican Republic community that sounds very 
similar to the circumstances that one find s in the rural areas ofSoLlth Africa (see ego Sharp 1994. 
Spiegel 1980) or as a matter oftact in any vi llage with heavy outmigration anywhere in the Third 
World. She (1990 : 148) qualifies the statement that few pennanentjobs are created as a result of 
migrant's investments by saying that migrant income provides numerous temporary and very 
small-sca le income-generating opportunities for non-migrants. None of these are nearly adequate 
on their own to allow a person to survive. This leads to a situation of occupational multiplicity, 
where every individual perfonns any number of these ' windfa ll ' jobs. Even this does not. 
generally, provide an adequate income for the ind ividual's survival. Occupational multiplicity is. 
in fact, a state of chronic underemployment (Georges 1990: 144) where individuals have to pool 
their income in the household to smooth over its irregular nature. Despite this, it makes an 
important contribution to household survival (Georges 1990: 148). I have already ment ioned a 
number of the temporary jobs created by migrant income, such as bui lding work, chi ld minding 
and help during ploughing and harvesting. Other examples are fattening poult ry for sa le (Georges 
1990: 146, Spiegel 1980:147), or sell ing a neighbour ' s fruit in an infonnal market (Spiegel 
1980: 149). 
The jobs created through migrant investment are often parcelled out to fam ily members, friend s 
and neighbours, i.e. people who already form part of the migrant's network (Georges 1990: 152. 
SpiegeJ 1980). This is because migrants prefer to employ people to whom they already stand in 
a trust relationship. Because of this, non-migrants who do not have network connect ions (Q 
migrant households gain only to a limited extent from the diffusion of migrant earnings. This 
demonstrates, once again, the problems faced by those who are excluded from the better-
resourced networks. Not only are their chances of becoming migrants limited, as we saw in 
chapter 4, but they also struggle to gain access to the recycled migrant income. This category of 
people also struggle to become self-employed. Access to a pre-existing cash income is often 
essential for success in th is regard. In the case of agriculture, for example, one needs cash to 
invest in seed, ploughs and draught power before one can reap a harvest. As a result, those 
households that have a wage-earn ing member are in a better position as far as fanning is 
concerned (Spiegel 1980: 126). The same applies to occupations such as beer brewing (Sharp 
1987: 139, Spiegel 1980: 146, 149, Spiegel 1987: 117). 
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This raises the question of how those who are isolated from better-off networks and who do not 
have access to a migrant income manage to survive. One of their strategies is to sell offpreviously 
acquired land (Georges 1990:147-148) and livestock (SpiegeI1980:147). Another is to reduce 
consumption needs by hiving offhousehold members to better-off households (I have discussed 
this strategy in chapter 3). Young men in this position fail to marry and remain dependent 
members of their households of origin (Spiegel 1980: 124). Women, in turn, resort to prostitution. 
Where there is some level of social security provision (as in South Africa). pensions are an 
important resource for destitute families - to such an extent that people actively recruit old people 
into their households in order to get access to their pensions (Spiegel 1987). A more common, 
outcome, however, is underconsumption (Georges 1990: 159-160). People are forced to eat less 
and remain in a chronic state of malnourishment, which makes them more susceptible to disease 
and ultimately, to dying prematurely. 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
In chapters 2 to 4 I have advanced an argument that departs from the assumption that migrants 
benefit from migration and that concludes that migration has the potential to foster inequality 
between those who leave and those who stay behind. In this chapter I have investigated this 
assumption in more detail, in an attempt to make the theory more adequate in confronting the 
complexity of the real world. I have specifically analysed the factors that determine the level of 
advancement that flows from migration, such as the type of migration, the timing ofthe migration 
decision, and gender. These factors all affect the degree to which the theory of the inequality 
producing effect of migration is applicable under particular circumstances. If, under some 
circumstances migrants benefit less from their migration, their welfare obviously does not increase 
as much relative to non-migrants as under other circumstances. With each of the factors I have 
investigated, I came to the conclusion that, while this may reduce the extent to which migration 
differentiates between migrants and non-migrants, it opens up a new arena of differentiation: 
between different categories of migrant. In this way migration may distinguish between push and 
pull migrants, between rural-urban versus rural-rural migrants, between earlier and later migrants 
and between male and female migrants. 
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To conclude I tried to estab lish to what extent the redistribu tion orlhe migrant" s earnings to other 
households in the area of origin may amel iorate the differe nt iation that may take place between 
migrants and non-migrants and between different categories of migrant. The end-result of this 
invest igation was that the redistribution of the migrant ' s earnings as a resu lt of network 
obligations will not have much impact on thi s differentiation. but that the migrant's demand fo r 
the services and products of others in the area of orig in may ameliorate it to a limited extent. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PREHISTORY OF A RURAL SOUTH AFRICAN SETTLEMENT: 
NKOSINI IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
My argument about the impact of migration on inequality has, up to now, been formulated at a 
high level of generality, as well as abstraction. J have attempted to unravel a few strands of a 
complicated web o[causali ty. In order to do so. I have ignored much of the regional and cultural 
specificity that provide the context within which these causal mechanisms play out. Although it 
is essential for the purposes of theory const ruction to abstract from empirical reali ty, a theory 
only has value to the extent that it can shed some light on that reality. This is what I begin to do 
in the following two chapters. In these chapters I present a case study of migration in a particular 
South African rural community. This case study should be read as an illustration of how some 
of the variables I have discussed in the theoretical part may play out in the real world. 
The rural village in question is located in the Northern Province, near its boundary with 
Mpumalanga province and is called Nkosini (the place of the king) because it is where the local 
chief, Poni Mahlangu, lives. The inhabitants of this vi llage are all members of the Ndzundza 
Ndbele group. and in this chapter I discuss the history of the Ndzundza Ndbele, as it relates to 
the process by which the Nkosini villagers have come to settle here. I ca ll this chapte r a 
prehistory because it deals with the settlement history of this group of Ndzundza-Ndbele before 
they came to settle in Nkosini. They have only been living here for the past sixty years, which 
is why I feel it is necessary to trace their past settlement from their pre-colonial strongholds on 
the eastern side of the Steelpoort ri ver, through their period as labour tenants on white farm s up 
to their movement to Nkosini on the western side of the Steelpoort river. I specifically do not 
address their labour migration to distant (urban) locations in this chapter, with the result that the 
issues of selectivity and inequality I have discussed in the previous four chapters do not feature 
explicit ly here. The prehistory ofNkosini does however form an essential background to the next 
chapter (chapter 7), which does deal with these issues. 
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6.2 A NOTE ON SOURCES 
There is a considerable secondary literature on the history of the Ndzundza Ndbele. and it is on 
this that I draw in my discussion of the period before the village ofNkosini came into existence. 
I have found the Masters thesis of Van Jaarsveld (I 985) especially useful for the period before 
the Ndzundza-Ndbele conquest. [n addition I have made extensive use of the work of Delius 
(1983 and 1989) for my discussion ofthe period of indenture and labour tenancy following their 
defeat, as well as Morrel (I983) and James (1987 and 1988) for subsequent periods. 
I also make use of information derived from periods of fieldwork in this village, especially to 
flesh out my discussion of the migration histories ofNkosini residents. The fieldwork was done 
in the period between August 1996 and January 1997 when I went to Nkosini on four separate 
occasions. In total I spent about three weeks there, living. with an interpreter, in the household 
of a member of the interpreter's extended family. During this time I did a survey of 40 households 
out of a total of 185' households in the village. The purpose of the survey was primarily to 
establish whether there were any households who were excluded from access to migration. and 
strict representativity was not my main aim2. Sampling was done by walking through the village 
from one end to the other and selecting households randomly, making sure that I selected two 
households in every group often3. I also conducted a number ofin-depth interviews. These were 
I Houses in Nkosini have numbers painted on them that range from 001 to 198. This does 
not indicate the total size of my population, however. Nr. 187 is the local shop and was excluded 
because it would otherwise have placed the owner's household at risk of being sampled twice (the 
shopkeeper was interviewed any way, but her and her husband's information was not included 
in the analysis of the infonnation about fann of origin and time of arrival in Nkosini). There are 
no houses numbered 76 to 79 and 192 to 197. In addition this series contains the houses of the 
two royals, who were not included in my sample. This leaves 198-(1+4+6+2)~185. 
2 According to Neuman (1997:221-222), in small populations ofless than a thousand, it 
is desirable to increase the sampling ratio to about a third ifrepresentativity is to be ensured. In 
this case the ratio was lower (about 22%) with the result that some degree of representativity was 
probably lost. 
J I deviated from this in two cases. Three houses in the 90's range became part of my 
sample. This is the area around the house where [ started my interviews. There were only two 
houses in the I 90's, so I did only one interview here. 
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with a schoolteacher, shopkeeper, local authority offic ial , the official responsible for a brick 
making project, as weJl as the family members of my interpreter. I also conducted interviews with 
se lected groups of people. This included three middle aged, unemployed men in a sheheen (one 
of whom became a part of my sample), two women helping out in the local school feeding 
project, and six young people of both sexes. The infonnat ion obtained in these interviews only 
entered into my sample if it threw more light on a person already included in it. Late r, in end 
October and beginning November 1999, I followed up my visits to Nkos ini with four in-depth 
interviews with migrants from Nkosini who lived in hostels in Mamelodi . Pretoria, and in Apr il 
2000 with telephone interviews with Mr and Mrs. Roux of Blink water, who both grew up in this 
area. 
6.3 A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE HISTORY OF THE NDZUNDZA NDBELE UNTIL 
THEIR SUBJUGATION BY THE TRANSVAAL REPUBLIC ' 
The language of the Ndzundza-Ndbele forms part of the broader Nguni language group. Other 
Nguni-speakers are the Zulu of KwaZulu-Natal , the Swazi and the Zimbabwean-Ndbele. The 
Ndzundza-Ndbele are therefore related to these groups. The Ndzundza-Ndbele fonn part of the 
Transvaal-Ndbele (and specifically the Southern Ndbele part of the Transvaal Ndbele). Doubt 
ex ists about aspects of the origin of the Transvaal-Ndbele, but, according to Van laarsveld 
(1985 : 14), the following can be said with certainty. They are probably an offshoot ofNatal-Nguni 
groups, but, unlike the Zimbabwean-Ndbele who only split off from the Zulu in the early 19th 
century, they left KwaZulu-Natal and have been living in the Transvaal for at least two centuries 
and probably longer. No significance, except that of similar broad Nguni origin, can therefore 
be attached to them sharing a name with the Zimbabwean-Ndbele. Some ethnographies date back 
their presence in the Transvaal to around the year 1500 (Van laarsveld 1985:9), others to a later 
period . 
Since the Transvaal-Ndbele came to live in the Transvaal, there have been numerous splits in that 
4 This sect ion is based largely on the master's thesis of Van l aarsveld (1985), and to a 
lesser extent on the work of Delius (1989). 
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group. The Ndzundza came into being when their chief, Ndzundza, and his followers were 
evicted from the Pretoria area where they had previously lived with another group, the Manala 
Ndbele (together, these two groups are referred to as the Southern Ndbele)' . After splitting from 
the Manala they settled in the Steelpoort-river valley. Pressures such as cultural assimilation into 
the majority Sotho-speaking population of the Transvaal and the displacements caused by the 
difaqane' led to the Ndzundza-Ndbele being the only Transvaal-Ndbele group left with a 
relatively pure Nguni-heritage by the time they made contact with the Voortrekkers in the 1840s; 
although even among them Sotho-influences could be discerned, as Delius (1989:230) points out. 
They also suffered heavily as a result of the difaqane, but they managed to regroup eventually. 
During the years of the difaqane, at around 1839, they moved to the mountain ranges to the east 
of the Steelpoort valley under their chief, Mabhogo, as these mountain ranges offered more 
protection against being raided by other chiefdoms. In these mountains (in an area of about 84 
km' ) they built a number of fortified strongholds. The whole area was called KoNomtjharhelo, 
and the name of their main stronghold, and capital, was Erholweni (Van Vuuren 1992:8). One 
reason why the Ndzundza-Ndbele survived the difaqane better than the other Transvaal Ndbele 
groups was in fact the protection offered by their fortified mountain strongholds (Van laarsveld 
1985 :22, Delius 1989:229). They lived here in the Steenkampsberge (the highest point in the 
Transvaal, at 2331m, is in these mountains) near present day Roossenekal until they were 
defeated by the forces of the Transvaal Republic in 1883 (Van Jaarsveld 1985:22). 
The site of their capital was on the eastern side of the Steelpoort-river valley, not far from the 
present site ofNkosini, which is on the western side ofthe Steelpoort-river. How the Ndzundza-
Ndbele moved from the eastern tathe western side of the Steelpoort river is the subject of the rest 
of this chapter. Although there are indications that the Ndzundza-Ndbele initially welcomed the 
arrival of the Voortrekkers, based partly on the hope that they might restrain the other Nguni 
, The Manala Ndbele has since been assimilated to some extent by other groups. 
' Delius (1983: 19) defines the difaqane as "the struggles and migrations unleashed by the 
conflicts which accompanied the emergence of Zulu dominance in Natal". As a result of this 
process, numerous Nguni-groups were driven out ofKwaZulu-Natal into the Transvaal, among 
which was the Ndbele under Mzilikaze who eventually settled in Zimbabwe. These groups, as 
well as the Zulu, in turn raided the people already living in the Transvaal, with the result that 
many of the pre-existing Transvaal chiefdoms did not survive intact. 
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groups from raiding the Southeastern Transvaal , their attitude soured when they began to clash 
with the Voortrekkers over land and the demands made on them by the Voortrekkers to supply 
labourers for farming (Delius 1983:30-3 1). One of the reasons for the escalating conflict was the 
population increase on both sides. By 1879 the Ndzundza-Ndbele numbered about 10000 people 
and found that their land needs had increased considerably (Van Jaarsveld 1985: 160). This added 
further urgency to a border dispute that had been raging between them and the Transvaal 
Rcpublic 7 for some time. 
During the course of 1880, the Ndzundza-Ndbele under their chiefNyabcla claimed a large area 
of land between the Steenkampsberge in the East and MaJeoskopB in the West (Van laarsveld 
1985: 158). This area included at least twenty white farms that were occupied al the time, as well 
as a number of other white farms that were unoccupied by their owners due to the security 
situation that was caused by the war against the Pedi under Sekhukhune. What is interesting from 
the perspective of the later sett lement patterns of the Ndbele (as we shall see below, a 
considerable number of the present day inhabitants ofNkosini were born on these farms) is that 
the farms Kafferskraal, Lagersdrift and Grootkop were among the farms claimed by the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele (Van Jaarsveld 1985: 163-164). During 1880 the Ndzundza-Ndbele moved on 
to some of these farms and this led to the owner of five of them, ComeJis Du Plooy, complaining 
to the magistrate of Lydenburg that five of his farms (viz. Zwartkoppies, Uitkyk, Lagersdrift, 
Kafferskraa l and Grootkop) were used by the Ndzundza-Ndbele. With the exception ofGrootkop 
(which was first registered in 1870) the other farms were first registered in the names of their 
white owners in 1857. Du Plooy bought these farms between 1872 and 1879 from their owners, 
who had never lived on them (Van Jaarsveld 1985 :164). 
After a long period of escalating tension between the Ndzundza-Ndbele and the Transvaal 
Republic , war broke out between them on 7 November 1882. The war ended on 10 July 1883 
7 The Transvaal Republic was the state created by the Voortrekkers. 
8 Maleoskop is a mountain on the present day farm of Rooikraal, which is not far from 
Nkosini (see map on p. I SS). The Kopa lived there first under their chiefMaleo, until they were 
scattered after their defeat by the Swazi in 1864. Subsequently the area was inhabited by the Pedi , 
some ofwhorn went to live there after their defeat by the British forces in 1879 (Van Jaarsveld 
1985:147, 165, 171). 
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when Nyabela surrendered with 8000 of his subjects (Van Jaarsveld 1985:235). It is noteworthy 
that the Transvaal burghers (and their largely Pedi-allies) achieved this victory not through 
outright military defeat of the Ndzundza-Ndbele (the costs of that would have been too high as 
it would have involved storming the heavily fortified capital of Erholweni), but through a long 
period of siege which led to widespread famine and succeeded in breaking Ndzundza-Ndbele 
resistance (Van Jaarsveld 1985). 
After their defeat, the Ndzundza-Ndbele lost all their land and became indentured labourers on 
white farms in the vicinity for a period of five years. The Volksraad resolved that they must be 
dispersed and that they would never again be allowed to live near Erholweni (Coetzee 1980:248). 
According to Delius (1989:232), an area of about 15 000 morgen in the Ndzundza-Ndbele 
heartland was parcelled out to the landless among those burghers who had participated in the 
campaign. They received the land on condition that they senled the land and improved it. This 
area came to be known as the Mapochsgronden, after Mabhogo, a previous chief of the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele. Burghers who had participated in the campaign or who were without labour 
received preferential treatment as far as the allocation of labourers was concerned (Delius 
1989:232). 
6.4 THE DISPERSAL OF THE NDZUNDZA-NDBELE THROUGH INDENTURE, AS 
WELL AS THEIR ATTEMPTS AT CONSOLIDATION ON KAFFERSKRAAL 
The scanering of the Ndzundza-Ndbele after their defeat initiated a new cycle of dispersal 
followed by attempts at consolidation, which seems to be a constant theme in their history. It was 
barely 50 years after they had moved to Erholweni in an anempt to reverse their scanering by the 
Difeqane. This time, however, conditions were to prove less auspicious for their efforts to 
regroup. The Transvaal government was of the sentiment that black settlement was never again 
going to be allowed in the Mapochsgronden, and they were able to enforce their will due to the 
weakened state of African chiefdoms in the Transvaal (most of whom had lost their 
independence by then). This, together with the general lack of land for black senlement, also 
made it difficult for the Ndzundza-Ndbele to be absorbed into other chiefdoms (Delius 1989: 
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232.237). 
According to Delius ( 1989:234), the burghers who served in the campaign against the Ndzundza-
Ndbele were from the districts of Middelburg, Pretoria, Lydenburg, Standenon, Wakkerstroom 
and Potchefstroom. Most of the labourers went to the first four of these districts, which, with the 
exception ofStanderton, which is more to the south, form a contiguous area in the Southeastern 
Transvaal. Many of the Ndzundza-Ndbele tried to escape their indentured state, but this proved 
to be difficult, as there were few places to seek shelter (Delius 1989:236). Besides seeking to 
escape, another response was to move from farm to farm . This movement resulted from attempts 
to reunite families or to improve conditions of service and it accelerated after their period of 
indenture ended (Delius 1989:243). When their indenture ended, they became labour tenants on 
white farms. They could now move from farm to farm, looking for better conditions, provided 
that the white farmer was prepared to give them a trekpw·. 
Most of the royal fam ily were sentenced to jai l terms in Pretoria. This, as well as the dispersal 
of the Ndzundza-Ndbele, proved to be a major threat to their future as a distinct group. When one 
of the royals, Madzidzi , escaped, a long overdue initiation could be organised for young men 
(Van Vuuren 1995:13, Delius 1989:201). Initiat ion plays an essential ro le in Ndbele society in 
insti lling a consciousness of themselves as a distinct group, and consequently this initiation (held 
in 1886) was vital in ensuring the continued existence of the Ndzundza-Ndbele (Delius 1989: 
241 , Van Vuuren 1995). After escaping, Madzidzi, who was a younger brotherofNyabela, went 
to live with family members on the white fann of Kafferskraal (Delius 1989:240, James 1987: 
31). According to Delius ( 1989:24 1) and James ( 1987:47), the first initiation also took place on 
Kafferskraal. Kafferskraal was one of the farms claimed by Nyabela a few years previously (see 
p.143 above), and Madzidzi's choice of it as a refuge indicates a degree of continuity in 
Ndzundza-Ndbele settlement patterns. After their period of indenture ended, a number of 
Ndzundza-Ndbele went to live on Kafferskraal wi th Madzidzi (James 1987:31). 
Madzidzi assumed the ro le of chief by default, although he was not the rightful heir. In terms of 
the rules of succession, the rightful heir to the throne was Fene, who was still too young to rule 
at the time and in whose place Nyabela was acting as regent. According to James (1987:44-47) 
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and Delius (1983 :84-85), chiefly successions always contained elements of negotiation and were 
not always simply determined by the rules for succession. Madzidzi's de facto position, as well 
as these elements of indeterminacy built into the process, seems to have led to a situation where 
he was recognised as chief by the Ndzundza-Ndbele who lived in the Middelburg district. Fene 
eventually held sway in the Pretoria area, and this division continues until today, with Fene's 
lineage ruling in the former Kwandbele homeland and Madzizdi's lineage ruling in Nkosini in 
the fonn of the current chief, Poni Mahlangu (see James 1987:44-50, for a more detailed 
discussion of this leadership struggle). In the rest of this narration, I shall concentrate only on the 
history of the latter group, because it was largely them that ended up living in Nkosini. 
The Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902) provided an opportunity for the Ndzundza-Ndbele to regroup. 
As the authority of the Transvaal Republic collapsed, and with the departure of male burghers 
to the front and the herding of Boer women and children into concentration camps, many 
Ndzundza-Ndbele left the farms and congregated around Madzidzi at Kafferskraal and to a lesser 
extent around Nyabela and Fene in the Pretoria district (Delius 1989:244). According to Krikler 
(1993:14) as many as 300 'kraals' streamed back to settle on farms around Kafferskraal in the 
Middelburg district. The British forces supplied these Ndzundza-Ndbele with guns and enlisted 
their support against the Boers, but soon after the war ended the cattle and the guns they acquired 
through the war were seized (Delius 1989:245-246). Despite being promised a location of their 
own in return for helping the British, none was forthcoming (Morrel 1983: 138). Instead, pressure 
was applied on them to return to the farms on which they had worked before the war (Del ius 
1989:246). This was because the restoration of white agriculture in the Transvaal was a much 
more important consideration for the occupying British forces than any promises they might have 
made to the Ndzundza-Ndbele. Their importance as agricultural labourers made them much too 
useful to be allowed to stay on locations of their own. Most of the Ndzundza-Ndbele returned, 
although some were allowed to remain on Kafferskraal. Madzidzi in particular was allowed, after 
he had 'begged hard' (quoted in Krikler 1993: 196), to remain there. This episode initiated a new 
cycle of dispersal and attempts at consolidation. 
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6.5THE NDZUNDZA-NDBELE QUEST FOR LAND OFTHEIR OWN, CULMINATING 
IN THE MOVE TO THE TRUST FARMS AROUND NKOSINI 
After the dispersa l of the Ndzundza-Ndbele they once aga in li ved as labour tenants on white 
farms in the Southeastern Transvaal. There are indications that their post-war dispersal was not 
as drastic as the previous onc. As labour tenants, the Ndzundza-Ndbele had more freedom of 
movement than as indentured labourers, and it seems that they had succeeded in moving closer 
to their previous heartland in the Middelburg district. Delius (1989:255-256) refers to the census 
of 1904/5, which enumerated approximately II 000 Ndzundza-Ndbele on farms in the 
Middelburg district, and approximately 9 000 living on fanns in the Pretoria district. The census 
fi gures reveal that, at this stage, these two districts were the only ones where significant numbers 
of Ndzundza-Ndbele were living (Delius 1989:256). These districts were at that time much 
bigger than they are at present, however. At the beginning of the century, the Middelburgdistricl 
also contained what is today the Witbank district, as well as parts of the present day Groblersdal 
district. The Pretoria district in turn contained the present day Bronkhorstspruit district and part 
of the Groblersdal district (see map in the beginning of Krikler's [1993] book). The number of 
20 000 Ndzundza-Ndbele living in these two districts probably represented most of the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele population. The perception that most of the Ndzundza-Ndbele were living in 
these two districts is strengthened by the fact that approximately 10000 people were indentured 
after the war in 1883 - if we allow for natural increase, a total population of around 20 000 
Ndzunzda after 20 years does not sound unreasonable. It would take a population growth rate of 
about 3,5 per cent per annum to double the population after 20 years, which is certainly high by 
any standards. 
This perception is confirmed by estimates of the Ndzundza-Ndbele population provided by the 
Department of Native Affairs of the Transvaal government in its 1909- 1910 annual report, 
although with a few modifications (Transvaal 191 I, appendix 3). That report li sts the Ndzundza-
Ndbele population of Middelburg district as 7692 out of a total black population of 15694. In 
addition there were estimated to be 5219 Ndzundza-Ndbele (out of a total of2836 1) living in the 
Pokwani sub district of Middelburg. Pokwane was in the north of the Middelburg district, and 
consisted of reserve areas and locat ions that were the left overs from the former Sekhukhuneland, 
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as well as white farms carved out of the fonner Sekhukhuneland. It seems likely that most of the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele enumerated here were in fact living on white farms, given that the Ndzundza-
Ndbele had no land of their own. This gives us a total of 12911 Ndzundza-Ndbele living in the 
greater Middelburg district, which is not so different from the 11000 enumerated five years 
previously. The only other district where they were strongly represented according to these 
estimates, was Bethal, where they numbered 3745 out of a total black population of 5459. In 
Ennelo the Ndzundza-Ndbele fonned 1515 out ofa total black population of 18500. In other 
districts the report combines the number ofNdzundza-Ndbele with other groups, e.g. in Belfast 
there are 2408 Ndzundza-Ndbele plus Basotho, and in Carolina the Ndzundza-Ndbele are thrown 
together with a disparate group (numbering 3782) consisting of Zulu, Bushman (sic) and 
Shangaan. 
I have related previously how the Ndzundza-Ndbele lost their land. The fact that they did not 
have any land of their own, unlike their Pedi-neighbours, placed them in an unfavourable 
bargaining position with regard to the rendering of agricultural labour (James 1987:36, Morrel 
1983 : 137). The Pedi had access to a number oflocations, which were pieces of crown land that 
were granted around the end of the 19th century to Africans (Morrel 1983: 122). In addition large 
numbers of them lived as rent paying 'squatters! on land company farms. This offered, as long as 
rents were relatively low (rents increased as land became more scarce over time ~ Morrel 1983: 
130-133), an alternative to wage labour. The Ndzundza-Ndbele were less fortunate. After their 
period of indenture ended, they worked as labour tenants on white farms, mostly in the 
Middelburg district. Their labour contracts involved the rendering of labour on the fanns in 
exchange for a place to stay as well as some land on which to graze their cattle and plant crops 
for subsistence and sometimes for sale9, In the beginning. they mostly did not receive any cash 
wages (if they did, these were very low), which made their labour very attractive to the white 
fanners who were, with a few exceptions, perpetually cash strapped and undercapitalised (Morrel 
1983:138, 168). 
, The amount of land offered to labour tenants for their own use varied much between 
farmers and overtime. On some fanns conditions were favourable and tenants produced a surplus 
for sale, on others they did not have enough for their own subsistence (Morrel 1983: 179). 
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The exception to this situation was the fann of Kafferskraal , where a group of around nine 
famili es of Ndzundza-Ndbele were living as rent paying tenants on white owned land (James 
1987:37 fn. 12, James 1988:23), and a few other farms in the Pretoria and Middelburg districts 
where they lived in a similar set up (Delius 1989:247). Another farm that probably contained rent 
paying Ndzundza-Ndbele was the farm Wonderhoek in the Middelburg district. Morrel (1983 : 
166) relates that the farmer W. Wheeler was found to have 23 squatter fami lies on his farm , 
Wonderhoek. in 1909. They each payed him 10 bags of maize per annum in order to remain on 
the farm. Morrel does not say anything about the ethnic affiliation of these squatters, but 
according to Van Vuuren ( 1995: 13), the farm of Wonderhoek in the Middelburgdistrict was onc 
of four places used for Ndzundza-Ndbele initiation ceremonies during the 1920's: the other three 
being Kafferskraal , the farm Welgelegen in the Pretoria district where Fene lived, and another 
white owned farm in the Middelburg district, Witpoort. This suggests that Wonderhoek was 
indeed inhabited by Ndzundza-Ndbele. 
The Ndzundza~Ndbele responded to their predicament by making numerous requests to be 
allocated the location they were promised by the British in return for the help they provided in 
the Boer War (Morrel 1983: 138, Coetzee 1980:251). Due to pressure by white farmers who 
wanted to retain their landless labour force, nothing came of these requests until the 1 940s. Even 
the unofficial Ndzundza-Ndbele location on Kafferskraal was highly unpopular among whhe 
farmers (Morrel 1983: 138). Their only alternative, that of buying land, was very difficult, given 
that they did not earn wages as labour tenants (Morrel 1983 : 137). They did have the option of 
earning wages by engaging in migrant labour during their off-season, but as we shall see in the 
next chapter, this was initially a very limited option. After numerous unsuccessful attempts by 
Fene to buy land, Fene's son eventually managed to buy the fann Weltevreden near Pretoria in 
the 1920's (James 1987:47, Coetzee 1980:251-252). This farm in later years became the nucleus 
of the K waNdbele homeland. 
In terms of the 191 3 Land Act, it became illegal for blacks to rent or own land in most white 
areas of the country. As a result, 'squatting' (rent-paying tenants, as in Kafferskraal), labour 
tenancy, sharecropping or otherwise living on white farms without working for the white farmer 
became illegal (Morrel 1983: 124). In return, land would be made available for exclusive black 
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occupation in reserves in order to accommodate those displaced from white farms as a result of 
the enforcement of the Act. Eviction from farms were in fact linked to provision of alternative 
land for the displaced, which delayed the implementation of the Act for a long time. A number 
of commissions of inquiry were established to investigate the need for reserves in the various 
districts. The first of these was the Beaumont Commission, which was established in 1913. The 
Beaumont Commission recommended that an area in the Middelburg district far to the north of 
Kafferskraal be set aside for the Pedi. This included Sekwati's location and Mogale's location in 
the heartland of Sekhukhuneland, but did not offer any land for Ndzundza-Ndbele occupation 
(Morrel 1983 : 124-126). 
The issue was revisited by the Stubbs Commission in 191 7-1918. He increased the land area 
potentially set aside for black occupation considerably. He recommended in particular that a large 
area between the Blood River in the south and the land scheduled by the Beaumont Commission 
in the north be set aside for the Ndzundza-Ndbele (Morrel 1983: 137). Farmer influence ensured 
that this did not happen, however. Because he feared the dislocation that could result from 
declaring such a large area a 'native' reserve, as well as the consequences flowing from large scale 
evictions from white farms, he recommended that a moratorium be placed on evictions. He also 
recommended that the area in the south of the reserve be declared an open area, which meant that 
whites who already owned land there could sell their land to other whites. Over the long term 
however, the land was supposed to be bought for black occupation (Morrel 1983: 128). According 
to Morrel ( 1983 : 130-131) this had the perverse effect that farms within the open area that were 
previously unoccupied by whites and only used by them for winter grazing and as labour farms, 
now experienced a heavy inflow of white settlers. This applied in particular to farms near 
Kafferskraal that were in the vicinity of the Blood and Olifants Rivers and that offered irrigation 
potential. The result of this was that rents increased on farms such as Kafferskraal, as the land 
became more valuable (Morrel 1983: 131). More demands were also made on the labour force 
in this area. 
The situation stayed unchanged until after the 1936 Land Act. As a result of this Act, more 
attention was given to enforcing the provisions against squatting and sharecropping. Some time 
after that Kafferskraal ceased to be farmed on a rent tenancy basis. By the 1960's it was a labour 
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tenancy fann like the others in the vicinityJO, The 1936 Act also led to the establishment of the 
South African Nat ive Land Trust, which was given money to buy land for exclusive black 
occupation. During 1943-4", the Trust bought a number of farms to the north of Kafferskraal, 
such as Paardenplaats, Goedenhoop and Vaalkopfontein. At around the same time, a number of 
Ndzundza-Ndbele fami lies who had been living on KafTerskraal under their chief Jonas 
Mahlangu Ca successor ofMadzidzil, left to settle on these farms (James 1987: 4 1 1. ln 1957 these 
farms became the Mahlangu tribal authority which, in 1962, was forma lly incorporated into the 
Nebo-district as well as the Lebowa homeland (Coetzee 1980:270). This was an anomalous 
situat ion, however, since, in terms of Apartheid ideology, Lebowa was the homeland for the Pedi 
people. This group of Ndzundza-Ndbele did not fit here , given the idea that each ethnic group 
should have their own homeland. It was not until much later that the KwaNdbele homeland was 
created northeast of Pretoria around the farm ofWeltevreden. After 1994, the tribal authority lost 
many of the local government functions it previously fulfilled. Today Nkosini falls under. the 
HlogotloulLepelle transitional local counci l, which look over most of these functions. 
6.6 THE ORIGIN AND TIMING OF THE MOVE TO NKOSINI 
6.6. 1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT NKOSINI 
Nkosini is a closer settlement with a population of approximately 1200. As previously 
mentioned, it is the seat of the Mahlangu tribal authority. It is situated on a plateau in hilly terrain 
at an elevation of around 1600 m. Towards the south the land fa lls away towards the valley of 
the Blood River, and towards the north it gradually slopes down to the Oli fants River. To the 
northeast is the Sekhukhune mountain range. One of the highest peaks of these mountains, 
Hlogotlou, at 1915 rn, is not far from Nkosin i. East of the Sekhukhune mountains the land fal ls 
away towards the Steelpoort River valley. The plateau on which Nkosini is si tuated is connected 
in the southeast to the rest of the Transvaal Highveld via Tauteshoogte and the Bothasberge. 
10 Interview with J.R. 
11 Interview with J. R. 
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Due to its elevation rainfall is, like in the rest of the Eastern Transvaal highveld, good (around 
700mrn annually). The hilly terrain makes farming difficult, however. Some households have 
fields allocated to them, but since these are some distance from Nkosini. getting to and from their 
fields is difficult (Interview with MM). In addition, many households who do not have an 
external cash income from migrant labour wages find it impossible to afford the input costs 
associated with agriculture, with the result that many fields are not worked (Interview with EM). 
There used to be considerable cattle holdings in the community, but these have been depleted 
through stock theft (Interview with MM). 
To the south of Nkosini is the boundary between the Northern Province and Mpumalanga, 
Nkosini being in the Northern Province (see map 6.1 on p. 155). There is considerable 
. unhappiness in the area about the fact that it falls in the Northern Province. This has led to much 
popular agitation for the area to be incorporated into Mpumalanga. In the later half of 1997 this 
dispute flared up and led to incidents of violence. The reasons for the unhappiness about the 
provincial demarcation are not entirely clear, but one suspects that ethnic identification plays a 
role. The fonner homeland of Kw aNd be le falls in Mpumalanga. In addition farms immediately 
to the south ofNkosini where large numbers ofNdzundza-Ndbele still live, such as Kafferskraal, 
Zaaiplaats and Buffelsvallei, are also part of Mpumalanga, as is the fonner capital of the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele around Roossenekal. According to a local government official. the case for 
incorporation into Mpurnalanga is made in terms of the existence of the graves of their ancestors 
in Mpumalanga (interview with A.M.) which strengthens the suspicion that ethnicity is a factor 
here. 
Nkosini is surrounded by a number of closer settlements with varying degrees of formality and 
levels of service. Monsterlus, which is about 10 km's away, is the closest to being a town. It has 
tarred roads, street lights, and shopping centres. Groblersdal is the nearest 'white' town and is 
about 40 km's from Nkosini. Middelburg, about 110 km's from Nkosini is the largest town in the 
vicinity. Pretoria is 240 km's from Nkosini, which means that it is too far away for daily, or even 
weekly, commuting to be possible. The area in which Nkosini is situated is nicknamed 
Dlawulale, which means 'eat and sleep'. It is derived from the perception that this place is so far 
from anything that by the time you get there, you are so tired that you can only eat and then go 
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6.6.2 THE ORIGIN OF THE PEOPLE OF NKOSfNI 
lames (1987:21 , 4 1-42), in reporting on the results of heT research in a vi llage that she calls 
Morotse (which is not fa r from Nkosini ), claims that the Ndbcle in-migrants into this area can 
be divided into two groups: a) those who lived on Kafferskraal or on farms surrounding it and 
b) those who lived further afield in the Southeastern Transvaal. The first group lived close to 
what became the reserve area and were thus in a better position to make the move to that area 
when land became available there. They moved there at an earlier stage (from the 1930's to the 
end of the 1950's - James 1987:21) and under more favourable terms. The terms were more 
favourable because labour tenancy agreements did not place as many restrict ions on things such 
as catt le holding and farming on one's own account as was the case at a later stage. In addition. 
the earlier migrants generally left out of choice, whi le the later migrants were evicted from the 
farms. The later group, according to her (James 1987:2 1), arrived from the 1960's onwards. She 
(James 1987:42) claims that they are the majority group among the Ndbele residents of Mo rot se. 
[n my survey. [ asked about the migration histories of the oldest member(s) of each household. 
This information was not always available, as respondents sometimes did not know where tHeir 
spouses/parents were born. I obtained information about the place of birth of the spouse (in 
addition to the respondent's place of birth) in only fi ve cases. This information is included here. 
In fi ve cases the respondent was a child who did not know anything about their parent's place of 
birth. Another problem was that, in a few cases, the respondent could not remember when they 
came to live in Nkosini. I used the Ndzundza-Ndbele system of initiation regiments as a memory 
aid fo r o lde r respondents with regard to the date when they arrived in Nkosini . Initiation is done 
every four years and each regiment of initiates is given a name. These names are repeated over 
a cycle stretching 60 years and allows the researcher to date an occurrence to a specific four year 
period (Van Vuuren 1995:7). [ identified 37 individuals who were born elsewhere. Of these. I 
have no information about when they arrived in Nkosin i in the case of seven individuals. In the 
case of another nine, I could work out on the basis of other information they gave me (e.g. 'I lived 
12 Chris Van Vuuren, personal communication. 
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on Buffelsvlei until after the birth of my last child and the death of my husband and then came 
to live here') approximately when they arrived in Nkosini . 
Ofthe 37 who were born elsewhere, three people were born on white farms in the Belfast-district 
(the Belfast district is just to the east of the Middelburg district) and eleven were born on white 
farms in the Groblersdal-district (immediately to the northwest of the Middelburg district). 
Twenty-one of the rest were born in the present day Middelburg district. This leaves two people: 
one was born on a white farm near the Loskop-dam (since this can mean either the Groblersdal 
or Middelburg districts, I could not classify it) , and one who was born in Tafelkop. Tafelkop was 
a white farm to the northeast ofNkosini in the Nebo-magistrates district that was acquired by the 
Trust for black occupation. It is today a big closer settlement on the road to Groblersdal , not far 
from Nkosini. Distinguishing between districts of origin does not, however, adequately capture 
how close to Nkosini the fanns of origin of its residents are situated. There is, in fact, little 
evidence of movement from further afield in the Southeastern Transvaal into Nkosini. 
With a few exceptions, everybody was born on farms very close to Kafferskraal and Nkosini. 
Especially prominent here are eight contiguous farms just to the south and southeast ofNkosini 
(see map 6.1 for place names). These farms are Kafferskraal, Zaaiplaats, Buffelsvallei, Waterval 
and Grootkop in the Groblersdal district and Paardekloof, Toeloop and Blinkwater (also called 
Stofberg) in the Middelburg district . Although the last three are in another district, they are 
situated just to the northeast and east of Kafferskraal. I call these farms the Kafferskraal farms, 
due to the historical importance of Kafferskraal as the seat of the chief. It is clear that these 
farms fulfilled an important role in housing the Ndzundza-Ndbele living in the north of the 
Middelburg district. The tenancy arrangements differed from farm to farm, and over time, with 
labour tenancy being more common. Kafferskraal was initially occupied by tenants who paid 
rent, as we saw previously. Later, however, the situation became the more common one oflabour 
tenancy". Zaaiplaats, on the other hand, was bought by the Trust after 1936 for black occupation, 
but was never incorporated into the reserve area (James 1987:57). It therefore remained part of 
the Groblersdal district. Buffelsvlei, and most of the other farms, was occupied by labour 
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tenants l '. James (1987:39-40) describes how a Pedi labour tenant by the name of J&:Obs 
Madihlaba lived during the 1930s with his family on Buffelsvallei and how he left the farm after 
a dispute with the white land owner in 1938. 
The breakdown of the farms near Kafferskraal is as follows: besides the two people born on 
Kafferskraal, one person was born on Grootkop (next to Kafferskraal), three on BuffelsvaUei, ODe 
on Zaaiplaats, four on Perdekloof, one on Toeloop and eight on Blinkwater (the original 
Blinkwater farm includes the small settlement of Stofberg - respondents tended to use the two 
names interchange.bly)ll. One person was born in Ellisdrift, which is just to the north of 
Stofberg. Ellisdrift is another name l ' used by Nkosini-residents for the old white I.bour colony 
of Laersdrif, and at present consists of small-holdings. In addition three people were born on 
white-owned small-holdings near Roossenekal. Roossenekal is, as was previously mentioned, 
near the site of the Ndzundza-Ndbele capital of Erholweni in the Steenkampsberge and is also 
called Mapochsgronde, in honour of M.bogo, a previous ruler of the Ndzundza-Ndbele. 
Roosenekal is just to the north of Stofberg. 
The situation thus differs from the one James is describing for the village of M 0 rot se, in that only 
three people were born in a district (Belfast) that is not immediately adjacent to the Nebo district 
in which Nkosini is situated. James argues that most of the Ndzundza-Ndbele in her study area 
came from further afield in the Southeastern Transvaal. One possible explanation for this 
difference could be that the Nkosini in-migrants form part of the group, distinguished by James, 
that arrived earlier (before 1960). According to James this group arrived mostly from areas close 
by and in this respect they are similar to the Nkosini in-migrants. Since the chief came to live in 
Nkosini in the early 1940s, it is not unreasonable to suppose that those who came to live in 
14 Interview with lR. 
I ' The land on which Stofberg is situated was sold the South African Railways fill' 1ht 
erection of a station by one of the owners of Blinkwater, Dirk Stofberg (Interview with J.it) 
I' lIDs was confirmed to me by the respondent herself. It is not clear why the people 0{ 
Nkosini would want to substitute one Afrikaans name for a farm for another. It does ho"ever 
indicate their intimate knowledge of the area and the ln~uence of the Afrikaans language 'os the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele as a result of their long standing association with Afrikaners as farm labourers 
and labour tenants (Vim Vuuren 1992). 
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Nkosini arrived more or less at the same time as he did. There is, however, little evidence to 
support this hypothesis. 
Most of the migrants arrived during the 19605 and 19705. Labour tenancy was formally abolished 
by government notice in the Middelburg district in 1967, and this seems to have resulted in 
increased movement off the farms (Surplus People Project 1983: 120). Of the 30 individuals I 
have information about, 11 arrived during the 19705 and another eight during the 19605. Only 
seven arrived before 1960: one in the 1930s, two in the 1940s and another four in the 1950s. 
There are only four recent arrivals: three during the 19805 and onc during the 19905. Of these, 
two are atypicaL The first came here during the 1980s, but was born in Tafelkop (in 1943). 
Tafelkop was bought by the Trust in that year, so the migrant wasn't born on a white farm. It is 
most likely that his parents moved into Tafelkop from a white farm not long before 1943, 
however, given that this purchast! was followed by considerable in-migration. Another late arrival 
moved to the farm Vaalkopfontein during the 19305 as a child with his parents (he was born on 
the farm Schoongezicht in the Belfast-area). Part of Vaalkopfontein eventually became the 
settlement of Nkosini. He then moved around a great deal and only came to live with his sister's 
child in Nkosini during the last few years. In his case it is difficult to describe him as a bona fide 
first time in-migrant into Nkosini. 
The picture that emerges from these data is ofa community that had a low rate of in-migration 
from its inception in the late 1930s until the 1950s, followed by a major growth spurt as many 
settlers arrived during the 19605 and 19705, and ending with almost no inmigration during the 
last two decades. Nkosini therefore ceased being a magnet for people evicted from white farms 
since the beginning of the 1980s. Those leaving the farms in recent years have either gone to 
surrounding settlements or preferably to KwaNdbele, which is much better situated with regard 
to access to jobs in Pretoria, Bronkhorstspruit and Johannesburg (Interview with teacher, W. S.) . 
.Because Nkosini is too far away from these places to be a home for daily commuters, job seekers 
cannot look for work using Nkosini as a base. By the time one has heard from people visiting 
from Gauteng about a job going there, it is already too late, because it would have been taken 
long;;ago_ The situation is different in KwaNdbele, because one can be updated on a daily ba~i5 
about what is happening on the job market by commuter friends and relaJives (Inte~iew with 
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E.M.). 
Almost all of the in-migration into Nkosini was thus from surrounding farms and not from more 
distant farms in the Southeastern Transvaal, contrary to what one would expect from James's 
work (as we saw above, she claims that the majority arrived from further afield in the South 
Eastern Transvaal). In addition the short-distance migration took place at a different stage than 
James reports for the short-distance Morotse migrants. James believes that those who came from 
close by were the early migrants, which is not the case in Nkosini. We are thus presented with 
two, opposing, pictures ofNdzundza-Ndbele migration, which raises the question whether either 
ofthem can be generalised to Ndzundza-Ndbele migration as a whole. James (1987:21) certainly 
thinks that her version has more general applicability. Another way in which to ask this question 
is whether these two pictures are competing versions ofa general description afin-migration into 
the Mahlangu tribal area or whether they reflect local conditions that differ between the two 
villages. If the fanner is the case, we have to decide which version is correct. If the latter is the 
case, the two versions are obviously not contradictory. 
This is an important question, because if my version of events can be generalized to the whole 
area, in other words if most Ndzundza-Ndbele migrants have arrived from fanns close by, it 
means that they have had more control over their settlement patterns than generally recognised, 
and that the impact of their dispersal by the indenture system and labour tenancy was 
counteracted to a significant degree. They were consequently not such a captive labour force as 
is suggested by some historical evidence (see e.g. Morrel 1983: 164). [t also means that the 
conditions were relatively favourable for the reestablishment of networks of mutual help, given 
that (in the absence of sophisticated communication and transport technology) networks need 
some degree of physical contiguity to function properly. 
Since my survey is restricted to only one village, it is clearly too limited to answer the question 
whether my version ofNdzundza-Ndbele in-migration can be generalized to the whole area. If 
more information was available regarding the distribution of the Ndzundza-Ndbele population 
between Transvaal districts over the first half of this century, it could give us an idea of how 
many people were available in which places for in-migration into the Mahlangu tribal area. This 
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could ill uminate onc aspect of the two differing interpretations, viz. whether the majority of 
Ndzundza-Ndbele in-migrants into the Mahlangu tribal area came from close by or from more 
d istant parts of the Southeastern Transvaal. We have already dealt with two sources of evidence 
in this regard. The first is the census figures for 1904/S (quoted by Delius and mentioned above 
on p. 147), and the second is the estimates provided by the Department of Native Affairs for 
1909119 10. These suggest that at the beginning of the century, most Ndzundza-Ndbele were 
li ving in the Middelburg and Pretoria districts, with a significant minority living in Bethal 
district. There are also some mid-century data available. These are the census fi gures of 1946, 
combined with Van Warmelo's ( 1952: 11 ) extrapolations of these. 
They broadly confirm that most Ndzundza-Ndbele from the Southeastern Transvaal were living 
in Middelburg and Bethal around the 1950's, that is the time when migration to Nkosini started 
to take place. Van Warmelo ( 1954:11 ) attempted to calculate the total number of Southern-
NdbeJe (among others) in the country in 1946, and thei r dispersal between magisterial districts '7. 
Since he only provides us with the proportions which the Ndzundza-Ndbele made up of the total 
black population in various districts, it is necessary to combine his figures with the 1946 census 
stati stics for magisterial districts (South Africa 195 1). These data is presented in the following 
tab le (table 6. 1). 
17 Van Warmelo does not disaggregate the Southern Ndbele figures. As we saw on p. 141 
above, the Southern Ndbele consists of the Manala and the Ndzundza-Ndbele. Since the former 
lives large ly in the Pretoria district, one can safely assume that almost all the Ndbele's 
enumerated in the Southeastern Transvaal were Ndzundza-Ndbele. 
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Table 6.1 
Distribution of Ndzundza-Ndbele population of tbe Soutbeastern Transvaal in 1946 by 
magisterial district 
Magisterial district Number of Ndzundza- Percentage 
Ndbele 
Middelburg 25967 50% 
Groblersdal 4017 8% 
Belfast 5133 10% 
Lydenburg 2413 5% 
Bethal 10110 19% 
Carolina 2512 5% 
Ermelo 2261 4% 
Total 52413 100% 18 
Sources: Van Warmelo 1951 : 11, South Africa 1951 
Van Warmelo mentioned also that a significant number of Ndzundza-Ndbele lived in 
Bronkhorstspruit district, as well as Pretoria, Witbank and the East Rand, but I did not include 
this in my calculations, for the following reasons. The first is that Pretoria and the East Rand are 
urban areas and as such unlikely to have contributed many labour tenants fami lies to the Nkosini 
population. In addition, Van Warmelo did not give estimates of the number ofNdzundza-Ndbele 
living in these areas. He did give a figure of 22195 Southern Ndbele for Bronkhorstspruit. 
Bronkhorstspruit was previously part of the Pretoria district and probably contained a higher 
proportion of Man ala Ndbele, which renders the number of22195 problematic as an estimate of 
the number ofNdzundza-Ndbele. It is further the case that due to distance factors, most of the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele in this group would have migrated to the Kwandbele nucleus around 
Weltevrede rather than to the Mahlangu tribal area. 
" Adds up to 10 I % because of rounding off. 
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These figures firstly makes it clear that hal f of the Ndzundza-Ndbele of the Southeastern 
Transvaal lived in the current Middelburg district in 1946. To this figure we must add 
Groblersdal, which had 8% of the Ndzundza-Ndbele population and which is the district in which 
farms such as Kafferskraal is located (it was previously part of the Midddelburg distri ct), As is 
clear from the map. parts of the Belfast and Lydenburg districts are also close to N kosini , which 
accounts for a further 15%. The only di stant district with a large number of Ndzundza-Ndbele 
is Bethal , which contributed 19% to the total. The other more distant districts (Ermelo and 
Carolina) had only 9% of the population. 
Comparing these fi gures wi th the estimates for 1909/ 1910, one is struck by the stability of 
distribut ion of the Ndzundza-Ndbele. It is clear that the large majority of the Ndzundza-Ndbele 
population of the Southeastern Transvaal must have lived in the area in and around the original 
Middelburg and Bethal districts during the labour tenant period. Because Van Warmelo's 
calculation for the Middelburg district does not di stinguish between Ndzundza-Ndbele living on 
the farms near Kafferskraal and those living in the rest of the district, it is not possible to 
decisively fal sify James's assertion about the origins of Ndzundza-Ndbele in-migrants (she 
distinguished between those living on the nearby farms and those living in more distant locations 
in the Southeastern Transvaal , which would presumably include the more distant parts of the 
Middelburg distri ct) . The distribution of Ndzundza-Ndbele does however raise question marks 
about her assertion - they were certainly less dispersed than she suggests. 
There are also, however, indications that my own findings reflect conditions peculiar to the 
histo ries of the N kosini residents interviewed by me. One interesting aspect of the migration 
histories recounted here is the high proportion o f N kosini residents who were born on the 
Kafferskraal farms or in the Stofberg vicinity. Of the 35 born elsewhere, 13 are from the 
Kafferskraal farms. This represents only eight farms, out of a total of about 160 farms in the 
present day Middelburg district (I established this fi gure by doing a rough count of farms from 
the 1 :250 000 map). To this fi gure of 160 farms we must add those farm s that are in the present 
day Witbank and Groblersdal districts and that previous ly formed part o f the Middelburg district, 
as we ll as fa rms in the Bethal district. Within the boundaries of this area, lies the farms most 
likely to contribute migrants to the Mahlangu tribal area. That most of the Nkosini migrants were 
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born on only eight (contiguous) fanns, rather than being more widely distributed across the whole 
area, therefore suggests a clear tendency for Nkosini residents to cluster with regard to their farms 
of origin. 
One possible explanation for this tendency relates to the fact that Nkosini is presently the seat of 
the chief - a function it has taken over from Kafferskraal. One can argue that people who 
previously lived with the chief, or close to the chief, would be more likely to do so again if the 
chiefs place of residence changes. This argument explains why those who had moved at around 
the same time as the chief would join him in Nkosini , but it does not, however, explain why those 
who arrived after the early 1940's would choose to settle there. As we know, the chief left 
Kafferskraal in the early 1940's, while the majority ofNkosini in-migrants arrived after the 1950's. 
They, or their parents, chose not to leave with the chief when he did so, so why would they join 
him later? It is therefore not clear why so many Nkosini residents arrived from the same group of 
farms. 
One can presume that network connections between people who have lived near each other for 
some time had something to do with this tendency to choose Nkosini above other destinations, 
Living in the heartland of Ndzundza-Ndbele settlement, Nkosini residents and their ancestors 
were able to escape the isolation that Ndzundza~Ndbele who were situated on fanns in the deep 
Southeastern Transvaal would have experienced. Their concentrated settlement pattern was 
conducive to the construction of dense local networks. Many residents are related to each other, 
which is another factor that would have led to a denser and more intimate set of network 
connections. Sixty per cent of my respondents all had the same surname (Mahlangu - the same 
as that of the chief). In total, there were only 11 surnames among 40 respondents. A number of 
the respondents are closely related to the chief. This connection to the chief, as well as the 
prevalence of kin relationships, suggests that network cOIUlections were important as a factor in 
detennining the choice of Nkosini as a migration destination. The impression that family 
connections are very important is reinforced by the pattern, very apparent in Nkosini, whereby 
male children build houses around their parents' house. The conclusion one can draw from this 
is that the local support networks of future Nkosini residents were characterised by relatively high 
density as well as intensity (see chapter 4 for a discussion of these aspects of the structure of 
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networks). 
Respondents did not always move directly from the place they were born to settle in Nkosini. 
There was a significant amount of movement between farms over the lifetime of some migrants. 
In a few cases migrants came from further afield to live in Zaaiplaats, Kafferskraal or Blinkwater 
for some time before they moved to Nkosini. These three fa rms therefore served the function of 
directing migrants to Nkosini . 
6.7 CONCLUS ION 
What emerges very clearly from this discussion is a picture of a people that have been very mobile 
as far back as we can see. In the precolonial period their mobi li ty seemingly had much to do with 
leadership disputes and the breakup of tribal units. Later, events such as the difaqane initiated a 
number of cycles of dispersal and attempts at consolidation for the Ndzundza-Ndbele. Their 
dispersal by the difaqane ended in their consolidation in the mountain strongholds of 
KoNomtjarhelo. This was followed by their defeat by the forces of the Transvaal Republic, after 
which they lost their land and were scattered as indentured labourers among farmers in what was 
originally the Middelburg and Pretoria districts. During the Anglo-Boer war, many of the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele used the opportunity to congregate around Madzidzi in Kafferskraal , as well 
as Fene in the Pretoria district. With the cessation of hostilities, they were dispersed again , 
however. An opportunity to regroup did not present itself until land was bought by the Trust in 
194 1and a number offamilies settled, with the chief Jonas Mahlangu. on these farms. Nkosini is 
one of the settlements that emerged as a result of this migration. 
Most of the residents of Nkosini who were born elsewhere, were born on the surrounding whi te 
farms. Some of them on fanns to the south of Nkosini such as Kafferskraal. Zaaiplaats and 
Buffelsvalle i, and others on farms a little further away, particularly those on and surrounding the 
old white labour colony of De Lagersdrift. This applies even to those who have moved more 
recent ly to Nkosini , that is in the 1960's and \970's . This raises doubts about the general 
applicabi lity of James's asse rtion that more recent Ndzundza-Ndbele migrants to the Mahlangu 
164 
tribal area are from further afield in the South Eastern Transvaal, rather than from the surrounding 
area. The extent to which the origins ofNkosini in~migrants are clustered around a few farms in 
the vicinity, as well as the phenomenon that most of the people ofNkosini seems to be related to 
each other. are two clues that suggest that network connections between residents ofNkosini are 
particularly strong. 
It is evident that the settlement history ofNkosini residents are closely bound up with their history 
of colonial subjugation and the policies of Segregation and Apartheid that came after that. Buying 
land for black settlement, and evicting blacks from ' white' areas when their labour was no longer 
necessary, was part of the broader policy of Segregation, and later Apartheid, of the government 
of the dai'. These policies were based on the belief that broader geopolitical separation between 
black and white people was necessary to ensure the future of white political domination. Due to 
broader political developments, the Ndzundza-Ndbele were prevented from consolidating their 
own position geographically for any period of time. They were often forced by circumstances 
beyond their control to uproot themselves and begin a new struggle for consolidation. This also 
applied to the movement of some of them to Nkosini. 
These are the circumstances that led to the situation whereby Nkosini residents became involved 
in migrant labour even before the community was born. In fact, the migration to Nkosini, and 
labour migration after that, was superimposed on long standing connections with migration 
destination areas. This phenomenon has considerable implications for our understanding of 
changes in selectivity, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
19 The exception to this is of course the fact that the Mahlangu tribal area was eventually 
incorporated into the predominantly Sepedi-speaking homeland of Le bow a, which contradicted 
an important pillar of Apartheid ideology: the supposed imperative to settle each black 'ethnic 
group' within their own homeland. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR MIGRATION FROM NKOSINI AND 
MIGRANT SELECTIVITY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The conventional model of the development of mobility, as propounded by Massey and others. 
holds that the selectivi ty of migrat ion becomes less pronounced overtime. This is the result of the 
growth of networks that reduce the costs of migration. Massey et al. fonnu lated the ir model to 
specifically explain changes in international migration over time, but others (for example Skeldon) 
descri be the development ofintemal migration in a s imilar fash ion. I com.:l udt:d my discussion uf 
migrant networks in chapter 4 by saying that. although this model is in broad terms correct. it 
needs to he amended in certain important respects: a) the poorest people in the migrat ion sending 
community are likely to be excluded from the assistance provided by networks because they 
cannot reciprocate, and one should therefore not expect the income selectivity of migration to be 
reduced for that group~ and b) households dynamics and gender will , at least in the African case. 
combine to ensure that (married) women continue to be under represented in the migrat ion stream 
as long as circular migration persists. In addit ion trends in the costs of migrat ion will have an 
independent impact on the operation of this model. If the costs of migration decrease over time. 
less income selectivity will remain. If the costs increase, however, the cost reducing impact of 
networks may be outweighed by the increased costs. 
In this chap ter I give attention to aspects of this model in the context of a discussion of labour 
migrat ion from the village ofNkosini. My objective with this exercise is twofold. I firstly want to 
use the model and the causal links it proposes to deepen our understanding of the consequences 
and causes of labour migration in one area of the rural periphery of South Africa. I believe the 
model can do this because it emphasises variables (such as the costs of migration and select ivity) 
which have up to now not received much attention in the literature on migration in this country. 
Besides using the model to understand migration in South Afri ca I, secondly, want to reverse the 
focus and see what lessons empirical rea lity has to offer regarding the adequacy of the model. 
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Because this is a case study which does not allow for generalization. and because there are still 
numerous unresolved methodological problems in studying migrant selectivity (alluded to in 
chapter 3 above), this study can test the theory only to a limited extent. It can however begin the 
process of identifying shortcomings in the model. At the very least it can suggest ways in which 
the model should be extended to accommodate the complexity of empirical reality. 
From the above it is clear that my discussion in this chapter is largely going to be directed at the 
first part of the theory I am developing, in other words that part that deals with changes in 
selectivity over time. The second part. which is concerned with the assumption that migration 
improves the position of the migrant, will not receive attention here. 
7.2 HOW THE NDZUNDZA-NDBELE BECAME INVOLVED IN MIGRANT LABOUR 
Delius (1983 :62-79) describes the process by which the Ndzundza-Ndbele and neighbouring 
societies became involved in migrant labour in his book on the history of the Pedi. and in this 
section 1 summarize relevant parts of his discussion. His focus is primarily on the Pedi, but much 
of what he is saying with regard to migrant labour also applies to the Ndzundza-Ndbele. 
According to Delius (1983 :63) the Ndzundza-Ndbele were participating in migrant labour to the 
Eastern Cape by the early 1860's. They were only one of a number of societies who were so 
involved - among the others were the Pedi, who were living on the western side of the Steelpoort 
river valley and the Manala Ndbele who lived near Pretoria. According to Delius (1983:63) the 
Pedi were the most committed to this system. He (1983 :68) reports that they became invol ved 
in this movement as far back as the 1850's. 
The initiative for this movement seems to have come from the chiefs (Delius 1983:74). They also 
exercised tight control over the migrants by sending members of the royal family to accompany 
the migrants and by demanding on their return a portion of the wages earned by them (Del ius 
1983:75), Permanent settlement of the migrants at their destination was discouraged from all 
sides: by the chiefs, by the colonial authorities in the Eastern Cape and probably by the migrants 
themselves, with result that nobody stayed at their destination for longer than two years (Del ius 
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1983 :64). There was therefore no question of the format ion of migrant networks that would 
encourage voluntary migration later o n. The most important mot ive behind this movement was 
the acquis ition of firearms (Delius 1983:68). Firearms were used for hunt ing, which was an 
important source of food and income (thro ugh the ivory trade). as we ll as fo r defensive purposes. 
Another motive was to restock catt le herds, which were dep leted as a result orthe d{(i::fqane and 
disease. 
It is an interesting question how these societies in the north became aware of lhe opportunities 
for wage labour in the Eastern Cape, which was, after a ll , more than a thousand kilometres away. 
Delius (1983: 71 ) believes that pre-exist ing trade networks between these societies and the 
southern Sothos under thei r king Mshweshwe acted as conduits of this kind o f infonnation. It is 
clear that the migrants faced many hardships on their way to work. Trave lling to the Eastern Cape 
and back was done on foot and often at night. They travelled at night especially on theicreturn 
trip. The reason for this is that they wanted to avo id being harassed or captured - either by 
Transvaal burghers who declared that it was illegal for blacks to possess firearms, or by other 
tribes who wanted to re lieve them of the products of their labours. It took fifteen days of trave l 
for the Pedi before they reached the kingdom of Mshweswhe and by the time they got there, the 
food they carried with them was often fini shed (Delius 1983 : 64). Suffering from hunger and 
exhaustion, the migrants had to work here for some time before they were given an exit pass to 
proceed to the Eastern Cape. Port Elizabeth, where some of them ended up, was at least another 
fi ve hundred kilometres away. The costs of migration were therefore extraordinarily high. These 
costs large ly took the fonn of time and effort and did not involve money to any s ignificant extent 
(occurring before these societies were fully integrated into the money economy). Chiefly 
assistance, as well as travelling in groups, seems to have played a ro le in overcoming these costs. 
After the discovery of diamonds in 1871 at Kimberley, the movement of labourers was redirected 
to the diamond fiel ds. This was a closer destination where migrants could earn higher wages 
(Del ius 1983: 66). The returns published in an appendix to Sieborger's ( 1975: 183-1 93) thes is 
indicate that the Pedi seemingly responded to the new opportunities before the Ndzundza-Ndbele. 
and for a long time they remained an important part of the mines' labour force. Nevertheless. by 
1877 the Ndzundza-Ndbele fea lUred strong ly, cont ribut ing 2760 of the 18834 'new hands' 
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recruited for the Kimberley and Beaconsfield mines in that year from the whole of Southern 
Africa. As with the other tribes, Ndzundza-Ndbele movement to the mines occurred despite the 
deprivations that the trip to and from the mines entailed. Sieborger (! 975) describes how migrants 
had to contend with drought, cold weather and hostile farmers and officials in the Republics while 
they were walking to and from the mines. The costs of migration were therefore once again very 
high, although, given the smaller distance to the diamond fields as compared to the Eastern Cape, 
probably lower than in the latter case. The Ndzundza-Ndbele's strong showing in the ranks of the 
workers on the diamond fields continued until involvement in migrant labour came to an abrupt 
halt when the Ndzundza-Ndbele went to war against the forces of the Transvaal Republic in 1883. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the result of that engagement was that the Ndzundza-Ndbele 
lost their land and their cattle and that they were indentured among white farmers in the South 
. Eastern Transvaal for a period of five years. During that period they were not allowed to leave 
the farmers' land, with the result that migrant labour was impossible. 
7.3 NDZUNDZA-NDBELE INVOLVEMENT IN MIGRANT LABOUR DURING THE 
LABOUR TENANCY PERIOD 
At the end of their five year period of indenture the Ndzundza-Ndbele were uniformly poor, since 
they had lost all their land and cattle. Numerous commentators remarked on their poverty (see 
Delius 1989:247 and MorreI1983 :37). Since almost everybody was poor, there was very little 
social differentiation among them (Delius 1989:247). With few exceptions', the Ndzundza-Ndbele 
continued to work on the white farms as labour tenants, as explained in the previous chapter on 
p. 148. This means that they had access to grazing land which made it possible to start 
accumulating cattle again, which they slowly did by trading the products of their craft work 
(Del ius 1989:243). 
IThe exceptions were those who later became rent tenants on farms such as 
Kafferskraal, as well as a few richer families who were sharecroppers (Delius 1989:247). 
Sharecroppers owned the seed, draught animals and implements necessary for farming. This 
allowed them to remain independent producers on the white farms (see Keegan 1986:78-79 
regarding the differentiation between sharecroppers and labour tenants). 
169 
Afte r the ir indenture ended, they were fomlally free to leave the fann on which they lived if the 
farmer was wi lling to give them a trekpas. The trek pas was one of two kinds of passes given by 
farmers. It was issued by an official upon the request of a farmer and allowed a black tenant to 
drive hi s stock through the countryside (Keegan 1986: 151 ). Famlers sometimes refused to give 
their tenants such passes if they could point to (real or imagined) failures on the part of tenants 
to fulfill their sides of the tenant contract, but, as Keegan ( 1986 :152) points out. in the climate 
of labour scarcity on the farms that existed until at least the 1930's (see Morrell 1983: 179 and 
Schirmer 1995:513 for evidence regarding labour shortages in the Middelburg- and Lydenburg-
districts respectively). these refusals were not always effective in rest ricting the mobility of 
tenants. Tenants could often find another farmer who wanted their services and who was prepared 
either to employ them without a rrekpas or to challenge in court the first fanner'S refusal to issue 
a trek pas (Keegan 1986: 152). Significant movement consequently did take place between farm s. 
especially from farm s that belonged to the poorest farmers and where conditions were at their 
worst, to the farms of better off farmers who could give the Ndzundza-Ndbele better terms of 
employment (Del ius 1989:243). As we saw in chapter 6, there was probably also a slow process 
by which Ndzundza-Ndbele gradually moved closer to their former heartland, especia lly to the 
farms surrounding Kafferskraal where their chief lived. 
7.3. 1 OFF- FARM EMPLOYMENT 
In cont rast to the (rekpas, which allowed the tenant and his household to leave the farm er's 
employ permanently. farmers also issued passes to sanction temporary absences from the farm 
(Keegan 1986: 15 2). During these absences tenants could work for wages for another employer. 
These passes opened up the poss ibility for tenants and (mainly) their sons to engage in a limited 
amount of otT-farm employment , using their farms of origin asa base. This was possible because. 
in the labour tenancy system. tenants were only contracted to render labour to the fanl1er for a 
specitied period. During the rest of the year, tenants could work on their own fields or work 
elsewhere to earn cash wages. Farmers were generally not against the practice of leave for off-
farm employment for two reasons: a) it absolved them from the necess ity to pay cash wages. s ince 
the tenant's need for cash (to pay taxes, among other things) could be sati sfied to a limited ex tent 
in this way; and b) it occurred in the off-season, when, given a system of mono cropping. labour 
170 
demands were low (Morrell 1983: 186, Keegan 1986: 122-123). 
Fanners' commitment to granting such leave of absence was not uniform, however. The length. 
and the mere existence, of this leave varied from farm to fann and over time. It is clear that until 
the Anglo-Boer war at the end of the nineteenth century, the Ndzundza-Ndbele had limited 
possibilities for this kind of employment. They were in a very powerless and poverty-stricken 
state, and farmers probably used this to refuse their requests for such passes (Del ius 1989:242-
243, Morrell 1983:164. Also see Van Vuuren 1992:13). Although their general conditions of 
employment probably improved somewhat in the new century with the Anglo-Boer war coming 
to an end2• by 1914 it was still reported that many tenants worked on the farms the whole year 
through. and that their children were in many cases not allowed to leave for temporary 
employment elsewhere (Del ius 1989:246). As we shall see below, conditions became more 
auspicious for off-farm employment as the century wore on, so that by the 19405 it seems to have 
been quite common. 
Even when passes were forthcoming, they were, at the start of the new century, often not issued 
for a period long enough to allow the tenants to travel far in search of work. It seems that many 
farmers were concerned that their tenants might not return if they became too established further 
afield. Tenants were contracted to work for a period of three to six months for the farmer, but this 
did not necessarily mean that the tenant could stay away for nine or six months of the year 
respectively. Besides the imperative of cultivating their own piece ofland (Schirmer 1995:5 11 ' ), 
tenants were often faced with a situation where their leave was spread in small amounts 
throughout the year, with the result that many tenants could never leave the farm for any 
significant period of time (Schirmer 1995:511 , Keegao 1986:123-124). They therefore tended 
to work on neighbouring farms rather than further afield (Morrell 1986: 186, Keegan 1986: 124). 
2 As we saw in chapter 6, many Ndzundza-Ndbele absconded from the farms during 
the war, and it took a considerable effort on the part of the colonial administration to get them 
to go back. 
3 Given that the product that famler and tenant were producing were in all likelihood 
the same, e.g. maize, and that the times of high and low labour demand were the same for 
tenant and farmer, it is unlikely that the need to cultivate their own patch of land interfered too 
much with the tenant's off-farm employment 
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Until the 1940's most tenants in the area around Kafferskraa l were employed loca lly in their off-
time, earning wages by working for another farmer. on road and rail construct ion projects, for the 
co-op. in the roller mill s, or even by working for the same fanner"' , The duration of their absence 
is probably not the on ly reason why they did not travel further in search of employment - their 
sk ill s were, afte r all. agricu ltura ll y based . 
In add ition the labour t ime that tenants were cont rac ted to provide was sometimes very vaguely 
detined. Marrel (1983: 180) argues that these vaguely defined contracts were more prominent 
among those tenants who worked for poor farme rs and in areas w here labour shortages were less 
of a problem. Poor fanners could not afford to employ many tenants and therefore needed more 
work done more frequent ly by each o f the ir tenants; consequentl y they were less amenable to 
letting them work e lsewhere for significant periods of time (lames 1987:35). According to Morrell 
( 1983: 180-181 ), labour tenants had less barga ining power in the north of the Middelburg-distri ct 
(where most of the residents ofNkosini came from - see chapter 6 above) because labour was 
more readi ly ava ilable due to its closeness to the locat ions and reserve areas ofSekhukhuneland. 
Writi ng about the situation around De Lagersdrift in 1930, MOITe ll (1983: 180-181) mentions that 
tenants were often expected to work whenever there was work to be done, with no off-time being 
laid down. Tenants called these contracts the ·somaar' contract. De Lagersdrift is in the north of 
the Middelburg-di stri ct, and was, as we saw in the previous chapter, until recent ly a labour colony 
for poor whites . If Morre l is correct , the 'som aar' contract would probably also have applied in 
the smal l-holdings around Roossenekal , also known as Mapochsgronde, where many poor whi tes 
lived (Morre Il 1983:89). It is 110t c lear, however, that Morrell's argument that poor fa rmers were 
more likely to offer the 'somaar' contract is not cont rad icted by his ( 1983: 176) other argument 
that poor farmers had less bargaining power in their dea lings with tenants. Poo r fanners were 
often fo rced to employ rich tenants w ith large herds o f cattle (large herds were unpopu lar with 
fanners, but poor fanne rs were not in a position to be choosy about the ir tenants). Ifpoor fanners 
couldn't choose their tenants it is doubtful that they could force them to work witho ut wages and 
without leaving for periods ofwage-eaming employment. 
Not all the w hite farmers in the north of the di strict were poor, however. Fanns in the vic inity of 
4 Interview with 1.R. 
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the Blood River, such as Kafferskraal, were much bigger than in De Lagersdrift, and farmers had 
more capital at their disposal (Morrell 1983). As I pointed out in the previous chapter, most of 
the residents ofNkosini originated on these fanns. On these fanns, tenants were much more likely 
to be given pennission to stay away once their period of compulsory labour to the fanner was 
Dvers. 
Besides the problems experienced by some tenants in leaving for periods of migrant labour in 
more distant towns, such as Pretoria and Johannesburg, there were other factors limiting the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele's participation in off-farm employment in the early years ofthe century. One 
of these was the control exercised by the farmer over the movements of the dependents of the 
household head. The contract which the labour tenant entered with a white fanner often specified 
that the tenant's whole household was required to render labour to the farmer. The tenant 
commined not only himself, but also his whole household to this contract (Morrel 1983: 181 -182, 
Keegan 1986:132, Schirmer 1996:123).lfan unmarried son, or less frequently, a daughter ofa 
labour tenant family left the fann in search of work elsewhere without the fanner's permission, 
the farmer could evict the whole family, because he regarded the contract between him and the 
head of the labour tenant household to have been broken (MorrellI983: 171 , Schirmer 1996: 129). 
These controls gained official status when they were contained in the Native Service Contract 
Act, which was passed in 1932 (Duncan 1995:136-137). The intention of these restrictions was 
inter alia to make it more difficult for young men, who had the most potential for off-farm 
employment, to leave without the farmer's permission. It was also to force them to return after 
their pass expired. This Act also increased control over the movement of women, especially 
married women. Passes were never granted for women to leave on their own, which made it very 
difficult for them to leave (Schirmer 1996: 147). 
Children who absconded did not only act against the will ofthe white farmer. They often also left 
against the will of their fathers (especially initially when their parents were still committed to the 
labour tenancy system). This was not only because the family risked eviction, but also because the 
whole household's participation was necessary to cultivate the tenant's own fields. In fact, the 
exploitation ofthe whole household's unpaid labour is the basis on which the viability ofthis type 
, Interviews with J.R. and S.S. 
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offann ing depended (Keegan 1986:84,134). This of course set the stage for generationaL as well 
as gender (the tenant generally being male) confli ct in labour tenancy households (Keegan 
1986: 134). Household heads also objected to their wives leaving for temporary migrant labour. 
thus limiting the movement ora further group in tenant families (Schirmer 1995 :522).The shared 
need for the labour of the dependents of la hour tenant households ensured that while fanners and 
black household heads often had the same interests when it came lO ensuring that chi ldren and 
wives did not abscond (Schinner 1996: 114, Keegan 1986: 134). 
It is clear that the Ndzundza-Ndbele's movement from the farms for periods of rnigrant labour 
was restricted. These restrictions app lied to all tenants, whether Ndzundza-Ndbele or not, but it 
seems that the Ndzundza-Ndbele had more problems in this regard. This was because they were 
highly valued by fanners as fann workers (James 1987:37). This was probably in part due to their 
fanning skills. lames does not attach much significance to this as a reason and believes that the 
real reason why they were so popular among white fam1ers is that they did not have any 
alternatives to farming and were therefore very exploitable. Whatever the reasons for their 
popularity, the fact is that the Ndzundza-Ndbele encountered especially strong res istance to their 
leaving the countryside. 
The effect of these restrictions should not be overestimated, however. This statement applies 
especially to the contractual obligations of the tenant's family members. The existence of a 
contract between a tenant and a farmer about the employment of the former ' s family, was not in 
itself a guarantee that it would be honoured. [n a context of labour scarcity fanners were not 
always prepared to evict the tenant family. This is because they would have had to forego the 
services of the family members who were still prepared to work on the farm in the process 
(Keegan 1986:133 -1 34). The bargaining power of the tenant, as reflected in the demand for his 
services, was therefore a factor in the amount of control the fanner could exercise over his 
dependents. Fanners often complained to magistrates that the wives or children of their tenants 
refused to work for them. Within months of the passage of the 1932 Act, farmers' organisations 
were complaining it was not effective in ensuring that the dependents of their labour tenants return 
afte r their spell of migrant labour was officially over (Duncan 1995: 139). These restrictions were 
also very difficult to police from the urban end (Duncan 1995:139). Accord ing to Duncan. '(a) 
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lucrative trade in forged fanners' 'leave notes' developed, about which the pass office could do 
littlet • These contractual obligations were therefore not completely successful in forcing 
dependents a) to work for the fanner, b) to refrain from leaving without pennission, and c) to 
return when their spell was supposed to be over. It must also be pointed out that the restriction 
placed by this system on the movement of dependents only applied to trips not sanctioned by the 
fanner. The conclusion one arrives at is that these restrictions made migrant labour by dependents 
more controlled and more difficult, but not impossible. 
From this discussion, as well as the foregoing few pages. it is clear that the labour tenant 
household, at least initially, was not the ideal base for periods of migrant labour on the part of 
sons and daughters. Leaving the fann without pennission could upset the rural base for such 
movement, because the household risked being evicted. If children left without their parent's 
penniss ion they risked alienating them. Given that they still needed their support, especially in the 
case of young men who needed their father's help in accumulating cattle to use as bridewealth 
payment. this was not a wise decision. 
The importance of a conducive rural base for migrant labour becomes apparent once one 
compares the position of the Ndzundza-Ndbele with their neighbours, the Pedi. Unlike the fonner, 
the Pedi had access to alternatives besides the labour tenancy system (see chapter 6, p. 148 
above). Some of them lived in locations and reserve areas, which consisted of those parts of their 
former home, Sekhukhuneland, that remained under Pedi control, or on land they rented from 
white owners. Both of these kinds of senlement pattern differed from labour tenancy in the 
respect that in the case of the fanner two, households could maintain more control over how the 
household's labour was going to be used. They did not have to contend with the white fanner's 
demands for the labour time of household members and could dispatch them for a period of 
migrant labour in a distant (mostly urban) destination without getting pennission first. Migrant 
labour is, by definition, a system that necessitates a base around which family members can 
circulate and to which they can return periodically. This discussion makes it clear that, at least 
initially. labour tenancy provided a less conducive base for migrant labour than other settlement 
systems. 
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As we sha ll see towards the end of this section, this changed over time during the nineteenth 
century. By the 1940's and 1950's it was not uncommon for youths in the Kafferskraal vicinity to 
leave the farm for many years while their parents were working for the farmer and then return 
unmolested to work on the farm themselves for some time. At that stage it seems that it was 
important that at least one memberofthe family stayed behind to render labour (James 1985: 182). 
These restrictions were therefore more common at the beginning, rather than the middle. orthe 
century . 
7.3.2 PERMANENT MOVEMENT FROM THE FARMS 
Besides migrant labour, another way in which the Ndzundza-Ndbele could benefit from urban 
employment opportunities was by leaving the fanns for good and becoming permanent urban 
dwellers. As the country industrialized in the first ha lf of the 20th century, many jobs were created 
in town. Many blacks did move to town, as is attested by the increase in the proportion of the 
black population that lived there (Duncan 1995:100): between 1921 and 1951 the urban black 
population rose from 657 620 to 2 328 342, or from 14% of the total black population to 27,2%. 
This rise occurred despite official government policy that black migration to the towns should be 
discouraged. as well as restrictions in tenns of the pass laws that limited the rights of blacks to 
settle permanently in the urban areas. According to Duncan (1995), the Department of Native 
Affairs, whose job it was to implement these restrictive measures, did not always do so, among 
other reasons because the officials did not agree with these measures and did not think that they 
were practical. 
Permanent migration to town in most cases probably started as circular migration, which then 
developed into a more permanent arrangement. Reasons why this could occur are dissatisfaction 
with fann labour or the choice of an urban woman as a bride. Circular and permanent migration 
should therefore be seen as two points on a continuum rather than as discrete entities (see 
Gelderblom & Kok 1994). Because of the link between the tWO types of migration. the 
impediments faced by Ndzundza-Ndbele labour tenants in their circular migration (as set o ut in 
7.3.1 above) would also apply to permanent migration. There is another reasons why they would. 
initially, be under-represented in this drift to town. 
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In a discussion oflabour tenancy in the Lydenburg district, which is adjacent to the Middelburg 
district, where most of the Ndzundza-Ndbele labour tenants we are studying lived, Schinner 
(1996: 113-116) emphasises the extent to which the labour tenants themselves were, at least until 
the 1940's, committed to a rural lifestyle. The title of his paper is "What would we be without our 
land and cattle?". As the title suggests, most labour tenants could not easily conceive of a 
meaningful life without access to land and to cattle. Cattle fulfilled important social functions, not 
the least of which was their role in breadwealth payments. It was for this reason very important 
for households to maintain access to land on which to graze cattle. Schirmer (1996: 118) adds to 
this the relative security that flowed from access to land. In contrast to the urban areas, where one 
could easily be fired (there was a very high labour turnover in the unskilled occupations that 
labour tenants would aspire to - Schirmer 1996: 118), access to land at least allowed one to 
survive. Given that for most Ndzundza-Ndbele labour tenancy was the only way in which they 
could initially get access to land and cattle, this explains their initial attachment to the system. 
Since they didn't own the land, and often were caught up in disagreements with the farmer that 
forced them to leave, this security was not absolute. It was certainly less than the security of 
tenure offered to those living on trust land or in locations - although even here black spot and 
betterment removals threatened security of tenure, especially in the Apartheid period. As Schirmer 
(1996:114, 120) points out, it wasn't only the land, however, but also the social relationships 
surrounding the cultivation and holding of land that contributed to this feeling of security. 
Conditions on the fanns were generally harsh, and fanners often used violence to discipline their 
workers (Del ius 1989:243, Van Vuuren 1992: 13). This was tempered by the relatively intimate 
relationship that existed between farmer and tenant (Schirmer 1996:118). Farms were big and 
isolated, with the result that fanner and tenant got to know each other very well, especially s ince 
they grew up together. The labour tenant setup also allowed the tenant some degree of autonomy 
(Schirmer 1996: 114). He and his family were only contracted to work for the farmer for part of 
the year. During the rest of the year the tenant could farm on his own account, and this was highly 
prized by tenants. 
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7.3.3 THE COSTS OF MIGRATION AS AN OBSTACLE TO BOTH THE PERMANENT 
AND CIRCULAR MIGRATION OF NDZUNDZA-NDBELE TO TOWN 
One of the central themes o f this thesis is the constraints faced by those pioneering migration in 
financing the costs involved in doing so. Earlier in this chapter I referred to the high costs of 
migration faced by the I 9!h century Ndzundza·Ndbele migrant labourers to the Eastern Cape and 
the Kimberley diamond fields. At that stage the costs revolved largely around the time and effort 
expended in travel ling to employment and back. as we ll as the dangers and hardships faced on the 
way. The money costs as such were very low to non-existent. During the 20th century, thi s 
situation changed, and the money costs of migration became more prominent. 
This happened despite the major migration destinations (the Witwatersrand and Pretoria) no:v 
being closer and more accessible to migrants from the Southeastern Transvaal than the diamond 
fields and the Eastern Cape were before. As the pass laws became stricter and better policed, the 
trave l documents that migrants had to cany became more extensive. The list now included an 
inoculation certificate , proof of payment of taxes and leave of absence from their farm. Migrants 
had to pay to get these certificates from magistrates and other authorities. On their way to work 
and back, they were often stopped by real or bogus officials who demanded to see their 
certificates, and had to pay real or bogus 'fines' for con-compliance (see Van Onselen 1982: 174). 
With the advent of the railway line between Lourencyo Marques and Pretoria in 1895. it became 
possible to travel from Middelburg to Pretoria by train. This reduced the trave lling time to 
employment opportunities. especially for those who lived c lose to Middelburg, but it also 
introduced a money cost (the train ticket) into the calculus of costs. When the branch line to 
Stofberg was const ructed in 1927 (Morrel 1983:94), it made it eas ier for the people who lived on 
the fanns in and around Kafferskraal to travel to Pretoria and other destinations. In add ition 
migrants had to consider the living costs in the destination area whi le they were looking for work. 
This was unlikely to be very high at that stage however, since the chronic labour shortage o f the 
time made it easy to find employment. 
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Some costs were fixed (such as those involved in getting your travelling documents in order), 
others (such as transport costs) depended on the distance travelled to work. As we saw in chapter 
6, in the first half of the 20" century the Ndzundza·Ndbele were living in a reasonable 
concentrated fashion in the Middelburg and Bethal districts. Relatively few ofthem were living 
in the outlying districts such as Carolina and Ermelo. The core area of Ndzundza·Ndbele 
settlement was relatively close to urban destinations such as Pretoria and the Witwatersrand, 
compared to say, the Transkei , with the result that the distance costs of migration was also lower. 
In addition, there were employment opportunities in the immediate vicinity with even lower 
distance costs, such as those opening up at the beginning of the century on the Witbank and 
Middelburg coal fields. As I pointed out in chapter 3, these costs have to be evaluated in terms 
of the income levels of the prospective migrants, however. Ndzundza·Ndbele labour tenants 
received very little by way of cash wages, and they were initially viewed by their contemporaries 
as being very poor (see p. 168 above), with the result that even modest money costs would have 
been major disincentives to migration for them. This situation changed over time, as we shall see 
in section 7.4.3 , where I also discuss the implications it had for migration. 
These costs could have been met in principle through the actions aflabouc recruiters. According 
to Morrell (1983 :212) the Premier diamond mine near Bronkhorstspruit was active in recruiting 
black labourers from the Middelburg district in the beginning of the twentieth century. Most of 
these workers seem to have been Pedi who lived in the reserve area, however (none of my 
respondents recalled ever working for Premier mines). The coal mines of Wit bank and Middelburg 
were also active in recruiting labourers at the same time (Morrel 1983:211). Since these towns 
were close by, it was also easier to go to them from a costs perspective. Labour recruiters 
provided cash advances to potential migrants as an inducement and arranged transport for them 
(MorreIl1983:2 12, Crush et aI.1991 ). Employers such as the mines and municipalities also often 
provided free (or very cheap) board and lodging to their workers in hostels. This lowered the 
costs of migration, or in the case of cash advances at least made them more affordable (Crush 
1985: 154). 
Because labour recruiters were since 19 I 1 forbidden to recruit in white farming areas in order to 
safeguard the farmers ' labour supply from competition from the mines (Schirroer 1995 :520, Crush 
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et al. 1991 : 138), this avenue was to some extent c losed (0 labour tenants from the white farming 
areas of the Middelburg district. This restriction was flouted during times of exceptional labour 
shortages on the mines and elsewhere, such as the 1940's (Schinner 1995:520). Dunean 
(1995: 132, end note 246) refers to letters written in 1939 by the Department of Agriculture to the 
Departments of Mines and the Interior, as well as the South African Railways and Harbour. 
requesting them not to 'permit recruiting where it would interfere with farmers ' labour 
requirements'. The fact that this letter was deemed necessary. indicates that other employers were 
indeed poaching the farmers' labourers . This was especially common in the period before the 
mines centralised their recruiting operations in 1912 (Crush et al. 1991). At that stage, recruiting 
was largely unregulated and often in the hands of private recruiters, who often 'stole' farm 
labourers (Morrel 1983 :212). 
One can assume that some Ndzundza-Ndbele did get involved in migrant labour in this way. 
although the number seems to be limited. The report of the Native Affairs Department for 1911 
(Union of South Africa 1913) is a useful source in this regard. It gives a breakdown of black 
labourers from the different districts of the Union, their destinations, and whether they travelled 
on their own or were recruited. Concentrating on the two districts with probably the largest 
number ofNdzundza-Ndbele at that time, Bethal and Middelburg, the following picture emerges. 
Of the 1270 workers from Middelburg who travelled to employment elsewhere during that year, 
only 70 were engaged through labour agents. The rest all moved independently. None of the 493 
workers from Bethal were recruited. The numbers are not broken down according to tribal origin, 
so we don't know how many of these workers were Ndbele, rather than Pedi6 . We don't know 
anything about the identity of the recruited workers either. Nevertheless, recruiting does not seem 
to be a very significant factor in the flow ofNdzundza-Ndbele from these districts, at least at this 
stage. One can conclude from this that the costs of migration were, at least in the early years of 
the century, indeed a constraint on Ndzundza-Ndbele participation in labour migration to the 
growing urban economy of the country. 
6 Because Pokwani is listed separately, one can assume that the proportion Ndzundza-
Ndbe1e in the Middelburg figures were high. As was pointed out in chapter 6, Pokwani was 
part of the Middelburg district at that stage, and was home to a large part of Middelburg's 
Pedi population (see the 1909119 10 figures provided in that chapter). 
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The destinations to which these workers travelled are listed in the tables below. It is clear that the 
Witwatersrand was the single biggest destination for both groups of workers. Distance seems to 
be a factor in the selection of destinations. While Pretoria is the closest destination to Middelburg, 
the Witwatersrand is located more advantageously for Bethal residents. This helps to explain the 
low numbers of Bethal, as opposed to Middelburg, workers going to Pretoria. 
Table 7.1 
Destinations to which Middelburg workers travelled - 1911 
Witwatersrsnd Pretoria Otber Transvaal Elsewhere 
Mines 281 148 176 0 
Other 176 235 209 4 
Total 457 383 385 4 
Table 7.2 
Destinations to wbich Betbal workers travelled - 1911 
Witwatersrand Pretoria Other Transvaal Elsewhere 
Mines 23 0 0 0 
Other 248 29 188 4 
Total 271 29 188 4 
Source: Union of South Africa (1913 :84). 
7.3.4 THE DECLINE OF THE LABOUR TENANCY SYSTEM AND THE INCREASED 
MOVEMENT FROM THE FARMS RESULTING FROM THIS 
By the 1940's, the number oftenants still committed to the farming life began to decline. Due to 
the increasing use of tractors, farmers had less need of the draught cattle of the tenants. In 
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addition the expanding market for agricultural products increased the value of agricultural land, 
with the result that farmers became more restrictive with regard to the amount of grazing and 
arable land allocated to tenants, and started putting pressure on them to se ll their cattle (Schirmer 
1996: 136, Morreli 1983: 178). The expanding market had another effect. Farmers started to make 
more demands on the labour time of tenants, with the result that the period that tenants had to 
work for the fanner increased. Contracts for three months labour time in a year became less 
common and were replaced by contracts of up to six mOnlhs. My interviews suggest that until the 
1940's workers were only bound to render four months of free labour on the farms near 
Kafferskraal. By the 1950's this had changed to six months'. 
Another sign that labour tenancy started to come to an end, was the fact that tenants and fanners 
came into conflict over the former's children more frequently. Education in particular became a 
bone of contention (Schirmer 1996: 127, Delius 1989:250). Education became more readily 
avai lable, as schools spread through the rural areas. In De Lagersdrif, the Dutch Reformed Church 
established a school , associated with its mission station, in 1953. Farmers often put up resistance 
to the tenants' children going to school, because they, correctly, realised that it would give those 
chi ldren more alternatives in the urban economy and make them more likely to abscond. Tenants, 
on the other hand, increasingly realised that an education would in future become essential for the 
advancement of their children. In this respect the fathers, especially, undenvent a change of heart , 
as they were previously more concerned about their children looking after the catt le than them 
going to school (Schirmer 1996: 126). 
Increased possibilities for off-farm employment in the booming wartime economy and the laxer 
application of the pass laws (Duncan 1995:99) made it both more attractive and easier to leave 
for an urban job. It is also clear from the evidence provided by Schirrner (1996: 129) about the 
children of labour tenants in Lydenburg that the aspirations of the youth increased at this time. 
More value was placed on Western clothes and other consumer articles, with the result that the 
attractions ofa cash income to be derived from an urban job started to increase. It was therefore 
not surprising that migration to more distant destinations such as Pretoria and Johannesburg 
increased. Whi le older people still worked locally in their off-time, the youth used this time to 
7 Interview with s.s. 
182 
leave for the cities', Migrant labour now became much more of a mass phenomenon, especially 
among the youth. Some of this movement was sanctioned by fanners. Fanners who did not 
previously give passes for longer periods adapted to this pressure for off-fann employment and 
began to give passes for longer periods of employment (Schinner 1996: 130). Much of this 
movement probably was against the wishes of fanners, however. In increasing numbers, children 
left the fanns for long periods, often pennanently. The following case study' of the migration 
history ofS.S.,who was born on the fann Paardekloof in 1926, demonstrates this dynamic : 
When he grew up, tenants worked for 4 months for the fanner and 8 months for 
themselves. He started off-fann employment when he was 19 years old. He took the bus 
from PaardekJoof to Stofberg, got on the train there and went to Pretoria. His parents 
gave him money for the journey, so one can assume that he left with their sanction. His 
uncle, who lived in a back yard shack in Lady Selborne in Pretoria, fetched him at the 
station. S.S. got a job through the intervention of a friend of his uncle, who worked in 
Robert's Heights. Since this was 1945, it was not difficult to find ajob in Robert's Heights 
(Robert's Heights is a previous name for Thaba Tswane, the suburb of Pretoria where all 
the military units are situated.) He worked there continuously until 1949, when he was 
retrenched. The fact that he did not return in that period to work for the fanner does not 
seem to have caused any irreparable conflict between him and the farmer. because when 
he was retrenched, he went back to the farm, and worked for the fanner for 8 months. His 
father kept on working for the fanner during this time. It is unclear whether this 
arrangement satisfied the farmer, or not. When he left again for Pretoria, in 1950, he only 
stayed for 6 months, however. working on the railways, and living in the hostel in 
Potgieter Street. Soon after that his first child, Jan, was born. After six months he returned 
to work on the rann, and continued with this pattern for six years (in the mean time, 
labour tenancy contracts had shifted from 4 months on, 8 months off to 6 monthsl6 
months. On one of these trips he was so cash strapped when he left that he had to travel 
to Pretoria on his bicycle. This trip took him one and a half days. During these six years 
he got married (in 1953) and built a house on Paardekloof. His wife was from 
Kafferskraal, a neighbouring fann . In 1956 he left the job at the railways and started 
working for Zylstra Construction. He worked there for 16 years, until 1972, on the 6 
months/6months system. In that year he came into conflict with the fanner over the labour 
time of his children. His oldest child was then 22, and the second oldest was only 11 . As 
a result of this conflict, he left the fann and came to live in Nkosini. When he tried to go 
back to his job in town, he ran into difficulties with his pass. He was told that he had to 
go back to Nebo and report at the labour bureau to be recruited. He did so, and got ajob 
at Bester construction in Witbank. He worked there for only five months, whereupon he 
got ajob at the Dutch Refonned Church in Faerie Glen in Pretoria, where he still works. 
8 Interview with J.R. 
9 Interview with S.S. 
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This case-study suggests that, by the 1940's, fanners did not necessarily evict the whole family 
when a son of a labour tenant left the fann on a semi-permanent basis. During my interviews I 
came across a few other residents of Nkosini that worked in town for years, whi le the ir 
dependents stayed behind on the fanns. One of these was M.M .. His family lived on Blinkwater 
for 25 years, while he worked elsewhere: first in Springs, then Pretoria and then in the ro ller mill 
in Kafferskraal . During this time his wife worked for the fanner, however, and this seems to have 
satisfied the fanner. Whether these case studies indicate that off-farm employment was less ofa 
problem all along than is suggested in the literature or that it had changed by that time, is difficu lt 
to say. The fact is that when this kind ofoff-fann employment becomes very widespread, there 
is not much farmers can do, given that they cannot evict all their labour tenant fam ilies. 
Returning now to S.S. , the tact that he decided the second time around to return after s ix months, 
suggests that the fanner's dislikes did play a role in how he arranged his migration. It is significant 
that his child was born around the time of his second migration. Perhaps his new responsibilities 
as father impressed on him the need to ensure a secure base for the mother of his child, which 
made it important that he maintained a good relationship with the fanner. That the issue of the 
employment of children, whether that be the employment of school going children or of adults, 
was a cause for confl ict, is attested by the fact that S.S. eventually left Paardekloof because of 
differences with the fanner about this issue. 
It is clear that by the 1950's, labour tenancy ceased to be a setup that could (within the constraints 
of the generalised powerlessness of black people) accommodate both the interest of white farmers 
in a cheap labour force and the des ire of black tenants fo r access to land . The system did not 
co llapse overnight, however. Most of the residents ofNkosini left the farms only during the 1960's 
and 1970's, as was pointed out previously in chapter 6. Labour tenancy was only officially 
abo lished in 1967 in the Middelburg district(Surplus People Project 1983: 120). Nevertheless, the 
history of the Ndzundza-Ndbele as labour tenants on white farms slowly started to come to an 
end. As conflict escalated between tenants and farmers about grazing for cattle and the labour 
power of the youth, farmers began to evict ri sing numbers of tenants (Del ius 1989:250). At the 
same time more and more tenants started to leave out of their own accord. Besides the factors 
184 
mentioned already, there were further reasons for this parting of the ways. Technological 
advances such as herbicides and harvester combines reduced the labour needs offarmers. The new 
technologies were introduced, as one can expect, for reasons of profitability I but this should not 
only be understood in the conventional sense. According to the fanners, the new generation of 
labour tenants were increasingly becoming deskilled as far as traditional technologies were 
concerned"-Jt became less common to find a person with the skills to inspan oxen among the new 
generation of fann workers. This is probably not surprising. given that the youth's motivation to 
work on farms fell as their aspirations for urban wages increased. 
As we recall from the previous chapter, the Ndzundza-Ndbele had in the mean time acquired 
access to trust land in the area around Nkosini. For the first time since their defeat by the ZAR 
. sixty years ago, the Ndzundza-Ndbele had an alternative rural base, apart from labour tenancy on 
white farms. Many of them left for the trust land, as it provided some (albeit increasingly limited) 
grazing for their cattle, and an alternative rural base from which to engage in migrant labour. 
Those with fewer rural assets to defend presumably were more inclined to move away on a more 
permanent basis to the growing urban areas, although, as Schirmer (1996) points out, the 
distinction between migrant labour and permanent migration was probably not always so clear cut: 
quite a few 'permanent' urban migrants still had cattle that grazed on white farms where some of 
their relatives worked or on the trust land. 
7.4 THESELECTIVlTY OF MIGRATION DURING THE LABOUR TENANCY YEARS 
(UNTIL ABOUT 1945) 
It is appropriate now to review the argument about selectivity that serves as a connecting thread 
throughout this thesis. Massey and his co-workers believe that the selectivity of migration changes 
as the migration stream matures. They distinguish between two stages in the development of a 
migration stream, with two corresponding states of selectivity. During the first stage, participation 
in migration is low in the community oforigio. Exposure to migration isjust beginning during this 
stage. The migration stream is very selective because the costs and risks of migration are relatively 
10 Interview with J.R. 
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high. Only a few individuals in the community among those motivated to migrate can afford to 
take on these costs 11 , Later, as migration becomes more diffused throughout the community. the 
costs of migration are reduced because those who are a lready in the destination area help those 
who have been left behind to migrate as well. Because of the operation of migrant networks the 
costs of migrat ion are now less of a barrier lO those who want to move. This is the second stage 
distinguished by Massey et al. in the development of migration from the area of orig in to a 
particular destination. During this stage, the migration stream is less select ive. 
In my discuss ion ofMassey et al. ' s theory I said that I agree with their characterisation of the first 
stage in the development of select ivity, but that the model should be modified with respect to the 
last stage. This is because the poorest are likely to be excluded from migrant networks, with the 
result that the costs of migration will continue to be an obstacle to their migration. The selectiv ity 
of migration will consequently not be reduced for people in this category. 
The history of the Ndzunza-Ndhele ' s invo lvement in migrant labour, as it was revealed in the 
above discuss ion, makes it clear that the community of Nkosini never, as a community, 
experienced the first stage in the development of migration, as delineated by both Massey et a l. 
and myself. The residents of Nkosini generally became involved in migrant labour before they 
moved to Nkosini. In fact , their ancestors were participants in the migrant labour system a few 
generations before that, as we saw in the beginning of thi s chapter. This movement came to an 
end upon their defeat and subsequent indenture in 1883 . It did restart slowly during the course 
o f the nineteenth century, as we saw above, and by the time people moved to Nkosini , they were 
heavily involved in migrant labour. There was consequently never a stage in the life of the 
community ofNkosini qua community when labour migration hadjust started - it started earlier. 
before the community was formed . As I sha ll point out below, thi s complicates the study of 
selectivity considerably. 
The information about work histories collected as part of my survey confirms that labour 
11 Massey et a l. believe, as do many others, that the wealthiest individuals in a 
community are unl ikely to be among the migrants. The people most likely to move initially are 
those who are not too poor that they cannot afford the costs of migration but poor enough so 
that access to urban employment opportunities wi ll improve their income. 
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migration started before Nkosini was formed. In interpreting this information it is necessary to 
arrive at a cut off date by which one can say that the early stages" of the community 's migration 
histoty is finished. In the case ofNkosini, the end of the 1970's suggests itself as the most likely 
date. Readers will recall from the discussion in chapter 6 that very little in-migration took place 
to Nkosini during the first few decades of the community's existence. In-migration only took off 
during the 1960's, with most people arriving during that decade and in the 1970's. By the end of 
the 1970's most of the originators of the existing households had arrived and the population of 
Nkosini had stabilised significantly. Ifwe concentrate on people who arrived until the end of the 
1970's and who were adults at the time, the following picture emerges: 
Twenty three people arrived as adults in Nkosini from elsewhere. Of three of these I don ' t 
have any information about the time of their arrival in Nkosini or their work histories. Of 
the other twenty, only five were not active as migrant labourers by the time they came to 
live in Nkosini (one of these started out upon arriving here)I), These five were al l female, 
and except for one whose husband deserted her upon arriving there, all had husbands who 
were employed as migrant workers. Except for the one who took up migrancy upon 
arrival, these five were all working on the farms as domestics before they came here. The 
other 15 were working in town (mostly Pretoria, although a few were also working on the 
East Rand, and in Middelburg and Johannesburg). 
To this figure we must add the three people in my sample who were born in Nkosini and who 
were adults before the end of the 1970's. This is in order to get a picture of the migration of 
everybody in Nkosini who were capable of labour migration at the time. All three of these were 
involved in migrant labour at some" stage before the end of the 1970's. 
Massey et al. 's first stage consequently does not apply to Nkosini as a community, but predates 
it. By the time Nkosini was formed, its residents were already in the second stage, the stage of 
mass migration. In order to present the data, I am therefore going to distinguish between three 
phases in the development ofNkosini migration: the first phase when they were still living as 
12 What I call the first phase in the history ofNkosini's involvement in migrant labour is 
not the same as that meant by Massey et al. when they talk about the first stage in the 
development of labour migration. It is my attempt to identify a relatively stable stage in the 
beginning of the community' s history. 
\3 A few women, for whom moving to Nkosini coincided with marriage, stopped their 
involvement in migrant labour when they moved there. 
14 People who were only intermittently involved in migrant labour during this period 
were also counted as migrants. 
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labour tenants on farms (unt il around 1945), the second phase when they were already engaged 
in mass migration but had just arrived in Nkosin i (that is, from 1945 to 1979), and the present day 
situation. 
The type of community that Massey et al. have in mind fo r their descript ion of the initial stage of 
migration is a more stable peasant community that offers alternative employment opportunities 
so that community members do not need to leave to work somewhere else in order to survive. 
Agriculture in particular would be a viable alternative to outmigrat ion. Nkosini never sati sfied 
these criteri a. Because oflimitations on land avai labili ty and the distance of the community from 
avai lable land (see chapter 6 above), the possibilities for agriculture are limited and have been so 
since the inception of the community, even though more land was avai lable initially. According 
to James ( 1987:65), more agricultural land was available shortly after 1943 when the Trust bought 
the farms that became the Mahlangu tribal area than at present. She is speaking specifically about 
the situation in the village she studied, Morotse, but this would also have applied to Nkosini 
because the agricultural land allocated to residents of Nkos ini are close to Morotse (the 
topography of the area around Nkosini makes cultivation impossible). As a result more farming 
was done initially. As residents streamed into the area, less land was available for each household, 
however. This was confirmed by betterment planning done by the Trust, which continually shrunk 
the amount of land for cultivation allocated to each household. Even at the beginning, there was 
not enough land avai lable to residents of Nkosini to make migrant labour to distant places 
unnecessary. This situation decreed that, if people did not have jobs by the time they came to 
Nkosini , they had to find them fast in order to survive. 
The lack of agricultural resources was not the only reason why Nkosini residents were so strongly 
involved in migrant labour since the community ' s inception. Another factor was the absence of 
old age pen sions in the early years. In contrast to the present situat ion, where many households 
in the rural areas depend very strongly on pensions for their survival, old age pensions did not 
feature as a source of income to rural black people in those years. The state started providing 
pensions for rural blacks only from the mid-1960's (Delius 1996: I SO). Given the lack of local 
opportunities for survival, there was therefore litt le by way of an alternative to migrant labour in 
those days if a household was going to survive. 
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The fact that Massey et al. 's first phase cannot be applied to the community ofNkosini is not, in 
itself, problematic for their theory. The problems thrown up here are an artifact of the peculiar 
unit of analysis applied rather than a reality. The unit of analysis, the community ofNkosini, did 
not exist before the late 1930's. It is the product ofinmigration l' from the surrounding farms. The 
fact that labour migration to distant destinations existed before the community came into being 
does not falsify the idea of two distinct phases as such, but merely suggests that the unit of 
analysis should be changed for the discussion of the first phase. Ideally speaking we need to go 
back a generation or two to the labour tenancy setup in order to trace the beginning of migrant 
labour to distant destinations. 
In this endeavour we are hamstrung by a lack of data, however. The information with regard to 
the period preceding their arrival in Nkosini is particularly sketchy. and is restricted to the 
historical information presented in section 7.3 above. There is another problem, however, which 
relates to the measurement ofseiectivity. Massey et a1.'s argument is that there is a particular 
pattern of migrant selectivity that corresponds to each phase of the development of migration and 
it is especially important, in the light ofthe focus of this thesis, to get some picture of selectivity 
in the first phase of migration. Ideally speaking we need information about the demographic 
characteristics of the migrant stream, as well as the characteristics of the community of origin, 
since selectivity is measured by comparing those two (see chapter 3 above). [fthe characteristics 
of the two are different, migration can be said to be selective. If the two are similar. migration is 
not selective. With regard to data about the community of origin, the unit of analysis problem 
rears its head again. The community of origin for Nkosini residents is, given that labour migration 
started before the community was formed, a virtual community, consisting of individuals spread 
throughout the Middelburg district and beyond and who, themselves or through their children, 
eventually came to live in Nkosini. Needless to say, it is in principle difficult to get information 
about such a group of people. [n addition, it is difficult to get information about the characteristics 
IS Care must be taken not to confuse the two kinds of migration we are dealing with 
here. The focus of the selectivity argument is on labour migration to a distant locale. The 
inmigration of people into Nkosini in order to live there is totally different for our purposes. It 
is similar to their previous movement frorn farm to farm in order to find more congenial 
surroundings. Even though selectivity might be a factor here as well, in the sense that 
particular kinds of people probably chose to live here rather than elsewhere, we shall not 
pursue this selectivity in the context of the present argument. 
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of the migrants who themselves, or represented through their children. later became Nkosini 
residents. 
Because comparing data about such vaguely defined entities is going to be difficuh, if not 
impossible, I am therefore not in a position to say much about the selectivity of migration of the 
labour migrants originating in the virtual community of future Nkosini res idents. The only 
information that I have relates to the Ndzundza·Ndbele in general. It is their selectivity that I shall 
now pursue. 
When one surveys the history ofNdzundza-Ndbele migration, it is apparent that the restrictions 
imposed on their migration played an important role in structuring its form. While they were living 
on the fanns as labour tenants the Ndzundza-Ndbele were to some extent, especially in the early 
years of this century, a captive labour force. As we saw above, these restrictions were often 
flouted , but they must neverthe less have had an impact. It is this impact, among others, that will 
feature in my discussion of the different kinds of selectivity in the next few pages. 
7.4.1 GENDER SELECTIVITY DURING THE LABOUR TENANCY YEARS 
The historical discussion presented above makes it clear that when migration hadjust started. men 
were more likely to be migrants than women. This was because, while living on the farms, men 
had more opportunities for migration. They were more readily given passes for off-fann 
employment by fanners, while legal restrictions contained in laws such as the Urban Areas Act 
and the Native Service Contract Act discriminated against the migration of women. Parents were 
a lso more open to sanctioning the absence of sons than of daughters. Wives , in addition, were 
expected to be at the side of their husbands. The reason for this seems to be primarily patriarchal 
attitudes that prescribed that a woman's place is in the home (see the references to Schinner 1995 
and 1996 above). These attitudes were not restricted to the Ndzundza-Ndbele, as my citations of 
Sozzoli ( 199 1 :89) in chapter 3 above makes clear. Bozzoli reports that women in the area around 
Phokeng in the current Northwest Province were not allowed by chiefs to purchase train tickets. 
It is not clear how relevant the other factor , which was isolated in chapter 3 as being responsible 
for the initial lack of women in migrant streams, is in this context. This factor is the gender 
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division oflabour in agriculture. Although women certainly worked on the fields during the period 
oflabour tenancy, and fulfilled an important role during harvesting and in hoeing the crops in the 
growing season, it is not clear that th.is can be a reason for fanners being less inclined to let them, 
rather than the men, go. One possibility is that the contribution of women may have been needed 
more consistently during the year (hoeing during the off-season, for example) but in the absence 
of more information about the gender division of labour on white farms, this remains mere 
speculation. A factor that certainly did play a role was the function of women as domestic 
workers. The fact that there is no off-season for this kind of work must have helped to disqualify 
them from off-farm employment. 
In the previous paragraph I have catalogued a list of restrictions that initially would have made 
women less likely to be labour migrants than men. As we saw. these restrictions range from the 
macro level (such as the pass laws) to the micro levels of the farm and the tenant household. 
These impediments add a new dimension to the study of selectivity. Massey et al.'s theory explains 
the selectivity of migration largely with reference to the costs and risks of migration. Except for 
the attention it gives to border controls, it assumes that labour is, in principle. mobile. This clearly 
was not the case for women in labourtenant households in the early years of the previous century. 
More attention will be given to this issue in paragraph 7.4.3 
7.4.2 AGE SELECTIVITY DURING THE LABOUR TENANCY YEARS 
It has emerged above that young people were the pIoneers m migrant labour to distant 
destinations. This escalated in the 1940's during the labour tenancy years as farmers and the ir 
tenants more often came into conflict about the labour time of the youth. The youth. because of 
their greater aspirations for a cash income, preferred to work in the towns during the off-season 
rather than on neighbouring farms. 
7.4.3 INCOME SELECTIVITY DURING THE LABOUR TENANCY YEARS 
In section 7.3.3 it became evident that the costs of migration were an obstacle to Ndzundza-
Ndbele labour migration, not because they were so high but because the Ndzundza-Ndbele had 
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such low cash incomes ini tially. In order to evaluate the extent of income selectivity experienced 
in Ndzundza-Ndbele migration streams, it is necessary to gather information about the cash 
incomes received by them later on. This will give an indication of how common migration to 
distant destinations subsequently became, as well as the potential for selectivity that existed in that 
period. During the first ha lfofthe 20lh century, the Ndzundza-Ndbele participated in two distinct. 
yet closely related, economies. The one re lated to their work as tenants on farms, as wel l as the 
farmi ng they could do on their own account. The other resulted from the periods of otT-farm 
employment they were allowed, and that were, as we saw above, the major sources of a cash 
income for them. The two economies are related because wages earned through off-farm 
employment could be used to buy cattle. Catt le, on the other hand, could be sold for cash. In the 
next few paragraphs I shall look at each of these two kinds of economic activity to see what role 
they played in the migration process. 
Because off-farm employment was in the immediate vicinity of the farms at first , we can separate 
this logically (as an independent variable) from labour migration to distant destinations, which is 
our dependent variable. It seems that employment in the vicinity was generally a precondit ion for 
employment in more distant destinations, because this was the most likely way for tenants to 
acquire the cash necessary for the move. The extent to which this was allowed varied, as was 
pointed out in section 7.3.1 , with the result that the restrictions on mobility from farms affected 
migrant labour not only directly , but also indirectly, in the sense that it also rendered its precursor 
and necessary condition, off-farm employment in the vicinity, very difficult. 
Besides off-farm employment, cattle accumulation was another method for the Ndzundza-Ndbele 
to finance the money costs of migration. We know that after they were defeated, the Ndzundza-
Ndbele lost all their cattle. During the course of the twentieth century, they started to accumulate 
cattle. By the 1940's and 1950's the size of the cattle herds of tenants became a point of conflict 
between tenants and white fanners. Fanners had less need of the draught power of tenants' catt le. 
as they mechanised, while they were less willing to provide valuable agricultural land for the 
tenants to graze their cattle on. We therefore have a picture of re latively little differentiation 
initially in the farming economy initially, followed by increasing differentiation, which came to an 
end again from the middle of the century as tenants were increasingly squeezed by the growing 
192 
capital and land intensity of white agriculture, as well as legal provisions against sharecropping 
and labour tenancy. This is the general picture of rural differentiation. This process did not 
necessarily occur in such a unilinear fashion for all tenants, however (Beinart & Delius 1986:38-
39). As we saw above, for example, rich tenants were more likely to live on the land of poor 
farmers because the latter had less bargaining power in their dealings with tenants. The land of 
poor fanners was therefore often a haven for rich tenants squeezed by these processes, wit~ the 
result that some of them could resist these forces working for their dispossession. Over the long 
run, however, the direction of change was clear: towards increasing dispossession of labour 
tenants. As the availabil.ity of a rural income decreased, exposure to a wage income earned 
elsewhere became more necessary. Those who were lucky and who already had access to such 
an income were obviously in a better position to survive the end of the labour tenancy system. 
It is thus clear that until the middle of the previous century, the number of people with the income 
needed to finance migration would have increased. This, together with the growth of networks 
would have made the income selectivity of migration less over time. We can therefore postulate 
a move from high income selectivity of migration initially, to lower selectivity over time. If there 
had been a significant amount of recruiting of migrants by the mines and other organisations, 
income selectivity should not have been very high in the beginning since it would have lowered 
the costs of migration. As we saw in pp. 178-180 above, there does not seem to have been much 
recruitment, so it is unlikely to have influenced the composition of the migrant stream 
significantly, however. 
Another factor, besides recruiting, that would have had an impact on income selectivity was the 
restrictions on the mobility of Ndzundza-Ndbele labour tenants. It became apparent in my 
discussion above that these restrictions varied over time, between regions and between farms and 
depended on factors such as the legal framework, the Willingness of government to enforce laws, 
and the bargaining position of tenants. The ease with which a labour tenant could leave the fann 
was therefore partly detennined by extraneous factors, in other words factors whose severity did 
not directly depend on the income of the tenant. Or to put it differently, migration was difficult 
for labour tenants, not only because of costs, but also because of restrictions on mobility that 
varied, at least partly, independently of costs and income. In so far as this was the case, the 
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income of the tenant household would not have been the only factor influencing their ability to 
undertake migration and this would have reduced the impact of income selectivity. However. 
there were causal links between income and mobility restrictions, running in opposite directions, 
which limited the extent to which these restrictions would have reduced the income selec tivity of 
migration. In the first place, better off tenants would have been in a better bargaining position vis 
a vis the fanner than their poorer cousins, and thus could overcome these restrictions more readily 
than the latter, Off-farm income, furthermore, was an increasingly important part of household 
income over the years, and this depended, as we saw, on the restrictions imposed by fanners. As 
a resu lt, the tendency for migration to be selective in terms of income would be reduced, but not 
by as much as otherwise would have been the case. 
7.5 INVOLVEMENT IN MIGRANT LABOUR IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE 
NKOSINI COMMUNITY 
The period that I am covering in this phase is from about 1945 to the end of the 1970's. It is more 
complex to measure selectivity over a period oftime, rather than at a specific date, because it may 
change over this period. Given that the community I am studying arose out ofinrnigration frQm 
the farms and materialized over this period, I do not have any other option. The question I am 
concerned with in this phase is whether the individual concerned was involved in migrant labour 
at the time slhe moved to Nkosini. The move to Nkosini could have been at any time over these 
35 years. The information that I gain from this is only an indirect measure of income selectivity. 
Migration is an innovation that diffuses through the community of origin. I f I know that there are 
some households that have not yet produced migrants, I can deduce that there is some amount 
of selectivity of migration as far as income inequality between households are concerned. Given 
that I do not have information about whether those households are rich or poor, it will however 
be difficult to say anything about which kinds of households are selected and which kinds not. 
7.5.1 GENDER SELECTIVITY DURING THE EARL Y YEARS 
According to Schinner (1996: 132), women started to leave the farms in the Lydenburg district 
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from the 1940's onwards. Initially this movement was quite limited, but over time numbers started 
to increase. Speaking about the whole ofSekhukhuneland. of which Nkosini forms the southern, 
Ndbele-speaking extreme, Oelius (1996: 148) claims that the mass migration of women to work 
in town started in the 1960's. Certainly by the 1970's a large part of the women in my sample were 
active in migration, although there was still a greater tendency for men to engage in labour 
migration than women. Of the twenty three people in my sample who were adults and who were 
living in Nkosini by the end of the 1970's, four people, who were all female, did not engage in 
migrant labour at some stage or another during that period. These four did work, but on the white 
farms. Of the twelve women who worked elsewhere, eight stopped doing so upon marriage (or, 
upon moving to Nkosini). Ideas about the proper place ofa wife in the family clearly played a role 
in regulating their migratory behaviour. 
7.5.2 INCOME SELECTIVITY OURING THE EARLY YEARS 
Only five adults were not migrant workers when they came to Nkosini, and these were all women 
who had husbands who were working elsewhere (one of these was subsequently deserted by her 
husband when he went to look for work). This suggests that there were no households who did 
not engage in migrant labour over this period at one stage or another. and that the migration 
innovation had diffused throughout the community. It is, however, very difficult to know what 
to make of this information. In the black rural areas, the pattern is that households who cannot 
provide for themselves tend to merge with households who do. In the light of the importance in 
areas such as Nkosini of a migrant labour income for survival, it is unlikely that households that 
failed to send migrants would still be around to be observed many years later when I did my 
survey. There is also the likelihood of self-selection. Only those households who already had 
access to migration are likely to have moved from the farms to Nkosini out of their own accord 
(as opposed to those who were evicted). If the households who had moved to Nkosini were all 
involved in migrant labour. it does therefore not mean that the Ndzundza-Ndbele in general could 
be said to be in the phase of mass migration. It must also be noted that I am taking about a period 
of 25 years here, and not a cross-section of Nkosini residents at any particular time. Having 
migrated once is no guarantee that a household will continue to migrate, given that all kinds of 
disasters, such as retrenchment, can occur. The conclusion one can draw from this discussion is 
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that it seems as if there was no income selecti vi ty by the time the phaseofmass migration arri ved, 
based on the observation that no household was reported to he uninvolved in migration, but that 
interpretation problems cast some doubt about the validity of this observation. 
It is evident that migrant networks played an important role in reduc ing the income select ivity of 
migrat ion in th is period . The case study presented on p. 182 is an eloquent demonstration of the 
importance of migrant networks. S.S. was given the money to pay for transport by his parents. 
He was fetched at the station by his uncle, in whose shack he slept initially and he got his first job 
through the good offices of a fri end of his uncle. Without the intervention o f these contacts, S.S. 
would have found it difficuh to migrate successfully. Similar stories were told to me endless ly by 
my respondents - in fac t I did not find a single case in which a migrant gained entry into the urban 
environment in a different fashion. This suggests that migrant networks were we ll developed by 
the time people moved to Nkosini. Readers will recall that in chapter 6 it became evident that 
Nkosini residents mostly originated on farms close to Nkosini (the Kafferskraal fanns), and that 
in this respect they were probably not representative of the movement of the majority of the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele into the Mahlangu tribal area. I concluded that their more concentrated 
settlement pattern facil itated the growth of strong rural networks, characterised by high density 
and intensity. These rural networks could easi ly have been extended into migrant networks, which 
suggests that Nkosin i residents were in an advantageous pos ition, in tenns of access to migration, 
re lative to others who were not so well integrated into networks (see chapter 4 for a discussion 
of the migration enhancing effect of dense and intense local support networks). This helped to 
reduce the income selectivity of the migration ofNkosini residents. This observation points to a 
dimension of network dynamics that has not yet received attention in the lite rature reviewed in 
chapter 4 : restrictions on the fann-to-fann mobi lity of potential migrants, as occurred in the case 
ofNdzundza-Ndbele labour tenants, can limit their ab ility to live in the vicinity offamily members, 
and thus restrain their ab il ity to cultivate networks. Conversely, those who succeed in 
overcoming these restrictions to some extent, are in a better posi tion with regard to the 
maintenance of networks. 
The question ari ses why all households seemingly could ga in access to migrant networks, given 
my earlier insistence that the poorest would be excluded from them. In the absence of more 
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information about the functioning of these networks at that time, one can only speculate. I have 
already alluded to one explanation above, which is that Nkosini residents were better integrated 
into networks than other Ndzundza-Ndbele labour tenants. It could also be the case that their 
networks corresponded at that stage more closely to Sahlins's category of generalized reciprocity 
(see chapter 4 above). When this kind of exchange is practised, less emphasis is put on the need 
to reciprocate, with the result that those who are unable to reciprocate would not be banished 
from the network so readily. Such an assertion would make sense in the light afmy discussion 
below (in section 7.6.3) of the changes that have occurred in Ndzundza-Ndbele networks as they 
have become more integrated into the urban, industrial economy. In that section I point out how 
the original Ndzundza-Ndbele homestead structure was eroded, with a concomitant decline in the 
intensity of mutual help networks. Since the period we are discussing in the current section is 
. largely located before those changes, it is not unlikely that network support was more 
unconditional then than at present. 
The distinction made above between those households who left the farms out of choice and those 
who were evicted from the farms has implications for differentiation. It is not unlikely, as James 
(1987) claims, that the former engaged in migration to urban destinations much more from a 
position of strength than the latter. Those who were evicted were forced to find waged work 
quickly if they did not already have access to such jobs, with the result that both their move to 
Nkosini and their further labour migration was unprepared and an act of distress (see chapter 5 
above for a discussion of the inequality producing effect of push as opposed to pull migration). 
James (1987) uses this distinction to support her argument that the early migrants from the farms 
to Morotse, a closer settlement not far from Nkosini, were more likely to be better off after their 
move than the later migrants. More of them left of their own accord, and arrived at a stage before 
the pressure on cattle herding by tenants intensified. Their herds were therefore larger than those 
of later arrivals. 
Up to now I have tried to keep the migration to Nkosini and labour migration to distant locations 
separate. It is impossible to study selectivity without separating these movements. These two 
were, however, closely linked historically, and in their combination, had the potential to worsen 
inequality. The link between the two is that, prior to their move to Nkosini, households were not 
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full y committed to labour migration. The wages earned during the off-season were merely a 
supplement to the agricu ltural produce of their own plots on the farms (and the other types of in-
kind remuneration they received from the farmer). They were also generally prevented from 
working elsewhere on a sustained basis (as we saw above). It is difficult to be promoted in ajob 
that one cannot occupy for more than a few months every year, which was the case for Ndzundza-
Ndbele labour tenants. After leaving for Nkosini , househo lds were fo rced to depend much more 
on a wage income for their survival on the one hand, and they had much more freedom to pursue 
opportunities in wage labour on the other. Those who left earlier could establish themselves better 
in urban labour markets than the others who were still labour tenants, at a time when the booming 
economy of the period between the 1940s and the 1960s offered many opportunities for doing so. 
By being in the front of the queue, so to speak, their networks could acquire more resources and 
advance the migration of add itional household members more successfully. This is another 
outcome of the fact that Nkosini res idents were involved in migrant labour before they came to 
live in Nkosini , and clearly. not one that Massey et ai's model of migration allows fo r. 
As a group, the Ndzundza-Ndbele of the South Eastern Transvaal (compared to those living in 
the early version of Kwandbele north of Pretoria, as well as other groups) became involved in 
migrant labour at a late stage. This applies even to the earliest urban migrants among them (in the 
1940's). Their position on the farm s limited both their commitment to urban occupations (given 
thei r self-perception as rural people) and their ability to find and then pursue them. After being 
tota lly immobi lized on the farms for fi ve years, they became labour tenants. As such, they were 
not allowed to leave the farms for more than a few months every year, which limited their upward 
mobili ty. As we saw, the costs of migration further constrained the labour migration of the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele, especially in the beginning when the cash incomes they earned were low. Their 
late transformat ion as fully committed urban workers also limited the amount of training they 
could acquire for urban occupations. After migrating to Nkosini the Ndzundza-Ndbele did not 
face these obstacles any more, but by then they were already inserted into unskilled occupations, 
with the result that this disability endured into the later years. As we saw in our discussion of 
network channelling, such inherited disadvantages can be reproduced over time through migrant 
networks. 
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That the Ndzundza-Ndbele were limited to unskilled occupations is confinned by Van Vuuren 
(1992:14-15), who mentions the clustering of the Ndzundza-Ndbele in occupations such as 
building work (and domestic service for women). especially in the earlier period. Of my own 
sample ofNkosini residents, all the older women (over 50 years old) who worked were employed 
as domestics. The men were mostly employed in roller mills, in building work, and in brickmaking. 
Other jobs that were mentioned were working in a butchery, repairing fridges, gardening, cattle 
herder, janitor, body guard for a Kwandbele taxi boss or working in a nursery. Two worked for 
Spoomet, one worked in a steel factory in Johannesburg, and one worked for ISCOR. One 
reported working for the TPA and one worked in the tribal office. Except for those who worked 
in the steel industry, Spoomet or the TPA (these jobs provided more security and possibilities for 
upward mobility) almost all of them were confined to jobs that offered few possibilities for 
promotion. From this one can deduce that the Ndzundza-Ndbele were disadvantaged by their late 
entry into urban occupations and that this disadvantage endured into their residence in Nkosini. 
7.6 PRESENT DAY INVOLVEMENT IN MIGRANT LABOUR 
It has emerged in the previous section that by the time the community started, its members were 
deeply involved in migrant labour. Over time, this involvement has been maintained at high levels 
so that presently, many Nkosini residents are migrants. The network of fonner migrants that 
prospective migrants could draw upon to lower the costs of migration contributed to maintaining 
the high levels ofmigrancy, as suggested by Massey et al. In this section I investigate the spatial 
form of present day migrancy from Nkosini, as well as the impact that networks have on its 
selectivity. The necessity for migration flows from the absence of local income earning 
opportunities, which is what I address in a brief interlude below. 
In Nkosini itself there is almost no economic activity. Besides the local shop or work as a taxi 
driver. the only other options are driver or gardener for the chief, and building-work. The roller-
mills at the cooperative near Luckau and in Stofberg are other possibilities. In addition, white 
fanners in the vicinity recruit seasonal labour (Surplus People Project 1983). The closest town 
of any significance is Groblersdal , which is about 40 km's away. There is a daily bus service to 
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Groblersdal, but it is very slow since the bus stops at a ll the villages on the way lO Groblersdal. 
There are also taxi 's that go to Groblersdal. A sing le taxi-trip to Groblersdal costed about R7,90 
in 1996. There seems to be only a limited amount of commuting to Groblersdal, as we ll as to the 
handful of employment opportunities offered by surrounding vi llages (government employment 
in Nebo, shebeens, bott le Slores, shops and taxis elsewhere). Commuters to Groble rsdal are more 
likely to move to Tafe lkop, which is a large village on the road to Groblersdal. 
7.6.1 SPATIAL ASPECTS OF MIGRANCY FROM NKOSINI 
The destinations to which migrams l 6 from Nkosini travel are li sted in the table below (table 7.3). 
16 I identified migrants by enumerating all the children of senior household members 
who now live or work elsewhere (whether their absence is permanent or temporary), plus 
those senior household members who currently do so. This assumes that all of them lived in 
Nkos ini at some stage, which is, generally. a safe assumption. The senior household members 
have, with few exceptions. been living here for decades, so one can expect their children to 
have grown up here as well. In a few cases there were grandchildren who were old enough to 
be migrants, but these were not enumerated. This method of identi fy ing migrants (and non-
migrants) is different from the one commonly used (where respondents are asked to name 
those who belong to their househo ld and who are absent), in the sense that it wi ll capture, in 
addition, many of those who have since established ho useholds of the ir own elsewhere. Those 
senior household members, and their children, who have since left Nkosini for good will sti ll 
escape this net, of course. There does not seem (Q have been many of these, however. 
Gathering data about the migratory behaviour of family members of respondents was 
necessary for another reason: fami ly connect ions play a vital role in the formation of migrant 
networks. In this respect I was particularly interested in knowing whether potential migrants 
from Nkosin i had connections in town that were in principle, if not necessaril y in practice, 
ava ilable to facilita te their migrat ion. See my discuss ion of this aspect below. 
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Table 7.3 
Migration destinations of Nkosini residents (current migrants) 
Pretoria Johannesburg East Rand 
46 18 27 
Kwdbl& p* Kwdbl& ER* Kwdblonly 
7 I 5 
n = 115 
*WtbklMdbrg = WitbanklMiddelburg 
*Kwdbl & P = Kwandbele and Pretoria 





Comparing this table with table 7.1 , it is clear that Pretoria has assumed a much stronger position 
as a migration destination over the years. This is in part due to the declining importance ofmining 
employment. As I pointed out, mining employment was very unpopular and served generally only 
as a point of entry into the urban economy. Already in 1911 , Pretoria was the most important 
source of non-mining employment, as table 7.1 indicates. 
As the above table (table 7.3) begins to show, Nkosini residents participate in migratory moves 
which are extremely complex and sometimes very ambiguous. Movement to Kwandbele is one 
example of this. In total 13 people moved to Kwandbele. This total consists of 5 who left fo r 
Kwandbele only and a further 8" who moved to Kwandbele and another place. Because 
Kwandbele is much closer to Pretoria than Nkosini . it is a better place to seek work from 
(interview with G.M. , see De Wet [1 995: 186) for a similar comparison of two communities in 
the Eastern Cape, one within commuting distance of East London and another too far for 
commuting to be possible). People commute on a daily basis to Pretoria from Kwandbele. This 
is different from the situation in Nkosini where people only come home on month ends. News 
17 This includes one person who lives in Soshanguve. Soshanguve is a peri-urban 
settlement near Pretoria that does not fonm part of Kwandbele. 
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about new employment opportunities received from town are therefore much fresher ifone's base 
is Kwandbele than if it is Nkosin i. Once one has found work in Kwandbele, the possibilities for 
daily commuting to town makes it an easier place to combine work and family life. Because 
Kwandbele was a homeland area, it was not subject to influx control and it was relati vely easy to 
get a res idential site there. This suggests why there was some outmigration from Nkosini to 
Kwandbele. As we saw in the previous chapter, Kwandbele was the official homeland of the 
Ndzundza·Ndbele. Those who have been enumerated as leaving for K wandbele only do not have 
a job in town, and are unemployed. or housewives, or, in one case, a teacher. Those listed as 
combining residence in Kwandbe le and another place are those who use the former as a base to 
commute to Pretoria and (in one case) the East Rand. 
The latter case demonst rates the complexity of migratory moves. She (S.M .)u has a house in 
Kwandbe le that her husband uses to commute (presumably) on a daily bas is to Ekangala, an 
industrial area near Bronkhorstspruit. She, by contrast, works in Kempton Park as a domestic and 
is, due to the distance and lack of transport to that p lace, not able to come home more than once 
a week. In this case movement to Kwandbele implied also a commitment to long distance, 
weekly, commuting to another destination. 
There is another example of such complexity involving Kwandbele. J.M.19 lives in a hostel in 
Pretoria, and has consequent ly been enumerated as having left for Pretoria. He is not pennanently 
employed and survives doing piece jobs. He is unmarried, but has three children with the same 
women. whom he still sees. She lives in KwaMahlanga, Kwandbele. The chi ldren live with their 
mother. He seems to have three places that he can call home: his parents' home in Nkosini. his 
hostel room in Pretoria, and his wife's place in KwaMahlanga. This ambiguity20 in the definition 
of his place of reside nee seems to be a result of his inabi li ty to consolidate his res idence anywhere 
in particular - he probably does not earn enough to get married and bui ld his own house. 
18 Interview with S.M . 
19 Interview with J.M. 
20 See Gelderblom & Kok (1994) for a discussion of this ambiguity of residence in the 
context of ci rcular migration. 
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The extent to which migrants invest in their accommodation in town vary, suggesting lesser or 
greater intentions to live there pennanently. If the migrant lives with hislher spouse in a shack 
(which is their property") in the East Rand for example, one can take this as an attempt to 
consolidate their residence in town. Some (or all) of their children may still live in Nkosini with 
the grandparents, or elsewhere. As long as children remain behind, their parents are supposed to 
contribute to their maintenance, and in this way they continue to be involved in households back 
home. Sometimes both husband and wife will live in Pretoria, but this is no indication that they 
regard their stay there as permanent. E.M.22 and his wife both stay in Pretoria, in the same room 
(it is not clear if this is a suburban domestic's room or if it is a room in a township). Both have 
jobs in Pretoria. Their two children live with the grandparents in Nkosini and the two often come 
home together to visit their children. They are currently (1996) building a house in Nkosini, which 
. indicates that they intend to live there at some stage. In other cases a person will invest in a house 
in Nkosini while living in a hostel in town. The investment in the rural house indicates a preference 
for living there, but then s\he would live in the hostel for many years, calling into question this 
preference. S.S. is 73 years old (see p. 182 above) and has a house in Nkosini (one of the bigger 
ones, in fact). Yet he is still living in a hostel in Marnelodi and has been doing so for around 25 
years. He can go on pension, but keeps doing his job as a cleaner cum gardener in a church in 
Pretoria and continues to live in the hostel. His wife has been dead for many years. All of his 
children, except for one child, have left the house in Nkosini, but his (or his wife's ~ it is not clear 
whose) father lives there still, as well as a granddaughter (the daughter of his dead daughter). S.S. 
visits home on a monthly basis. 
I have not enumerated in table 7.3 those Nkosini residents who moved away from Nkosini to build 
their house in one of the settlements in the vicinity. Many young people have left Nkosini for 
places such as Monsterlus or Mandela, just up the road from Nkosini, because these places are 
considered to be more progressive. Nkosini residents are very conservative, and, unlike other 
settlements in the vicinity, do not make demands to be provided with electricity, for example 
(interviews with W.S. and A.M.). Another, probably more important, factor is the availability of 
21 It is not unusual for people to live in shacks that are rented (or borrowed from 
friends) ~ interview with J.M. They are less likely to do so as couples, however. 
22 Interview with J.M. 
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open stands in Mandela. 
Table 7.3 demonstrates that current migrants from Nkosini , like their predecessors mentioned in 
the previous section. still prefer Pretoria as their major migration destination. Pretoria is fol lowed 
in popularity by the East Rand and Johannesburg. Distance seems to play a ro le in this hierarchy. 
with Pretoria being the closest metropolitan destination. followed by the East Rand and then 
Johannesburg. The popularity ofPrelOria may also be the result of the networks fonned as a result 
of recruit ing to the Premier mine near Bronkhorstspruit outside Pretoria in the beginning of the 
century. Even though the original members of these networks have long since died, it is not 
inconceivable that a channel ling effect between Nkosini and Pretoria can continue to operate years 
later as result of a growing density of network connections between these two places. Only 7 
Nkosini residents moved to Witbank or Middelburg, which is surprising, given that these two 
towns are the closest major urban centres to Nkosini. Those Nkosini residents who have moved 
to Witbank or Middelburg often have a house in Nkosini as well , and commutes back and forth 
every weekend. 
The channelling effect of network connections is visible as well with regard to migration to the 
"Moot" area of Pretoria. Van Vuuren (1992: 15, fn . 76) relates that Ndbele women have managed 
to gain an ethnic monopoly on domest ic work in this area2J, and that they are quite willing to 
defend this by assaulting others who trespass on their turf. Under such circumstances, new Ndbele 
migrants are more likely to find employment here as domestics, and they are more likely to come 
here because of the concentration of people who can help them. This may apply to gardening jobs 
for men as well. I did not probe this issue specifically in my interviews, but it is significant that in 
the four cases where this kind ofinformation was volunteered, areas in the Moot were mentioned 
Two respondents referred to working in Parktown, Pretoria (one as a domestic and one as a 
gardener), and one worked in Riviera. Another respondent's mother worked in Vi llieria, while his 
sister worked in East Lynne. He found gardening work in Waverley (interview with G.M.). All 
of these are suburbs in the 'Moot'. 
13 l ames (199 t : 12) g ives another example of how women from the MaJebogo district 
near Bochum managed to establ ish a monopoly over domestic work during the early 1970s in 
Braamfontein and Vrededorp in Johannesburg. 
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7.6.2 GENDER SELECTIVITY OF MIGRATION FROM NKOSINI 
The distribution of men and women between the migrant and non-migrant categories is depicted 
in table 7.4. This table represents all the adult men and women who lived in Nkosini at some stage 
in their lives and that could be traced. Only those who are currently away were enumerated as 
migrants (in other words those who are now living in Nkosini but who migrated at some stage in 
the past were regarded as non-migrants). 
Table 7.4 
Gender selectivity of migration from Nkosini (current migrants) 
Female Male 
Non-migrants 33 40% Non-migrants 20 23% 
Migrants 49 60% Migrants 66 77% 
Total 82 100% Total 86 100% 
n=168 
This table makes clear that, although the majority (60%) of women do migrate, they are still less 
likely to do so than men. Seventy seven (77) per cent ofthe latter were migrants. We have already 
mentioned the patriarchal attitudes of migrant men, who believed that their wives should stay 
behind to look after their rural homestead and their family members, as a factor in explaining the 
lower participation ofNkosini women in migration (see Sharp & Spiegell990, Bozzoli 1991 , and 
James 1991:8). 
Their lower participation can also be explained with reference to differences in the operation of 
male and female migrant networks. In an interesting paper. lames (1991) points to the 
discontinuities experienced by women from the Northern Province in the operation of their 
networks. She primarily has urban-based social support networks in mind, but her argument also 
applies to migrant networks. According to James (1991:6-11), age based groupings of women 
who have been initiated together in the rural areas form, as with men, the basis of networks of 
205 
mutual support. Unlike men's networks, however, the solidarity offemale networks is undennined 
by the patrilocal settlement pattern upon marriage. Women who marry leave their rural area of 
origin and settle with the husband's family in stead . As a result married women tend to lose 
contact with their friends from their age group. At their new homes they can developrelationships 
with women who are neighbours or relatives of their husbands, so there is the possibility of 
establishing new networks, but it is clear that they are generally at a disadvantage relative to men 
when it comes to the fonnation of networks (lames 1991 :6). If they do want to migrate, they are 
dependent on the support of these new networks, or of their husband's family. The support of the 
latter group, given the attitude of many men that the city is an inappropriate place for a married 
women to live in, is in many cases unlikely to be forthcoming. In cases where they do migrate, it 
is often because their husbands wanted their wives to join them in town. Female networks in the 
city are also broken up by the fact that women tend to go back to the rural areas to have babies. 
Unmarried women also lose out as a result of this settlement pattern, because they must forfeit 
the support that those who have left to marry could have provided to them. Another problem they 
face, according to lames (1991: 11). is that their place at their natal home is increasingly replaced 
by their married sisters-in-law as time goes on. As a result, the support offered by their own famil y 
networks (consisting primarily of fathers and brothers), also tend to wane as their s isters- in-law 
become established at home. There is consequently a danger that they may become isolated from 
support networks. Especially vulnerable , according to lames (1991: 19), are those women, and to 
a lesser extent men, who originated in communities that were subject to removals in the recent 
past (see De Wet [1995: 13] for a discussion of the impact of resettlement on networks). In these 
communities, networks had less time to become established compared to more stable 
communities, which compounded the instability already faced by female network s. 
It follows from this that women who divorce their husbands, and do not return to their own 
parents' households, but keep on living in the same village, a re also very vulnerable. If her 
husband's family refuse to have anything to do with her, she is likely to be isolated from the 
supp0rloffered by thi s la mily (James 1985 : 178-179). Given that she will not have anybody to help 
her with childcare if she has small children, she may find it difficult to leave her home to look for 
work. But even if she returns to her parents' househo ld, she still has to compete with her sisters-in-
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law, as we saw above. It is for these reasons that small female headed households, headed by 
younger women whose children are too small to contribute to household income, are more likely 
to be threatened by destitution (James 1985:178, Delius 1996:153). 
The following example of a female headed household demonstrates the danger of becoming 
isolated from people who have access to a wage income24, 
It is headed by two sisters, G.M. and S.M. who are respectively 26 and 23 years old. Both 
are still at school, and in this respect they (although a bit old) approximate the 
phenomenon of the youth headed household seen more commonly in South Africa today 
as a result of, inter alia, the AIDS epidemic. The house they live in is very dilapidated (at 
that stage it probably looked worst of all the houses in Nkosini). I interviewed both, and 
they provided somewhat conflicting accounts of why their parents do not support them 
any more, but as far as I can figure out, the situation is as follows. Their parents divorced 
some time ago. The father had an accident, and was disabled as a result . He now lives with 
his parents in another settlement in the vicinity. The mother hasn't come home for two 
years, and has stopped supporting them. She works as a domestic in Pretoria and 
seemingly has another boyfriend. G.M. has three children who live with her. It is unclear 
whether it is with the same man or not, but he (or they) dotes) not seem to support her. 
S.M. has two children, whose father is still at school. Both had their schooling disrupted 
as a result of the pregnancies, and this contributed to them still being at school at such a 
late stage in their lives. They have a sister (L.M.) and a brother (M.M.). M.M. does 
building work in Johannesburg, while L.M. works as a domestic in Johannesburg. L.M. 
has a child who lives in the house. Altogether six children live in that house. L.M. sends 
money intermittently to help support her child. The two also feed their grandmother from 
time to time who lives close by, and they might receive some money for this . Besides this, 
the household does not seem to have any visible source of support. 
This female headed household is, except for the links to the other sister and the grandmother, 
isolated from immediate family networks. It is an extended and rather big household, contrary to 
the picture presented above by James, but it is similar to that example in that it does not have 
significant access to an external wage income. The need to look after small children (and the fact 
that they are still at school) also seems to make it more difficult for G.M. and S.M. to look for 
work. 
7.6.3 INCOME SELECTIVITY OF MIGRATION FROM NKOSINI 
24 Interview with S.M. 
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I have pointed out above that Massey et al view the deve lopment of selectivity as a process of 
diffusion. It starts with the better-off people in a rural community and then spreads through the 
socio·economic hierarchy. At the end of this process, one can expect the income selectivity of 
migration to have been much reduced. My criticism of this view was that it would not be reduced 
to the same extent for the poorest, because they do not have access to migrant networks. One can 
therefore expect that even in the mature phase of the development of selectivity , there would still 
be households who have never produced migrants. As a result, the diffusion process would remain 
incomplete. 
In my review of migration in the early phases of the Nkosini community, I have stated that, as far 
as I can see, all households had access to migration by the time that they came to live in Nkosini. 
This statement has to be qualified, as I also sa id above, by the fact that the dynamics of households 
in black rural areas may make those households who did not have such access invisib,te to the 
current observer, as well as the observation that self-selection probably tied the move to Nkosini 
to pre-existing migrant labour. Nevertheless, it does seem that the diffusion of the migration 
iJUlovation, as far as income levels are concerned, was indeed completed for those who had moved 
to Nkosini (as we saw above, significant gender selectivity remained). Migration had percolated 
down into all sodo-economic groups by that time, unlike what one would expect from my version 
of the development of selectivity. 
In updating the unfolding of migration from Nkosini to the present time, the question arises what 
happens to access to migration after Massey et ai's two stages have been completed. Does the 
phase of mass migration continue indefinitely, or can there be reverses? In the rest of this chapter 
I shall argue that there are forces that can reverse this diffusion process. 
I base my argument on what I perceive to be an increasing disjunctllre between the demands 
placed on migrant networks on the one hand and their capacity to satis fy these demands on the 
other. Demands are increasing at the same time as the bonds cementing these networks are 
becoming eroded. The reader wi ll recall that in chapter 41 said that the contribution of networks 
ri ses and falls in line with trends in the costs of migration. If the costs of migration are rising, the 
role of networks in reducing these costs becomes more prominent. Over the years, some of the 
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costs of migration from South African rural areas have declined. I am thinking in particular of 
transport costs (measured in both time and money) and the psychological costs, which have 
decreased due to improved transport and communication links, as well as the spread of attitudes 
(and knowledge) appropriate to an urban cultural environment. One important cost that has 
increased, however. is the subsistence cost while looking for work. 
Under circumstances of generalised unemployment, the time taken by a new migrant to find work 
increases. Due to a surfeit of demand for jobs over the supply of them, access to them is rationed. 
Besides an increase in the time it typically takes to find the job, it is quite possible that after a few 
months of trying, the new migrant may have to leave town and return to hislher place of origin 
without having achieved success and without being able to reciprocate at a later date to the 
network members who helped himlher. N.M. is an example of this. 
Soon after she received her matric results at the end of 1995 (she upgraded her matric 
after first marriculating in 1994), she left for Pretoria to look for work. She went there 
with her sister who had a job as a live·in domestic in a white suburb. She slept in her 
sister's room except when her sister's boyfriend came to visit (then she had to sleep in the 
small kitchen of the domestic's quarters). She started off looking for work in an old age 
home (where a relative worked), then she rried a textile factory, a Checkers shop and a 
shoe factory (they wanted to know if she did maths at school, which of course she didn't). 
These attempts continued until September 1996, but she never found anything. She then 
came back to Nkosini. Since her return she has fallen pregnant, which will keep her from 
trying to look for work for a year or so. This will be her second child. The first child 
stayed with N.M.'s mother while she was looking for work. 
Family members in town have to accommodate the work seeker and often help with training costs. 
1.M. for example", attended courses at the ' Africa School of Skills' in Johannesburg for training 
to become a petrol attendant. These courses were paid for by his brother in whose shack he was 
staying at the time. The importance cffamily connections to get jobs or to get infonnation about 
jobs increase as well , given the scarcity of jobs. It is most likely that the increase in these costs 
outweigh the decline in transport and other costs (especially in the light of the fact that recruiting 
subsidised some of these costs initially) and that, in consequence, a higher subsidy is demanded 
from networks to facilitate migration. 
At the same time that more demands are placed on family networks, ~he ability of networks to 
" Interview with J.M. 
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satisfy these demands seems to decrease. This is particularly true of fam ily networks. l ames 
(1 987:76-78,95-98, 103-104, also see Delius 1996: 152) describes the changes that have occurred 
in fami ly life in Morotse in particular and rural South Africa in general. These changes revolve 
aro und the fac t that the class ical homestead, or lineage segment, of the precolonial period, which 
consisted of a number of related (along the male line) men and their wives and children and who 
lived together in a cluster of houses, has broken up. The different households that made it up have 
become isolated as a result. This had a negative impact on the relations of mutual help that 
previously existed within the homestead. The fo undat ions of the cooperative relationships that 
have been essential in getting work done in agriculture, and elsewhere, have consequently been 
eroded. lames describes how the work party, which earlier consisted of a number of relatives that 
helped each other to build a house or to cultivate the land has changed into a disguised fom1 of 
wage labour . Even though the rhetoric of mutual help is sti ll used to describe these relationships, 
it is difficult, especially fo r those households who are less estab lished in the community , to get 
anybody outside of their immediate family circle to help them if they cannot pay them in some 
form or another. As a result, people who do not have access to pension money or remittances 
from migrant labour struggle to get their fields ploughed. 
It is evident that this type of network setup is unlikely to satisfy Sahlins's condition of generalised 
reciprocity (see chapter 4 above), with the result that they tend to exclude those who are too poor 
to reciprocate. Consequently they will not be available to facilitate the latter's migrat ion, with the 
implications for the selecti vity of migration that were spelled out in detail in chapter 4. Thi s 
situation contrasts with the description given in section 7.5.2 of the networks of Nkosini residents 
when they had just settled there, in the sense that networks are now not as support ive of the 
migration of the poorest as they were, in all probability , at that stage. 
The dec line of mutual help also had an impact on the fortunes ofthe different kinds of households 
(James 1987:97): 
For the slightly larger ho useho lds, with absent migrants, thi s means the concentration of 
these migrants' incomes exclus ively within their househo lds; for the smaller household, 
often female-headed and lacking a migrant' s wage, it means the concentration within the 
unit of unremitting poverty. Here, then, the isolation and shrinking of the household is 
associated with an economic differentiation between households. 
James (1987:97-98), following Murray (198 1), emphas ises that thi s change cannot simply be 
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described as a change from an extended to a nuclear family. Only some of the households in her 
sample can be described as nuclear. There is in fact a large variety of household types, with some 
households continuing to be extended (albeit in a restructured form, being much smaller than the 
classical homestead). 
From lames's quote it is clear that economic differentiation was made possible by the decline in 
the intensity of mutual help between households. Economic differentiation also has a reciprocal 
influence on mutual help, however. As some households become more prosperous, they feel less 
inclined to help those who are less fortunate. This is, inter alia, probably because they regard it as 
unlikely that they will ever need the help of the latter households in return (see my discussion of 
this phenomenon in chapter 4 above). I probed the issue in my interviews and this perception was 
often confirmed. As one of my respondents put it (referring to those living in the tiled roof 
houses): 'Daardie mense is diep in die skuld' (Those people are highly indebted). It seems that 
those who are less well off think. that their richer relatives have too many commitments in terms 
of hire purchase agreements, etc. to help them. This confirms the comments to this effect by Sharp 
and Spiegel (1990), quoted in chapter 4 above. 
These observations do not imply that relatives have ceased to be a source of support for would 
be migrants. I have come across many cases where migrants used the homes of their relatives as 
a base from which to look for work. It does suggest, however, that the support offered by family 
members is not unconditional and that a time will come when one's family will make one 
understand that one has perhaps overstayed one's welcome. The contradictory position in which 
potential migrants find themselves therefore is that while their need for social capital increases, 
due to high unemployment, that capital seems to be depreciating. Under such circumstances those 
with numerous and close family members, preferably in different towns, are in a more 
advantageous position. 
It is perhaps as a result of the devaluation of family networks that alternative sources of support 
has come to the fore. One ofthese is the Zionist churches (Delius 1996: 166). James (1991) refers 
to another one: music and dance groups for men and women respectively called dinaka and kosa. 
Despite the rise of alternative networks, family members are still preferred to friends as sources 
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of support because it is reckoned that the support o ffamily members is still less unconditional than 
that of friends (interview with M.S.) 
There are also practical problems that may limit the help that family members and fr iends can 
offer. Numerous informants to ld me that because of reasons of pri vacy it is unacceptable to stay 
with a fami ly member and hislher gi rlfriend/boyfriend if they only have a one-roomed shack. In 
a shack settlement this might not be a major obstacle, as an extra room can always be added. Most 
backyard shacks are however not the property of the people living in them and in those cases it 
would not be poss ible to extend . Employer housing often present similar problems to a 
prospective migrant. 
Those who are most vulnerable to the erosion of networks are the poorest. This is because they 
are the most dependent on networks to subsidise the costs of migration and because they are the 
most likely to be excluded from them. In saying that the poorest are the most likely to be excluded 
from networks one runs the ri sk, in a context where the largest part of household income is 
derived from migrant labour remittances, of circularity. Such a circular argument has two legs. 
The first claims that households are poor because their members don't have access to migrant 
labour. By definition then, the poor do not have access to urban based family members who can 
facilitate their migration, which is the second leg. The statement that the migration of the poorest 
is constrained by their lack of network access would then add no new infonnation . 
One way in which to avoid circularity is to make a clearer distinction between network and 
household and say that the first leg refers to income derived from urban based household members 
and the second to help received from the wider network. The absence of remittance income does 
not therefore imply a s imilar absence of network connections. The fact that household and 
network overlap to some extent is a complicat ing factor. but as long as they do not overlap 
completely one can escape the charge of circularity. In the earlier stages of the diffusion of 
migration when many households st ill have access to a significant non-remittance income (such 
as from farming) , one can use the non-remittance income as an indication of how poor a 
household is. In thi's way one can also escape c ircularity. Because remittances are at present, 
besides pensions, in the majority of cases the mainstay of household income in Nkosini this method 
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of identifYing the poorest is not appropriate at the current stage of development of migration in 
that community, with the result that this option to avoid circularity is not available. 
I do not have infonnation about the income selectivity of migration as such. Measurements of 
household income are notoriously unreliable and would not have been useful in any case, given 
that I need premigration income to test selectivity (see chapter 3 above). My first thoughts of 
using educational level as a proxy for socio·economic status also proved unworkable when I 
discovered that educational level is almost directly associated with age in Nkosini. All of the older 
generation had very low levels of education, and almost all of the under 30's had matric. Because 
educational anairunent varies much more between than within generations. one needs a bigger 
sample that can control for age to make meaningful conclusions. 
Given these difficulties, I concentrated my energies on trying to identify individuals whose 
migration was constrained by a lack of network connections. This would not have yielded 
information about selectivity as such, but it would have helped to test the assumption that lack of 
network access can be a constraint on migration. A couple of respondents" did tell me that they 
couldn't go out to look for work because their family members in town were unable to help 
(another reason that was often given was that they were needed at home to look after children or 
parents), but it wasn't always clear if this was a rationalization for inaction or a real constraint. The 
interview would typically go like this: I would ask them if they couldn't go and stay with family 
member X. and they would say that X lives as a domestic with white people and they would not 
be welcome; probed as to why they can't live with Y, they would say that Y has gone off to live 
in Kwandbele; Z on the other hand, lives in employer accommodation - same story. Nkosini is full 
of young people in their early twenties who hang about in the community and who seem to 
experience an extended adolescence. Delius (1996: 160) describes them as living in social limbo. 
The young men (and increasingly young women as well) realize that they need to find ajob to get 
married, but do. not make any effort to move out to look for work. There may be many reasons 
for this. They may be discouraged in the face of high unemployment that will make their job search 
enterprise very difficult. Or the support provided by their families allows them to survive without 
working, while relaxed social mores make it easier to have sex without getting married. Or they 
26 Interviews with M.S. and N .M. 
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may val idly not have the social capital with which to look fo r work in town. 
It is clear that my research has not exhausted the study of the constraints placed on potential 
migrants by the ir lack of networks connections in town. Further study is needed of this aspect of 
the increasing inequality separating households in the ru ral periphery of South Africa. 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
I started this chapter by saying that I intend both to measure the model of the unfolding of 
selectivi ty aga inst a case study of migrat ion and to use this model to interpret the migration 
patterns uncovered in that study. As far as the first of these two obj ectives is concerned, I 
identified a number of shortcomings ofthe model. It is first ly clear that the characterizat ion of the 
two phases needs to be revised. Mechanisms such as recruitment can lower the costs of migration 
in the firs t phase of migration. leading to a reduced level of selectivity relatively early in the 
development of migrat ion. Another factor that will have an impact on selectivity in both phases 
is immobili ty induced by legal and social restrictions. In this chapter it was made clear that the 
mobility ofNdzundza-Ndbele labour tenants was constrained by their legal status as a trapped 
labour force. This entrapment was by no means total : there were, firstly, legal ways in which they 
could become temporary migrants. The Ndzundza-Ndbele labour tenants were, in the second 
place. by no means powerless to flout these restrictions. Thei r ab ili ty to do so increased over time 
(at least unti l the 1940's), and depended on the outcome ofa st ruggle for autonomy between them 
and their employers. This struggle, in turn , was influenced by a struggle for labour power between 
farmers, mi ners and secondary industry in the early years of the previous century (as well as 
between different fanners) which increased the bargaining power of tenants. It was also influenced 
by the state' s capacity and wi llingness to enforce these restrictions, which fl uctuated over time. 
These constraints on the mobility of labour tenants had the effect that the question whether they 
could or could not migrate did not only depend on their income, but also on the strength of the 
immobilising forces. This reduced the impact of income selec ti vity as such. In this vein I also 
pointed to the fac t that although the gender selectivity of migration was indeed reduced over time. 
it never disappeared altogether. Two reasons came to the fore for this. The fi rst is the impact of 
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legal and cultural restrictions on the mobility of women. Another important factor that needs to 
be considered is James's assertion that women's networks are more difficult to consolidate, given 
the patrilocal nature of black families. This reduced the ability of networks to facilitate female 
migration. 
Despite these shortcomings, the case study presented in this chapter did confirm that the costs of 
migration constitute an important barrier to migration, especially when incomes are low. It proved 
to be the case in the beginning of migration to distant locations, when it, in combination with the 
Ndzundza-Ndbele's position on the farms (first as indentured labourers and then as labour 
tenants), retarded their full participation in labour migration to urban destinations and left them, 
even after they had moved from the farms, at a disadvantage with regard to participation in urban 
labour markets. The networks they built up over time continued to channel them into unskilled 
occupations. It is therefore not surprising that, especially, the older generation ofNkosini residents 
were restricted to lower skill occupations. The cost of migration was also responsible for the initial 
income selectivity of migration, which was reduced as a result of the network subsidy over time. 
The importance of networks in subsidising the costs of migration and reducing the income 
selectivity of migration was very apparent in the second phase in the development of migration 
to urban destinations. it appears that they could do so because network members were initially 
more unconditional in the support they extended to others, with the result that nobody was, in 
principle, isolated from them. In addition J argued that the strength of the network connections 
ofNkosini residents, as deduced from their concentrated settlement pattern before their move to 
Nkosini, played a role in ensuring their almost total participation in migrant labour. 
It was tentatively suggested that the costs of migration may again act as an obstacle to migration 
at present. Consequently, it may sometimes be necessary to distinguish between three instead of 
two stages in the unfolding of migration. Once the migration innovation has diffused through a 
source community, we cannot assume that it will continue to be available for everybody in that 
community. If the first phase is the phase of high selectivity due to high costs, and the second 
supposedly the phase of mass migration, it is quite possible for a third stage to emerge when the 
costs of migration increase and the ability of networks to subsidise those costs decline, as was 
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outl ined in paragraph 7.6.3 above. Massey et al.'s argument is based on an implicit assumption 
that the ability of networks to subsidise migration can only increase over time, and does not give 
enough attention (0 forces that may erode that ability. In addition they do not properly consider 
the way in which the costs of migration can develop independently of the operation of networks 
over time: the cost of subsistence while looking for employment is indeed reduced by the fact that 
one may have fri ends or family in the destination area (as they say), hut this cost is also detennined 
by fac tors such as unemployment, which lengthens the time needed to find work. Consequently 
the increase in costs as a result of the latter can eas ily outweigh the decrease in costs effected by 
the network subsidy. I also argued that participation in the capitalist economy can erode the abi lity 
of network to subsidise migration, with the result that potential migrants in the area of origin can 




8.1 MIGRATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF INEQUALITY 
The aim of this thesis is to develop a theory of the inequality producing effect of migration. This 
effect resides in the tendencies of migration to exclude the poorest and to advantage those who 
participate in it. These tendencies are based on certain typical characteristics of the migratory 
move, which can be summarised in the following four propositions: 
a) The costs of migration can be an obstacle to the migration of poor people; 
b) Networks can reduce the effect of these costs over time, due to their ability to subsidise these 
costs; 
c) This abi lity is restricted by the tendency of networks to exclude the poorest ~ and 
cl) Migration improves the position of the migrant (as I said in footnote I of chapter I , I do not 
consider forced migrations such as slavery or refugee movements in this thesis, as these are not 
cases where migrants are likely to benefit from migration). 
These four propositions can be grouped into two categories: (a), (b) and (c) deal with the extent 
to which the costs of migration are an obstacle of the poorest, while (d) is concerned with the 
extent to which those who move away benefit relative to those who stay behind. If both aspects 
are present, in other words jfthe costs of migration are an obstacle to the poorest, and if migration 
benefits the migrant, migration can lead to inequality. 
That is the theory in a nutshe ll . In the course of this thesis I have identified a number of variables 
that affect the extent to which these four characteristics wil l appear in a particular empirical case. 
The thesis, especially chapters 3 to 5, can be seen as identifying the conditions under which 
migration will lead to inequality in the real world, on the basis of these variables. Here is a li st of 
some of the most important variables, as they have featured in this thesis. 
a) The costs of migration vary over time and space. Some of the costs are related to distance, for 
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example transport costs. The costs of job search, as well as living costs while looking for work 
depend on levels of unemployment. Technological developments tend to reduce distance costs, 
but are implicated in structural unemployment. which increases the costs and the duration of job 
search and with it, the living costs of this period. When labour is scarce, especially in the beginning 
ora migration process, employers' need for labour power can result in extensive recruiting. which 
reduces the costs of migration. The migration constraining effect of the costs of migration depends 
on the level of these costs relative to the income of the people in the area of origin. Ifincomes are 
low, as it was in the case of the Ndzundza-Ndbele (discussed in chapter 7), the costs will be more 
of a constraint, and vice versa. Another factor that surfaced in the case study is the extent to which 
these costs are expressed in money terms, as compared to the extent to whkh the remuneration 
of people is in cash as opposed to in kind. Capitalist modernisation is likely to increase the 
. importance of the money component of these costs, as well as the cash component of wages (with 
the decline of arrangements such as labour tenancy). 
b) Networks subsidise the costs of migration. Their ability to do so varies, depending on a host 
of factors. Here I shall list only some of these. Networks of high density and intensity can be 
expected to facilitate migration more readily. Another variable is network resources. Well-
resoUIced networks, containing many useful contacts, and channelling migrants into expanding 
regions and economic sectors, will provide a higher subsidy. 
c) This subsidy is not necessarily available to the poorest group in the area of origin, who are 
precisely the people who need the network subsidy the most. There are broadly two reasons for 
this. i) Networks firstly have a tendency to either exclude the poorest or to be deserted by those 
who are unlikely to need them again. ii) The networks of the poorest, furthermore, are more 
precarious. i) To begin with the first reason. As a result of contact with the modernising influences 
of the capitalist economy, networks undergo a change from a more unconditional conception of 
mutual help to one that puts more emphasis on the need for reciprocation. The outcome of this 
is that modem networks tend to exclude those who cannot reciprocate, in other words the 
poorest. Whereas networks exclude the strata poorer than the relatively homogenous group who 
belong to the network, the latter are in turn cut off from middle class people, who are unlikely to 
need the assistance dispensed by the network and who see network demands as onerous. ii) The 
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instability created by poverty and disease makes it difficult for the poorest to maintain their 
networks. Because their networks are more vulnerable. the migration facilitating effect of their 
networks is also more doubtful. 
cl) The extent to which migration improves the economic welfare of the migrant depends on a 
number of factors. The amount of control the migrant has over his/her migration in terms of the 
timing of and preparation for the move affects the rewards to be derived from migration. The type 
of destination chosen is also a factor : rural-rural migration tends to be more common among the 
poorest and is typically less rewarding to the migrant. Men tend to gain more from migration than 
women, which suggests that gender is also a factor in determining how rewarding migration is. 
One can evaluate the impact of gender on migration with reference to two dimensions: the impact 
of migration on the income earning capacity of women on the one hand and the effect it has on 
the control a woman has over her own income as well as that of other members of her household 
on the other. There is much empirical variation with regard to these two dimensions. Some of the 
variables that play a role in detennining these outcomes are the marital status of the woman 
(which helps to determine how much control she has over her movements), rural and urban 
income earning opportunities for women, and the impact of migration on female autonomy. 
Despite the variety of outcomes, it seems that in most cases women do gain from migration, 
although perhaps not as much as men. Another factor influencing the extent to which migration 
is advantageous for the migrant is the difference between the leaders (in other words the 
innovators) in a particular migratory move and the followers. The former tends to gain more from 
migration than the latter. The differentiations that result from the migratory moves of the leaders 
versus the moves of the fo llowers, or the movement of the migrants versus the immobility of the 
non-migrants, is lastly ameliorated by the redistribution of the migrant's remittances in the 
community of origin . 
I have now summarised the variables affecting the four characteristics of migration that enter into 
my theory. In the last section I specifically focussed on the factors affect ing the extent to which 
migrants benefit from their moves. This section can be read not only as contributing to an 
assertion that migration may reinforce inequality between migrant and non-migrant, but also as 
an assertion of the differentiation that can result among migrants as a group. If some categories 
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of migrants benefit more than others from migration (for example pull versus push migrants, or 
male versus female migrants) migration can lead to inequality in a different, albeit related, way. 
Pursuing the latter differentiation was a secondary aim of this thesis, besides the main one of 
examining the differentiation that can result between migrants and non-migrants. as I stated in 
chapter 2. 
I had another secondary aim (see p. 2 above). This was to show that the immobility of the poorest 
can worsen rural-urban inequality. I did not discuss this in any detail in the thesis, as it follows 
rather directly from the statement that the immobility of the poorest is to their disadvantage. If 
those who move away to the cities gain, and those who stay behind in the rural areas are relatively 
worse-off, it can contribute a situation of worsening regional inequality. For this to happen the 
. micro-differentiation between migrant and non-migrant must be repeated many times, so that it 
will eventually have an impact on the macro-differentiation between regions. In other words. once 
the population redistribution caused by migration becomes significant in tenns of absolute and 
relative population numbers, migration will also have an impact on regional inequality. 
8.2 MIGRATION AND INEQUALITY: DOES IT MAITER? 
I have until now assumed that the reader will accept that the topic I am pursuing is worthwhile. 
Perhaps the time has now come to make a few final remarks about the wider significance of this 
topic. One implication of this study is the realisation that vertical and horizontal social mobility 
are more intimately connected than commonly recognised. It is common knowledge that vertical 
and horizontal mobility often go together, as in the case ofa person who relocates upon receiving 
a promotion. What I am suggesting here goes beyond this: horizontal mobility has the capacity 
to reproduce, and change, the vertical mobility that accompanies it. From this it follows that class 
structure also has a spatial dimension, embodied at least partly in the geographical mobility of the 
population. 
I think that the thesis also illuminates a hitherto neglected aspect of rural poverty . Poverty is 
certainly a multidimensional phenomenon, consisting, as it does, of many layers of exclusion and 
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many different kinds of entrapment. This study brings to the fore the spatial dimension of this 
entrapment, insofar as it refers to the immobility of the poorest in a peripheral area. The spat ial , 
objective, immobility is accompanied by a subjective dimension, as became clear to me during my 
fieldwork. Certainly part of the phenomenology of rural poverty is a feeling of isolation and 
irrelevance to the wider world, which is reinforced by the reality of physical immobility. 
The argument about the immobility of the poorest is not restricted to the rural poor. It can also 
be applied to a declining industrial area, as I pointed Qut in my first chapter. It can be genera lised 
as a part of the wider argument about the increasing global mobility of capital not being matched 
by the mobility of labour (for an instance of this argument, see Caste lis 1996:232). Although 
capital has since the dawn of the industrial age been more mobile than labour, this contrast has 
grown much more glaring in the last number of years. As a result of the deregulation o f capital 
markets and the growth of infonnation technology, capital now circulates in an instant across the 
g lobe. Increasingly this is speculative , short tenn capital (Hoogvelt 1997) that is not tied to 'bricks 
and mortar' investment in employment creating projects (creating employment only in the 
burgeoning financial sector), with the result that the link between capital flows and employment 
creation has been severed to some extent. The diminishing portion of capital that is invested in 
productive enterprises such as mines and factories, is much more footloose than before. 
This is among other things a result of the strategy of 'flexible accumulation' (Harrison 
1994: 135,209), whereby parts of the work that used to be performed within the boundaries of a 
vertically integrated mega-enterprise are spun off to a network of smaller and larger 
subcontractors I. The footwear manufacturer Nike is often c ited as an example of this. Although 
the network relationship sometimes (especially in the Japanese case, Harrison 1994: 157) contains 
an element of a longer term commitment to the subcontracted suppliers, in genera l it a llows the 
big firms the tlexibility to quit a particular suppl ier at very short notice, stranding many workers 
in the process (unless their company can establish a relationship with a new parent firm) . 
1 Harrison is at pains to dist inguish his vers ion of'flexible accumulation' from the Post-
Fordist, flexible specialisation arguments of writers like Piore and Sabel. He specifically does 
not think that it entails the end of the domination of economic life by large firms - they become 
vertically disintegrated but still tend to dominate. It also does not spell the end of the dominant 
role of Fordist mass production, according to him .. 
221 
"Flexibility' in this context also refers to the lack of commitment of capital to particular regions 
and suppliers. Besides flexible accumulation, there are also other reasons why productive capital 
is more mobile than before, but I shall not discuss this here (see Hoogvelt 1997). In general, it is 
linked to the increasing globalization of production (Castells 1996: I 02). 
In contrast to capital, labour, especially low skill labour, is not globalized to nearly the same 
extent. The obvious reason for this is the restrictions imposed by immigration authorities (which, 
despite the porousness of borders and the withering away of the nation-state supposedly 
accompanying globalization, are as vigilant as ever). Another reason for the immobility oflabour 
over national boundaries is the costs associated with crossing boundaries. Despite my argument 
being formulated primarily in the context of a discussion of internal migration it also applies to 
. international migration. The costs part certainly applies, as is attested to by Massey et al. (1994) 
who used the costs of migration as an important explanatory variable in their discussion of 
international migration. 
The costs of migration imply that labour is, in general, less mobile than would be expected from 
within a neo-classical framework. The restriction imposed by costs do not apply across the board, 
however, as I have argued in this thesis. Many have the wherewithal to overcome the restriction 
imposed by these costs, with the result that one can expect a differentiated immobility oflabour-
those at the bottom of the stratification ladder will have their mobility curtailed much more than 
the rest. The outcome of this is that the struggle of the poor to find employment will be harder, 
not only because of the unemployment and insecurity of employment that characterise the 
globalization of capital, but also because of their lack of mobility to cope with the fluctuating 
fortunes of companies and regions. 
The current, global age is typified by an increasing differentiation in the capacity of individuals, 
spread across classes, nations and regions. to respond to opportunities for advancement and 
threats to survival. It is my hope that this thesis has helped to demonstrate that the spatial 
dimension to these responses, as expressed in differentiated mobility, is a significant part of this 
overall differentiation in life chances. 
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